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florentineprinzessinzusachsen
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Android SecurityEmbedded Systems SecurityIoT SecurityReverse EngineeringInformation GatheringMalware AnalysisDigital ForensicsMobile SecurityHardware & IoT SecurityIncident ResponseFirmware Analysis
GitHubflorentineprinzessinzusachsen/badbox-h713-projector

badbox-h713-projector

Allwinner H713 Android 프로젝터의 BadBox 악성코드 분석 및 제거 가이드: ADB 접근, 감염 증거, 펌웨어 백업, 드로퍼 제거, 검증.

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Wielo / Atongmu Malware Projector: BadBox Analysis and Cleanup (AT-M269 / H713)

Sep 26, 2026 · @R

A cheap Android projector (Wielo / Atongmu AT-M269, Allwinner H713) ships with a system-level dropper that turns it into a residential proxy node. This doc shows how to get in without opening the case, prove the infection, back up the firmware, remove the malware and verify the result.

1. Device

No-name LCD projector sold under changing brands. The board and firmware are shared across many H713 projectors (HY300 clones and others), so everything here applies more widely.

PropertyValue
Sold asWielo Smart Projector, model AT-M269 (FCC ID 2BAAR-AT-M269D)
ManufacturerShenzhen Atongmu Technology; firmware and apps from OEM "ASHD"
Hardware revisionpersist.sys.cm.hardversion = AT-M269_720P_HP_202410221430
SoCAllwinner H713M (ro.boot.hardware = sun50iw12p1), quad Cortex-A53; board exdroid, platform ares
RAM / storage1 GB DDR @ 576 MHz / 8 GB eMMC (7,818,182,656 bytes)
Wi-Fi / BluetoothAIC8800 (aic8800d80, driver rwnx 6.4.3.0)
KernelLinux 5.4.99, 32-bit (armv7l), built 8 Dec 2025
Real buildh713m_tuna_p3-user 11 RP1A.201005.006 eng.work3.20251208.154308 release-keys, firmware H713M-android11-v1.0, build host ishang-PC
OSAndroid 11 (SDK 30), user build, security patch 2022-02-05
DisguiseReports itself as Google ADT-3 (brand/model/device, manufacturer askey); real model in ro.product.model2 = AT-M269
Partitions / bootVirtual A/B, active slot _b, dynamic partitions (retrofit) in super; AVB 2.0, vbmeta.device_state = locked, verifiedbootstate empty; OEM unlock not allowed; /system 100% full
Securityro.debuggable=1, ro.adb.secure=0, service.adb.root=1, ADB on tcp/5868, SELinux permissive, privapp permissions permissive, AOSP test keys
Region defaultsTimezone Asia/Shanghai, DTV area cn / DTMB
# Read the identity yourself
adb shell getprop ro.product.model     # ADT-3   <- spoofed, to pass Google certification
adb shell getprop ro.product.model2    # AT-M269 <- real model
adb shell getprop ro.board.platform    # ares, H713 platform name
adb shell getprop ro.build.type        # user    <- release build

2. Get in

ADB is listening on the network, on a non-standard port, with no authorisation prompt and root rights.

# 1. Find open ports (projector on an isolated network)
nmap -p- 10.56.215.10
#   5868/tcp open   <- nmap guesses "diameters"; it is actually adbd

# 2. Confirm from the device side (e.g. via Termux on the projector)
getprop service.adb.tcp.port   # 5868
getprop ro.adb.secure          # 0    -> no "allow debugging?" prompt
getprop init.svc.adbd          # running

# 3. Connect from a computer
adb connect 10.56.215.10:5868
adb root
adb shell id                   # uid=0(root)

Turn lamp off while working over ADB

adb shell 'echo adb_keepalive > /sys/power/wake_lock'    # keep CPU/Wi-Fi awake (needs root adbd)
adb shell cat /sys/power/wake_lock                       # adb_keepalive must be listed
adb shell input keyevent KEYCODE_SLEEP                   # display + lamp off, ADB stays connected

# when done
adb shell input keyevent KEYCODE_WAKEUP                  # lamp on
adb shell 'echo adb_keepalive > /sys/power/wake_unlock'  # release the wakelock

/sys/class/backlight/tv > brightness/bl_power have no effect.

3. Infection chain

Two preinstalled system apps run as the system user (UID 1000). One downloads a loader, loader downloads four proxy modules and a second, independent loader.

Firmware (preinstalled, UID 1000)
├─ com.android.sysapp          /system/priv-app/AshdSysApp
│    OTA updater, can replace the whole firmware (update.zip / payload.bin)
│    C2: wjtysj.ishanghd.com/hx_kt.php
│
└─ com.android.umanalytics.yiyou /system/app/AndroidAnalytics_yiyou
     Dropper; Umeng + Baidu tracking
     └─ downloads cache/plugin.jar       (DEX, from *.ishanghd.com)
          ├─ app installer: pulls app lists per device profile, pm install -r
          │    └─ installs Disney+ etc. and com.google.adtest (payload)
          └─ "hs" task loader, C2 api.loritor.cc / api.nizero.cc, every 6 h
               └─ 4 encrypted modules  code_cache/.hs/.file/.rf/*.rf
                    SKN0041 com.ad.proxy   SKN0054 com.szns.sdk
                    SKN0058 com.link.core  SKN0061 ddth2 (VpsSdk)
                    -> all four: residential proxy clients

com.google.adtest (/data/app, installed by yiyou)
     Second loader "com.speed", own C2 (api.logobi.cc, api.pechlo.cc, ...)
     Native plugin loader, may install/delete packages -> backup channel

> strangers' internet traffic routed through your connection, and your device is tracked (serial, MACs, Wi-Fi SSID/BSSID).

4. Proof of factory level infection

a) Proxy-like traffic: one process, many foreign connections

adb shell "netstat -tnp | grep ESTABLISHED"
# tcp6 ... ::ffff:43.116.39.73:188    ESTABLISHED 4795/com.android.umanalytics.yiyou
# tcp6 ... ::ffff:198.44.189.x:9200   ESTABLISHED 4795/com.android.umanalytics.yiyou
# ... ~25 lines, same process, many IPs, odd ports
#  -> an "analytics" app does not hold 25 parallel sessions: this is a proxy node

b) Who installed what

adb shell pm list packages -i | grep -v 'installer=null\|com.android.vending'
# package:com.google.adtest       installer=com.android.umanalytics.yiyou  <- payload
# package:com.disney.disneyplus   installer=com.android.umanalytics.yiyou  <- cover
#  -> a system "analytics" app installing packages = dropper

adb shell dumpsys package com.google.adtest | grep -E 'codePath|firstInstallTime'
#  fake Google name, lives in /data/app, installed silently

c) Payload files in the dropper's data folder

adb shell 'ls -laR /data/data/com.android.umanalytics.yiyou' | grep -E 'plugin.jar|\.rf|files/apps'
# cache/plugin.jar    <- downloaded loader (DEX)
# code_cache/.hs/.file/.rf/-1.dex_assdk_huang_*SKN00xx*.rf    <- 4 encrypted modules
# files/apps/com.google.adtest.apk   <- stored payload for reinstall
# directories are chmod 777

d) System-level setup

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