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Barzakh — Ring -4 to Ring 0: offense-defense firmware research platform. We build the bootkits, then we catch them. Closed-loop. Zero trust in silicon. | Kitploit
ツール/GitHubGitHub/yasindce1998/barzakh
Defensive ToolsEmbedded Systems SecurityVulnerability ScannersReverse EngineeringMalware AnalysisHardware SecurityThreat IntelligencePapers & ResearchFirmware Analysis
GitHubyasindce1998/barzakh

Barzakh

Ring -4 to Ring 0: offense-defense firmware research platform. We build the bootkits, then we catch them. Closed-loop. Zero trust in silicon.

151824日前未レビュー
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Project Barzakh (برزخ)

"Barzakh" (برزخ) — a barrier between two realms; the unseen boundary separating the living world from the world of spirits. Here it stands for the barrier between offense and defense, between vulnerability and detection.

The most comprehensive open-source UEFI firmware security research platform

Firmware threat emulation | Modular detection engine | Closed-loop adversary validation

138 registered built-in detectors — generated registry.

CI Rust EDK II License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent


⚠️ ACADEMIC RESEARCH PROJECT — DEFENSIVE SECURITY ONLY

This platform exists to study firmware threats and build defenses against them. It contains offense emulations with lab safeguards. Use it only in authorized, isolated research environments. This safety guidance does not alter the BSD-2-Clause-Patent license.


📋 What Is Barzakh?

Scan/deployment migration: see HARDENING.md for full JSON scan outcomes, exit codes (0/1/2), mandatory API authentication, approved input roots, validation provenance, and the limits of heuristic findings.

Barzakh is a full-stack firmware security research platform that models real-world bootkit TTPs across every privilege ring — from UEFI DXE drivers (Ring 0) down through SMM, Intel ME, AMD PSP, platform DMA controllers (Ring -3), and CPU microarchitectural threats (Ring -4). It pairs each offense technique with a corresponding detection engine, creating a closed-loop system where every attack is both reproducible and detectable.

Key capabilities:

  • 21 EDK II offense modules spanning x86_64, AArch64/Apple Silicon, and RISC-V architectures
  • 138 specialized detectors with firmware-specific heuristics and structural analysis (spanning UEFI, Intel/AMD, ARM, RISC-V, Android, Apple/iOS, wireless, telecom baseband, and satellite firmware)
  • Cyber range — barzakh-scanner range up boots a real QEMU q35 VM (SMM on, swtpm TPM 2.0, OVMF), deploys payloads through the removable USB boot path, captures guest RAM, and asserts detections end-to-end (see docs/RANGE.md)
  • Threat-intelligence integration — IOC feeds, a YARA-subset rule engine (wildcards, jumps, boolean conditions), MISP event export, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  • Machine-learning analysis — isolation-forest anomaly detection and a logistic-regression malicious/benign classifier, trainable on the adversary corpus
  • Scan history & knowledge base — SQLite-backed scan history with diffing/trends, and a shareable (anonymizable) firmware knowledge base
  • Dashboard & REST API — barzakh-server serves a web dashboard and JSON API (port 8420) with scheduled scans and risk-score trends
  • Continuous monitoring — barzakh-agent watches firmware targets, records history, and forwards findings to SIEMs (Elastic ECS, ArcSight CEF, QRadar LEEF) or webhooks
  • 127 adversary payload generators for automated true-positive validation, plus 5 DMA/NVRAM + Rust-UEFI frontier payloads and the CVE-2026-97631 pxe_icmp_overflow payload (134 total), each with kill-switched dormant variants
  • Full Ring -4 coverage — CPU microcode, speculative execution, thermal/power covert channels, voltage glitching, debug interfaces, rowhammer
  • Hardware lab testing path — documented progression from simulation to real silicon

Reference Adversaries Modeled

ThreatTechniqueBarzakh Coverage
BlackLotus (CVE-2023-24932)Secure Boot bypass via vulnerable shimblacklotus detector + blacklotus_mok payload
LogoFAIL (CVE-2023-40238)Image parser overflow in UEFI firmwarelogofail detector + logofail_image payload
PixieFail (CVE-2023-45229+)Network stack buffer overflows in EDK2pixiefail detector + pixiefail_dhcp payload
CosmicStrandSPI flash DXE persistenceFV integrity + SPI region + persistence detector
LoJaxFirst in-the-wild SPI implantME/SPI detector + flash descriptor analysis
MoonBounceModified core DXE in SPI flashBoot Services hook + firmware volume diffing
MosaicRegressorUEFI persistence frameworkMulti-stage: FV tamper + PE inject + trampoline
Hacking Team (RCS)UEFI rootkit with Option ROMOption ROM detector + PCI expansion analysis
FinSpyUEFI bootloader modificationExitBootServices interception + memory scanning
Bootkitty (2024)First Linux UEFI bootkit, GRUB signature bypasslinux_bootchain detector + bootkitty_grub_patch payload
CVE-2024-7344Signed reloader loads unsigned PE payloadsreloader detector + secureboot_reloader payload
CVE-2023-1017/1018TPM 2.0 reference implementation buffer overflowtpm_command detector + tpm_ref_overflow payload
CVE-2026-97631EDK II UefiPxeBcDxe ICMP error overflow past the 504-byte Mode.IcmpError field during PXE bootpxe_icmp_overflow detector + pxe_icmp_overflow payload (armed + dormant)

🏗️ Architecture

Barzakh Architecture

🧩 Core Components

1. BootkitPkg — Offense Emulation (C11, EDK II)

21 EDK II modules across 3 architectures (x86_64, AArch64, RISC-V) emulating every known firmware persistence technique:

x86_64 Core (13 modules)
ModuleRingTechnique
DxeInject0DXE phase driver injection — LoadImage/StartImage + SetVariable hooks, FV persistence, SPI flash emulator with FVB2/Boot Guard backends, kill-switches
ExitBootHook0ExitBootServices interception + MSR hooking
SpiChipsetEmulator-1Chipset-level SPI interface simulation
SmmPersistence-1SMM handler installation and SMRAM persistence
CapsuleHijack-1UEFI capsule update mechanism abuse
AcpiTableInject-2ACPI table injection for kernel memory access
VirtualAddressMapHook-2EFI Runtime Services hooking
PciOptionRom-2PCI Option ROM implantation
MeSpiManipulation-3Intel ME SPI flash region manipulation
HeciIntercept-3Host-ME communication channel interception
MeDmaAttack-3ME-initiated DMA to host memory
AmtSolChannel-3AMT Serial-over-LAN covert channel
FtpmCommandForge-3AMD fTPM command forgery via PSP mailbox
AArch64 / Apple Silicon (7 modules)
ModuleTechnique
Aarch64DxeInjectARM64 DXE injection with EL-aware payloads
ExceptionVectorHookVBAR_EL1 exception table relocation
El3SecureMonitorEL3 Secure Monitor call interception
TzascManipulationTrustZone Address Space Controller bypass
DeviceTreeInjectDevice Tree Blob modification for persistence
IbootTrustChainApple iBoot chain-of-trust subversion
SepMailboxInterceptApple SEP (Secure Enclave) mailbox interception
RISC-V (1 module)
ModuleTechnique
RiscVDxeInjectM-mode firmware injection on RISC-V platforms
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