Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
उपकरणएक्सप्लॉइटब्लॉग
Log in
जमा करें
उपकरणएक्सप्लॉइटब्लॉग
जमा करें

हैकिंग, पेनटेस्ट और साइबर सुरक्षा उपकरण आपके सुरक्षा शस्त्रागार के लिए!

Kitploit हैकिंग, साइबर सुरक्षा और पेंटेस्टिंग टूल्स की एक निर्देशिका है। कमजोरियों को खोजने, सिस्टम का विश्लेषण करने, परीक्षण को स्वचालित करने और अपनी सुरक्षा को मजबूत करने के लिए नवीनतम प्रोजेक्ट अपडेट खोजें।

फ़ीडसंपर्कगोपनीयता© 2026 Kitploit

टूल निर्देशिका

श्रेणियाँ

सभी श्रेणियाँ देखें
Loading categories
उपकरण/GitHubGitHub/quaerendir/cve-2026-99999-audit
Defensive ToolsPrivilege EscalationContainer SecurityVulnerability AnalysisScripting & AutomationConfiguration AuditingSecurity VirtualizationMisconfigurationIncident Response
GitHubquaerendir/cve-2026-99999-audit

cve-2026-99999-audit

3193 दिन पहलेअभी तक समीक्षित नहीं
साझा करें

Read-only Bash audit script that triages CVE-2026-99999 (PwnEscape) Linux kernel IPv4 checksum OOB write, checking patch status, module reachability, and risk score.

रिपॉजिटरी देखें
अनुरोधित भाषा में सामग्री उपलब्ध नहीं है। अंग्रेज़ी संस्करण दिखाया जा रहा है।

cve-2026-99999-audit

CVE Name CVSS Disclosed Shell License Version CI

Read-only audit script for CVE-2026-99999 (a.k.a. PwnEscape). The bug is in the Linux kernel's IPv4 stack: it trusts the checksum metadata a packet arrives with. An untrusted VM guest can use it to escape to the host, and a local user or container can use it for privilege escalation.

   ___               ___
  | _ \__ __ ___ _  | __|___ __ __ _ _ __  ___
  |  _/\ V  V / ' \ | _|(_-</ _/ _` | '_ \/ -_)
  |_|   \_/\_/|_||_||___/__/\__\__,_| .__/\___|
                                    |_|
     CVE-2026-99999    ipv4 skb_checksum_help() csum_start OOB write

TL;DR

A CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packet carries csum_start/csum_offset taken from a virtio_net_hdr. The packet source controls those values. When the IPv4 stack later completes the checksum in skb_checksum_help(), nothing has checked the offsets against the IPv4 header it has already validated. The checksum write then lands on the network header or past it (CWE-787). Red Hat lists the outcomes as code execution on the host, a crash, or a leak of kernel memory.

The upstream fix has two Fixes: tags, one for each way bad metadata gets in. The script checks both:

EntryIntroduced byWho can reach it
tun/tap (also macvtap, ipvtap) with virtio_net_hdrf43798c27684 "tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr" (2.6.27)Guests of QEMU/KVM, vhost-net, Firecracker, Cloud Hypervisor; any user who owns a persistent tap; CAP_NET_ADMIN via userns
AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDRbfd5f4a3d605 "packet: Add GSO/csum offload support."Anyone with CAP_NET_RAW: unprivileged userns, Docker/Podman containers by default

It is the host kernel that has to be patched. Updating guest kernels does nothing.

CVECVE-2026-99999
ComponentLinux kernel net/ipv4 / skb_checksum_help()
ClassOut-of-bounds write → VM escape / LPE
ReporterPaulos Yibelo (pwn.ai), Vercel Sandbox challenge
Upstream fix6785011f8b16 "ipv4: validate checksum_start before completing checksum", in 7.3-rc7
Stable fixes5.10.272, 5.15.223, 6.1.190, 6.6.159, 6.12.113, 6.18.57, 7.2.11
Red HatImportant, CVSS 8.8 (AV:L/PR:L/S:C); no runtime mitigation. Fixed: RHEL 6 ELS 2.6.32-754.66.1.el6, RHEL 7 ELS 3.10.0-1160.167.2.el7, RHEL 8 4.18.0-553.178.1.el8_10, RHEL 9 5.14.0-687.59.1.el9_8, RHEL 10 6.12.0-211.67.1.el10_2; EUS/AUS streams carry other builds
UbuntuCVSS 9.3 (AV:L/PR:N/S:C); source package linux: 26.10 7.3.0-10.10, 26.04 7.0.0-43.43, 24.04 6.8.0-149.149, 22.04 5.15.0-203.213; 20.04/18.04/16.04 pending, 14.04 gets no fix; flavours and HWE kernels are fixed in their own builds
Debianbookworm fixed in 6.1.190-1 (DLA-4841-1), trixie in 6.12.113-1 (DSA-6568-1), unstable in 7.2.11-1

The stable versions were checked against the kernel.org ChangeLog-* files on 2026-10-17. In each branch, the listed release is the first to carry the fix and the release before it lacks it. Distro states were re-read on 2026-11-16 (Debian security tracker, ubuntu.com/security, Red Hat security data API). The report prints the age of this snapshot and warns once it passes 14 days (matrix_date, matrix_age_days, matrix_stale in JSON; a second NOTE: line with --quiet).

The upstream commit calls itself defence in depth: "a more complete validation at input is forthcoming". A follow-up virtio-net hardening series may get its own CVE.

What this script does

It only triages and changes nothing. It never loads a module, never touches sysctl, and never runs a PoC, so it is safe to run in production.

  • Inventories the running kernel, the distro, and the package of the running kernel.
  • Fix detection from the package itself: it searches the running kernel package's changelog (changelog.Debian.gz or rpm -q --changelog) for the CVE ID or the upstream commit subject. A fix found there always wins. On Ubuntu the kernel changelog is read from linux-modules-$(uname -r); the signed linux-image-* package only carries a signing wrapper. Ubuntu keeps the last 10 uploads there, so for the linux source package a version threshold decides as well.
  • Uses a distro fix matrix (Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL family, Oracle UEK) and the verified upstream stable thresholds for kernels that track upstream (Arch family, Fedora, vanilla).
  • Probes each entry module (tun, macvtap, ipvtap, af_packet) for being:
    • loaded (lsmod)
    • built in (/boot/config-$(uname -r), /proc/config.gz, modules.builtin), or compiled out
    • shipped at all (modules.dep; trusted only when the module tree exists, so a container isn't mistaken for a safe host)
    • blocked by an install <mod> /bin/true|false override, by a blacklist that the kernel's autoload alias honours, or by kernel.modules_disabled=1
  • Looks for hosting signals: /dev/kvm, hypervisor and vhost processes, tun/tap interfaces, user-owned persistent tap devices (no capability needed), container runtimes.
  • Reads the userns/netns gates and the Ubuntu AppArmor userns restriction.
  • Optionally hunts the kernel journal for skb_checksum_help / bad-offload warnings (--since / --until).
  • Produces a risk score from 0 to 100 and a verdict: PATCHED / NOT_APPLICABLE / MITIGATED / VULNERABLE / UNKNOWN.

Verdict rules

  • PATCHED: the changelog lists the fix, the package is at or above a concrete vendor threshold, or the kernel is an upstream-tracking one at or above the stable/mainline fix.

  • VULNERABLE: the kernel is unfixed and at least one entry path is reachable.

  • MITIGATED: the kernel is unfixed, but both paths are closed:

    • Guest path: no tap backend (tun, macvtap, ipvtap) is loaded, built in, or loadable.
    • Local path: no user-owned tap device, no container runtime, and unprivileged userns or netns disabled. Alternatively, no entry module can load at all.

    A module that is already loaded still counts, because a modprobe rule doesn't unload it.

  • UNKNOWN: the vendor has no fixed build yet and the changelog could not be read. Also used inside a container, where the package data describes the image, not the host kernel.

The AppArmor userns restriction lowers the score but is not counted as a block.

Usage

sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh                       # full text report
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --json                # machine-readable JSON, no banner
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --quiet --no-hunt     # one-line verdict for mass scans
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --since 2026-09-01    # widen IoC hunt window
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --since 2026-09-22 --until 2026-10-17  # bounded IoC window
sudo ./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --no-banner           # text report without the ASCII banner
./cve-2026-99999-audit.sh --version                  # print script version and exit

The script also runs without root. It then can't read every changelog or sysfs entry, and gives UNKNOWN more often.

Exit codes

टूल डाउनलोड करें

सबसे लोकप्रिय

सभी देखें →

हमारे समुदाय द्वारा सबसे अधिक उपयोग किए जाने वाले उपकरण खोजें।

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 अंतिम OSINT टूलकिट: जाँच ग्राफ़, विश्वास स्कोरिंग, उपनाम परिवार, मानचित्र, टाइमलाइन और रिपोर्ट। 49 मॉड्यूल, 400+ साइटें, किसी API कुंजी की आवश्यकता नहीं।

    916
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    # घोस्टलॉक वन-टैप निष्पादन ऐप (CVE-2026-43499)

    558
  • 3

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    ब्राउज़र-साइड रेड टीम टूलकिट, जिसमें रेकॉन, पेलोड जनरेशन, क्रेडेंशियल हमलों, क्रिप्टो, एन्कोडिंग और एंगेजमेंट रिपोर्टिंग के लिए 102 ऑफ़लाइन टूल्स हैं।

    370
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    प्लानर/वर्कर एजेंट, एसेट और एक्सप्लोरेशन ग्राफ़, MITM ट्रैफ़िक रिकॉर्डिंग, और भेद्यता पुनःपरीक्षण के साथ LLM मल्टी-एजेंट स्वायत्त पेनेट्रेशन टेस्टिंग प्लेटफ़ॉर्म।

    360
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT प्लेटफ़ॉर्म जो Shadowserver रिपोर्ट्स को MongoDB में इनजेस्ट करता है और उन्हें इंटरैक्टिव मैप्स, विश्लेषण, निष्कर्षों, सलाहों और कार्यकारी डैशबोर्ड के रूप में पुनः प्रस्तुत करता है।

    317
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    AI-मूल साइबरसुरक्षा के लिए कार्रवाई की प्रणाली—जहाँ इरादा नियंत्रित निष्पादन बन जाता है, साक्ष्य परिचालन स्मृति बन जाता है, और हर ऑपरेशन अगले को बेहतर बनाता है।

    289

सभी उपकरण खोजें

हमारे उपकरणों का संग्रह ब्राउज़ करें

सभी उपकरण देखें →