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Tracekit — Tamper-evident tracing, policy gates and cross-checks for AI agents: see what the agent did, and why. | Kitploit
工具/GitHubGitHub/cygnux-labs/tracekit
AI Security
GitHubcygnux-labs/tracekit

Tracekit

Tamper-evident tracing, policy gates and cross-checks for AI agents: see what the agent did, and why.

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Tracekit: the tamper-evident flight recorder for AI agents

Proof of what your AI agents actually did

Tracekit checks each tool call your agent makes before it runs, and risky calls wait for a person to approve them. Every action is signed into a tamper-evident log by a process the agent can't touch, so you can put agents on real systems and show what they did: your customers and auditors can verify the record themselves, offline.

PyPI Works with 42 agents and frameworks CI MIT licence

8 of 8

tamper attacks caught
480 trials, with a witness (E1)

956 of 956

harmful calls stopped
11 classes, 1 false alarm in 972 (E17)

< 1 ms

added per tool call
0.91 ms at p99, signer round trip (E9)

8 of 8

insider attacks caught
a merge gate on every PR (E8)

Built like Certificate Transparency: signed records in an append-only log that independent witnesses cosign
Open file format · verifiers in Python, TypeScript and Go · MIT · runs on your own machines

Try it · Add it to your agent · What it proves · What's in it · Proof · How it works · Pilot it · Contribute · Docs


Your agent can act. Can you prove what it did?

Agents now run shell commands, edit code, query databases, send email and move money. Sooner or later one of them does something nobody expected, and three questions land on your desk:

  1. What exactly did it do?
  2. Was it allowed to?
  3. Can anyone trust the answer?

Your agent's own logs can answer the first two, roughly. They can't answer the third: the agent, a bug, or anyone with write access can change them, and nothing would show it.

Tracekit sits in the tool-call path, the way a flight recorder sits in a plane:

What Tracekit does
StopChecks every tool call before it runs: allow, deny, or hold it for a person. An approval covers exactly the arguments that were approved, once.
RecordSigns every call, decision and result into a hash chain held by a signer the agent can't reach. A lost event becomes a signed gap, never silence.
ProveExports each run as one .tkb file. Anyone can verify it offline, even in a browser, and see VERIFIED, or FAILED with the record that was changed.

Here is one run, recorded both ways. A support ticket hides an instruction; the agent deletes 43 orders, then rewrites its own log and Tracekit's record so the delete reads as a lookup:

The agent's own log shows two lookups of order 1042 and grep finds no DELETE. Tracekit's record of the same run flags the run_sql call as deleting rows, and verification fails at record 7: hash does not match the event.

A ticket with a hidden instruction makes a support agent delete 43 orders, then edit its own log and Tracekit's record of the delete. grep finds no delete; Tracekit marks the run FAILED because record 7 no longer matches its hash.

The agent's log looks clean. Tracekit's record shows the delete, and the edit fails verification at the exact record that was changed. Watch it with sound (1:47) (real database, signer and viewer; scripted model).

See what your coding agent did last week

No install, no account, nothing wired into your agent, nothing leaves your machine. Point it at your Claude Code sessions and see every call Tracekit would have blocked or held:

uvx --from tracekit-ai tracekit audit --since 7d

Most people find at least one surprise. Add --share to get counts only, which you can post as a field report.

Try it in 5 seconds

uvx --from tracekit-ai tracekit demo --server

No API key; from an empty cache on a Mac it took 5 seconds. A scripted agent lists the files, then tries five risky things a real agent might, and Tracekit decides each one before it runs:

The scripted agent tries toTracekit
list the filesallows it
delete the home folder, hidden in base64holds it for a person, who rejects it: it never runs
run a downloaded script (curl … | sh)denies it
read ~/.aws/credentialsdenies it
send .env to a host a web page namedholds it for a person, who rejects it: it never runs
force-push to maindenies it

Then it verifies the run, and verifies a copy with one record edited:

VERIFIED: 6 tool calls in 17 signed records, none changed, removed or added after signing.
NOT PROOF AGAINST THE AGENT: in this setup the agent can reach the signing key, so it could have rewritten the record.
...
== tamper test: rewrite the downloaded script's deny as allow in a copy, then verify again
TAMPERED at event 8: its content was changed after it was signed.

The package is tracekit-ai; tracekit on PyPI is an unrelated project. Without uv: pip install tracekit-ai then tracekit demo --server.

Who it's for

Tracekit is one product, but people come to it with different problems. Find yours:

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