The independent security agent for AI-written software. Finds issues, investigates whether they are real, and shows you the evidence. Deterministic core, no API key needed, JSON and SARIF output.
The independent security agent for AI-written software. It finds issues, investigates whether they are real, and shows you the evidence.
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Ship Safe runs locally in your repo and works in two layers.
A deterministic engine finds issues across application code, AI agents, MCP configs, prompts, dependencies, CI/CD, secrets, and cloud-adjacent configuration. Fast, repeatable, and benchmarked — this is the sensor layer.
An investigation layer then decides what the findings are worth. It traces the value that reaches a sink, searches the project for controls a rule says are missing, builds attack chains across configuration no single file contains, and — when you ask it to — probes a leaked key against its provider. Every conclusion carries the pass that reached it and the lines it read:
CONFIRMED — traced end to end (10)
NoSQL Injection via $where [high]
app/data/allocations-dao.js:78 NOSQL_INJECTION_WHERE
why: threshold is assigned from the HTTP request and reaches the sink without validation on that path.
decided by: dataflow
1. value reaches NOSQL_INJECTION_WHERE here app/data/allocations-dao.js:78
2. getByUserIdAndThreshold is called here with threshold app/routes/allocations.js:23
3. threshold is assigned here app/routes/allocations.js:20
fix: Replace $where with standard MongoDB operators ($eq, $gt, $regex, etc.)
Real output from ship-safe investigate against OWASP NodeGoat. The tainted value is destructured in a route file and passed into a DAO three directories away.
Start with one command:
npx ship-safe
No signup. No API key required for scanning. Works offline for core checks. AI-backed red-team modes use your configured provider when available.
Use --no-ai to guarantee a fully local scan. Provider-backed classification, deep analysis, and GPT-Red send bounded context directly to your selected provider after best-effort credential masking. See Security & Data Flow for exact boundaries and context limits.
# Interactive REPL: scan, fix, and ask questions in one session
npx ship-safe
# Full audit: secrets + 29 agents + deps + remediation plan
npx ship-safe audit .
# Investigate: confirmed / likely / unresolved / refuted, with the evidence
npx ship-safe investigate .
npx ship-safe investigate . --all # also detail unresolved and refuted
npx ship-safe investigate . --verify # probe leaked keys against their providers
# What can an AI agent working in this repo actually reach?
npx ship-safe capabilities .
# AI agent red-team scenarios for agent-readable content
npx ship-safe red-team . --gpt-red
# Interactive fix agent: plan, diff, approve, verify the path closed
npx ship-safe agent .
npx ship-safe agent . --severity critical # critical findings only
npx ship-safe agent . --branch --pr # fix on a branch + open a PR
# Undo the last fix
npx ship-safe undo
# CI/CD mode — fails on any critical finding
npx ship-safe ci . --sarif results.sarif
npx ship-safe ci . --fail-on high # stricter: critical or high
# Gate on evidence instead of severity: block only what was established
npx ship-safe ci . --fail-on-verdict confirmed
npx ship-safe ci . --ignore-refuted # do not block on what was argued away
For pull requests, compare a trusted base scan with the head scan so existing repository debt remains visible without blocking unrelated changes:
# On the trusted base revision
npx ship-safe ci . --fail-on none --no-deps \
--write-baseline-report /tmp/ship-safe-base.json
# On the pull request head
npx ship-safe ci . --base-report /tmp/ship-safe-base.json --fail-on high
The base artifact contains hashed finding identities, relative paths, and rule metadata. It does not store raw matched secrets. PR results classify findings as introduced, resolved, unchanged, or uncertain; ambiguous matches are shown but do not block the pull request.
ship-safe ci to fail risky builds and upload SARIF into GitHub code scanning.
You can, and you should. It will find real things. But there are three questions it structurally cannot answer about its own work.
Did the agent that wrote this code just mark its own homework? Asking the author whether the author made a mistake is not a review. Ship Safe is a separate reviewer with a separate method, and it disagrees with itself in public — a data-flow trace overturns the heuristic pass, and a live probe overturns both.
Can it see what it can reach? A coding agent reviewing your repo cannot read your MCP server config, cannot enumerate the permissions it was launched with, and is the actor whose reach is in question. ship-safe capabilities reads all of it from outside and reports the combinations that are dangerous together while unremarkable apart:
CRITICAL Repository-controlled instructions reach an unattended write capability
1. CLAUDE.md is read as instructions and can be changed by anyone who lands a commit
CLAUDE.md:1
2. Claude Code runs without per-action approval
.claude/settings.json:2
3. shell execute granted: Bash(git push:*)
.claude/settings.json:3
4. filesystem write granted: Write
.claude/settings.json:3
5. mcp-tool write granted: mcp__github__create_pull_request
.claude/settings.json:3
Impact: Text committed to this repository can direct the agent to write files
or run commands with no human in the loop.
Boundary: Require approval for write and execute tools during sessions on
untrusted branches, or remove the pre-granted entries.
Each of those lines is unremarkable on its own. Together they are a path from a pull request to a privileged write, and no single-file review can see it, because no single file contains it.
Is it consistent, and can you prove it got better? Ask twice, get two answers. Ship Safe's engine is deterministic, and its conclusions are gated in CI by a benchmark that scores conclusion quality, not pattern coverage: how many known-real findings it settles, how much known noise it refutes, and whether it ever refutes something real. That last number's budget is zero — it is the only error class that loses a vulnerability silently. See benchmarks/.
The open-source CLI is the fastest way to scan any repo locally. Upgrade when you need a hosted workflow around the same scanner:
| Need | Use |
|---|---|
| Local scans, audits, and agent-assisted fixes | Free CLI |
| Scan history, cloud dashboard, and PDF reports | Pro |
| Shared workspace, PR Guardian, team reports, and collaboration | Team |
Compare plans at shipsafe.sh/pricing.
Ship Safe Cloud, the hosted dashboard for scan history, PR Guardian, billing, and team workflows, is developed in a private repository because it contains commercial product code and hosted infrastructure workflows. The public ship-safe repo remains focused on the MIT-licensed CLI, security agents, rules, fixtures, CI integrations, and documentation. See Ship Safe Cloud for the repo boundary.
All agents run in parallel. Each skips irrelevant projects automatically.
Investigation passes, in the order their evidence outranks each other:
A claim whose cited file or line does not resolve is recorded but never decides a verdict. Two passes of equal rank that disagree resolve to unresolved rather than to whichever verdict is scarier.
Also: ScoringEngine
$ ship-safe
███████╗██╗ ██╗██╗██████╗ ███████╗ █████╗ ███████╗███████╗
...
v9.4.1 · DeepSeek · ~/my-project
/scan to find issues · /agent to fix them · /help for more
shipsafe ›
Anything not starting with / is sent to the LLM as a free-form question, with your latest scan results as context.
# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Audit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Security gate
run: npx ship-safe ci . --sarif results.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif
A GitLab CI version is in docs/examples/gitlab-security-workflow.yml.
Use the Action from a pull_request workflow when you want critical and high
findings attached to the changed lines. Keep pull_request_target out of this
path for forked contributions: Ship Safe refuses that privileged combination
because the checkout may contain untrusted code.
name: Ship Safe
on:
pull_request:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
security-events: write
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: asamassekou10/[email protected]
with:
fail-on: high
inline: true
Inline comments are opt-in and only post critical/high findings. Re-running the job updates the summary without creating duplicate inline comments.
Works with any provider — auto-detected from environment variables. Use --provider <name> to override.
Anthropic · OpenAI · Google · DeepSeek · Kimi K3 / Moonshot · Groq · Together · Mistral · xAI · Perplexity · Ollama · LM Studio · any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
Kimi defaults to kimi-k3 through MOONSHOT_API_KEY or KIMI_API_KEY. Use --provider kimi --model kimi-k3 for long-context GPT-Red and deep-analysis runs.
For Kimi K3-specific long-context red teaming:
npx ship-safe red-team . --gpt-red --provider kimi --model kimi-k3 --k3-long-context
Ship Safe also checks Kimi K3 / OpenAI-compatible tool-call implementations for dynamic tool loading from prompt context, missing tool allowlists, forced tool calls on untrusted input, and replayed tool results without the original assistant tool-call message.
No API key required for core scanning. AI classification and red-team --gpt-red use your configured provider when available, with deterministic offline fallback for GPT-Red checks.
password = get_password() # ship-safe-ignore
critical findings are always reported. An inline comment cannot hide one, and
an attempt to suppress one is recorded in the scan. The comment is meant for a
human ruling out a false positive, and anything that can write a line of your
source — including an AI agent — can write the comment too, so the highest
severities do not honor it. Every suppression is counted, so a scan that
silenced findings never reads like one that had none.
Ordinary code rules do not grade Markdown prose or fenced code examples as
deployed source. Secrets are still scanned everywhere, and agent-readable
files such as AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md keep their dedicated prompt-injection
and trust-boundary checks. To review fenced examples intentionally, use
--include-doc-examples with scan, audit, or ci.
# .ship-safeignore
tests/fixtures/
docs/
Recall is the easy half of a scanner. A tool that flags everything catches everything and is useless, so we measure the other half: what Ship Safe says about code that is almost certainly fine.
Down from 1031 findings across the same four projects before v9.6.3, verified against NodeGoat and DVWA so the drop is reduced noise rather than lost detection. The 1 remaining critical is a false positive and the benchmark says which and why.
Corpus pinned by commit, reproducible with one command, limits documented: benchmarks/false-positives/
Run Ship Safe alongside them, not instead of them. CodeQL does interprocedural taint analysis Ship Safe does not attempt, Gitleaks is the specialist for secrets, and Trivy has a real CVE database behind it.
Ship Safe covers a narrower question: what an AI coding agent just did to your repository, your CI, and your local tool configuration. MCP client config, agent memory poisoning, hallucinated-package imports and AIBOM are the areas where we found no equivalent public rules in the other four.
Full coverage matrix, verified against their public registries, including where they beat us: docs/comparison.md
[](https://shipsafe.sh)
10.0 is verified Hermes Agent coverage. The baseline is Hermes v0.21.0 at an immutable upstream commit. Existing plugin and adapter checks are partial; terminal posture, ACP/TUI, current cron lifecycle, and credential reachability remain explicit work rather than implied coverage. See the coverage matrix.
See the roadmap for what is planned and what is deliberately not, and the 10.0 milestone for claimable work. Everything in it is open to contributors.
Ship Safe is open source, and the best contributions are small, focused improvements that make AI-assisted development safer.
Good first areas:
Start here:
Ship Safe is MIT-licensed and free forever.
Ship fast. Ship safe. — shipsafe.sh
| Area | Examples |
|---|
| AI and LLM security | Prompt injection, agent hijacking, excessive agency, memory poisoning, RAG poisoning, unsafe tool calls |
| MCP and agent configs | Over-broad tool permissions, poisoned registries, untrusted transports, dangerous allowlists |
| Application security | SQL/NoSQL injection, XSS, SSRF, auth bypass, path traversal, insecure API routes |
| Secrets and compliance | API keys, tokens, credentials, PII, leaked secrets in git history |
| Supply chain | Typosquatting, dependency confusion, risky install scripts, unpinned AI actions |
| CI/CD | Pipeline poisoning, unpinned GitHub Actions, secret logging, unsafe workflow triggers |
| Agent | Category | What It Detects |
|---|
| InjectionTester | Code Vulns | SQL/NoSQL injection, command injection, XSS, path traversal, XXE, ReDoS, prototype pollution |
| AuthBypassAgent | Auth | JWT flaws (alg:none, weak secrets), CSRF, OAuth misconfig, BOLA/IDOR, TLS bypass |
| SSRFProber | SSRF | User input in fetch/axios, cloud metadata endpoints, internal IPs |
| SupplyChainAudit | Supply Chain | Typosquatting, wildcard versions, suspicious install scripts, dependency confusion |
| ConfigAuditor | Config | Docker (root user, :latest), Terraform, Kubernetes, CORS, CSP, Firebase, Nginx |
| SupabaseRLSAgent | Auth | service_role key in client code, tables without RLS, anon key inserts |
| LLMRedTeam | AI/LLM | OWASP LLM Top 10: prompt injection, excessive agency, system prompt leakage |
| MCPSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | MCP server misuse, tool poisoning, typosquatting, unvalidated inputs |
| AgenticSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | OWASP Agentic AI Top 10: agent hijacking, privilege escalation, Kimi K3/OpenAI-compatible tool-call misuse |
| RAGSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | Context injection, document poisoning, vector DB access control |
| MemoryPoisoningAgent | AI/LLM | Instruction injection in agent memory files, hidden Unicode payloads (ASI-01, ASI-05) |
| PIIComplianceAgent | Compliance | SSNs, credit cards, emails, phone numbers in source code |
| VibeCodingAgent | Code Vulns | AI-generated code anti-patterns: no validation, empty catches, TODO-auth |
| ExceptionHandlerAgent | Code Vulns | Empty catches, unhandled rejections, leaked stack traces (OWASP A10:2025) |
| AgentConfigScanner | AI/LLM | Prompt injection in .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, malicious Claude Code hooks |
| MobileScanner | Mobile | OWASP Mobile Top 10 2024: insecure storage, WebView injection, debug mode |
| GitHistoryScanner | Secrets | Leaked secrets in git commit history |
| CICDScanner | CI/CD | Pipeline poisoning, unpinned actions, secret logging (OWASP CI/CD Top 10) |
| APIFuzzer | API | Routes without auth, mass assignment, GraphQL introspection, debug endpoints |
| ManagedAgentScanner | AI/LLM | Claude Managed Agent misconfigs: always_allow policies, unrestricted networking (ASI-03–ASI-07) |
| HermesSecurityAgent | AI/LLM | Tool registry poisoning, function-call injection, skill permission drift (ASI-01–ASI-10) |
| AgentAttestationAgent | Supply Chain | Unpinned agent versions, missing integrity hashes, unsigned manifests (ASI-10, SLSA L0) |
| AgenticSupplyChainAgent | Supply Chain | Over-privileged AI CI actions, OAuth scope creep, unsigned AI webhook receivers (ASI-02, ASI-06) |
| RobloxSecurityAgent | Supply Chain | Malicious Roblox/Luau Toolbox assets (runtime asset injection, rbxassetid:// loaders, HttpEnabled, payloads hidden in instance attributes) |
| ModelScanAgent | Supply Chain | Code-execution payloads in ML model weights (pickle opcodes in .pt/.pkl/.ckpt), torch.load without weights_only, scanner-evasion archives (CWE-502, CWE-506) |
| TrustBoundaryAgent | Agentic | GhostApproval symlink attacks (config-named links into ~/.ssh/~/.aws/.env), repo symlinks escaping the tree, and Friendly Fire run-on-review instructions in agent-read docs (CWE-59, CWE-61) |
| SlopSquatAgent | Supply Chain | Hallucinated / phantom package imports (slopsquatting) — bare imports not declared, installed, or builtin, plus known AI-hallucinated names (CWE-1357) |
| ClickFixAgent | Supply Chain | ClickFix / fake-CAPTCHA paste-and-run lures (fake error + Win+R/Ctrl+V/command-bar keystrokes, PowerShell cradles) and fake-installer npm lifecycle scripts (CWE-1357, CWE-506) |
| InstallGuardAgent | Supply Chain | npm worm behaviors in lifecycle scripts (credential harvesting, env exfiltration, destructive rm -rf, obfuscated node -e) and weaponized binding.gyp node-gyp actions (CWE-506, CWE-829) |
| Pass | Rank | What it establishes |
|---|
| VerifierAgent | heuristic | Pattern check around the finding. Never states more than "likely" |
| DeepAnalyzer | analysis | LLM taint reading of the finding and its file, with the citation validated |
| DataflowInvestigator | dataflow | Traces the value back to its origin, across one function boundary and into other files. JavaScript, TypeScript, and Python |
| AbsenceInvestigator | presence | Searches the project, or the handler, for the control a rule says is missing |
| LiteralContextInvestigator | presence | Decides findings about a written-in value by what surrounds it — prose, a help string, or a reserved address |
| CapabilityGraph | chain | Builds attack chains from configuration no single file contains |
| RedosReproducer | reproduction | Runs a flagged pattern against generated input in a worker with a deadline |
| SecretsVerifier | reproduction | Presents a leaked key to its provider. Opt-in: this discloses the key |
| Command | What it does |
|---|
/scan | Re-scan the project |
/agent | Run the interactive fix loop |
/findings | List findings from the last scan |
/show <n> | Full detail on finding n |
/plan <n> | Preview fix plan for finding n (no writes) |
/undo [--all] | Revert the last fix (or all fixes) |
/share | Publish scan report as a public URL (7 days) |
/diff | Show git working-tree diff |
/provider <name> | Switch LLM provider mid-session |
/quit | Exit (also Ctrl-D or Ctrl-C) |
| project | findings | critical | grade |
|---|
| express | 26 | 0 | C |
| requests | 15 | 1 | C |
| flask | 28 | 0 | D |
| chalk | 4 | 0 | B |