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CVE-2026-99999-analysis — CVE-2026-99999 Educational Analysis — attack chain simulation of Linux kernel csum_start bug (CVSS 9.3). See also: CVE-2026-99999-exploit (Working PoC). | Kitploit
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GitHub01luyicheng/cve-2026-99999-analysis

CVE-2026-99999-analysis

CVE-2026-99999 Educational Analysis — attack chain simulation of Linux kernel csum_start bug (CVSS 9.3). See also: CVE-2026-99999-exploit (Working PoC).

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CVE-2026-99999 — Technical Analysis & Attack Chain Study

⚠️ This is the educational/analysis repository. It demonstrates the CVE-2026-99999 attack chain locally (no network, no root, no real exploit).

🔴 Host-side PoC + harness: → CVE-2026-99999-exploit (end-to-end guest→host trigger is not verified).

Linux kernel IPv4 csum_start validation bug — IPv4 header corruption in egress fragmentation

2026-11-06 实测复核(v100, 7.0.0-38-generic):漏洞真实、分片错位可复现; 信息泄露与提权未获证实。详见 ~/cve-2026-99999-verify/report.md。

CVSS 9.3 CRITICAL | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Discovered by Paulos | CNA: kernel.org | Published: 2026-10-15


This is an educational/analytical project. It demonstrates the CVE-2026-99999 attack chain locally (no network, no root, no real exploit). The host-side PoC and harness live in the internal exploit repository; that harness reproduces the IPv4 header corruption, but a guest→host trigger has not been verified end-to-end.

⚠️ For authorised security research in isolated lab environments only.


Table of Contents

  1. Vulnerability Summary
  2. Technical Deep Dive
  3. Attack Chain
  4. IP Header Byte Layout
  5. Why the crafted csum_start is Dangerous
  6. Simulation — Run the Attack Chain Locally
  7. Affected Versions
  8. Mitigation
  9. References
  10. Legal Disclaimer

Vulnerability Summary

A frame injected through TUN/TAP (or virtio-net) carries a virtio_net_hdr whose csum_start is an offset from the start of the frame. The kernel's ingress check (__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()) only requires skb_transport_offset(skb) >= 20, so the value is accepted even when it does not point at the transport header. After VLAN decapsulation the skb->data pointer moves forward but the stored csum_start does not, so the offset is re-interpreted against a different base. In the IPv4 output path, skb_checksum_help() sums from csum_start to the end of the data and writes the 16-bit result back to csum_start + csum_offset — with a two-VLAN frame (csum_start = 22) that write lands on IPv4 byte 0.

The first byte of the checksum becomes the new version/IHL. When it is 0x4F, IHL becomes 15 (60 bytes) and ip_do_fragment() copies a 60-byte header. On the measured geometry (skb_headlen = 28) that reads 32 bytes past the linear region. In our runs those 32 bytes were zero, so no host memory was disclosed — the header-length corruption and the resulting payload misalignment are what we could actually reproduce.

Impact (verified): attacker-chosen IPv4 header length in forwarded fragments, with a 40-byte payload shift and a valid-looking IP header checksum. Not verified: guest-to-host memory disclosure / escape.


Technical Deep Dive

The virtio_net_hdr Structure

struct virtio_net_hdr {           // 10 bytes
    uint8_t  flags;               // VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM = 0x01
    uint8_t  gso_type;            // VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE = 0x00
    uint16_t hdr_len;             // network layer header length
    uint16_t gso_size;            // GSO segment size
    uint16_t csum_start;          // offset to transport header start
    uint16_t csum_offset;         // offset to checksum field within transport header
};

csum_start Values — Measured

csum_start is relative to the frame as handed to the kernel. The ingress guard requires skb_transport_offset >= 20, so anything below 20 never reaches the checksum code.

Settingcsum_startcsum_offsetWrite targetResult
Normal (UDP csum offload)34 (Eth 14 + IP 20)6 (UDP cksum)byte 40 (UDP checksum)✅ Safe
Single Ethernet, real IPv4 start140—❌ -EINVAL at ingress (14 < 20), never reaches the kernel path
Single Ethernet, above the guard200IP byte 6 (Flags/FragOffset)🟡 accepted; measured as corrupted frag_off (40, 5496, …)
Two VLAN tags220IP byte 0 (IHL)🔴 accepted; measured IHL 5→15 on every fragment
Two VLAN tags226IP byte 6 (Flags)🟡 hypothesis only, not verified

How skb_checksum_help() Works

skb_checksum_help(skb, csum_start=22 on a two-VLAN frame):
  1. offset = csum_start - skb_headroom(skb); after both VLAN tags are stripped
     that is 22 - 22 = 0, i.e. the start of the IPv4 header
  2. compute the one's complement sum from that offset to the end of the data
  3. write the 16-bit result to offset + csum_offset (IPv4 bytes 0–1 for offset 0)
  4. if the written first byte is 0x4F → version 4, IHL 15 (60 bytes)
  5. ip_do_fragment() then copies a 60-byte header although skb_headlen is 28
     → 32 bytes read past the linear data (all zero in the measured runs)

Attack Chain

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                           ATTACK CHAIN OVERVIEW                          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

  Guest VM (attacker) / TAP injection
       │
       │  ① build_crafted_packet()
       │     [virtio_net_hdr(csum_start=22, csum_offset=0)]
       │     [Eth header]
       │     [VLAN 1] [VLAN 2]          ← IPv4 starts at frame offset 22
       │     [IPv4 header: 0x45 = IHL 5]
       │     [UDP header]
       │     [payload]
       │
       ▼
  virtio-net / TAP ingress
       │
       │  ② __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()
       │     guard: skb_transport_offset < 20 → -EINVAL
       │     22 passes (14 would be rejected)
       │     csum_start=22 stored in skb->csum_start
       │
       ▼
  Host Linux Kernel — IPv4 egress path (not GSO)
       │
       │  ③ VLAN tags are stripped: skb->data advances 22 bytes
       │     headroom becomes 22 → write offset = 22 - 22 = 0
       │     skb_checksum_help() sums from offset 0 to the end of the data
       │     Writes the 16-bit result to IP bytes 0–1
       │     If the first byte is 0x4F → IHL 5 → 15 (measured)
       │
       │  ④ ip_do_fragment() called with corrupted header
       │     Copies hlen = 60 bytes, but skb_headlen = 28
       │     32 bytes read past the linear data — all zero in our runs
       │     Payload starts at original payload[32] (40-byte shift)
       │
       ▼
  Outbound fragments
       │
       │  ⑤ Each fragment carries a 60-byte header whose IHL is attacker-chosen
       │     and whose IP checksum is recomputed by the fragmenter (looks valid)
       │
       ▼
  Evidence on host egress interface
       │
       │  ⑥ tcpdump / bpftrace
       │     30/30 fragments with ver_ihl = 0x4F
       │     CSUM_HELP target_b0 = 0x45 (the byte about to be overwritten)

IP Header Byte Layout (RFC 791)

OffsetFieldNormal valuecsum_offset=0 corruptscsum_offset=6 corrupts
0Version(4) + IHL(4)0x45✅ overwritten (0x4F in tuned runs)
1TOS0x00
2–3Total Lengthvaries
4–5Identificationvaries
6–7Flags + Fragment Offset0x20..✅ Flags/FragOffset lo
8TTL0x40
9Protocol0x11 (UDP)
10–11Header Checksumcomputed
12–15Source IPvaries
16–19Destination IPvaries
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