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Misconfiguration-Manager — Misconfiguration Manager is a central knowledge base for all known Microsoft Configuration Manager tradecraft and associated defensive and hardening guidance. | Kitploit
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GitHubsubat0mik/misconfiguration-manager

Misconfiguration-Manager

Misconfiguration Manager is a central knowledge base for all known Microsoft Configuration Manager tradecraft and associated defensive and hardening guidance.

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1.2k11723 days agoReviewed by Kitploit
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Sponsored by SpecterOps Slack @subat0mik on Twitter @_Mayyhem on Twitter @unsigned_sh0rt on Twitter


Misconfiguration Manager

MM-cropped

Remediation Quick Start

  1. Review the list of known and documented Attack Techniques and corresponding to identify issues that may be present in your environment and how to remediate them
Defense Techniques
  • Refer to this introduction to the project
  • Run ConfigManBearPig and visualize the results in BloodHound for free
    • Refer to this walkthrough
  • Alternatively, run MisconfigurationManager.ps1
    • Refer to this walkthrough
  • Implement mitigations for identified misconfigurations
    • Refer to this walkthrough (or this recording (slides))
  • Overview

    This repository serves as a central knowledge base for all known Microsoft Configuration Manager (a.k.a. MCM, ConfigMgr, System Center Configuration Manager, or SCCM) tradecraft and associated defensive and hardening guidance. Our goal is to help demystify SCCM tradecraft and simplify SCCM attack path management for defenders while also educating offensive security professionals on this nebulous attack surface. Designed to go beyond the static nature of whitepapers, this living repository documents known SCCM misconfigurations and their abuses and encourages ongoing contributions from the community to enhance its relevance and utility.

    We've curated this repository to raise awareness of the rapidly evolving SCCM threat landscape, drawing inspiration from the MITRE ATT&CK framework, with a few deviations. We were also strongly influenced by Push Security's SaaS attack techniques matrix as well as Will Schroeder and Lee Chagolla-Christensen's Certified Pre-Owned whitepaper.

    Our approach extends beyond cataloging the tactics of known adversaries to include contributions from the realm of penetration testing, red team operations, and security research. At SpecterOps, we've leveraged many misconfigurations highlighted in this repository in real-world environments, while others represent experimental and exploratory research projects proved out in a lab environment.

    This project also serves as a central point of reference for all of the SCCM attack and defense resources that we're aware of.

    We openly invite you to submit both proven and exploratory SCCM-focused attack techniques and defensive strategies and resources to this project and to provide any feedback and recommendations about the content in this repository.

    For more of an introduction to the project, please reference our blog and conference talks:

    • Misconfiguration Manager: Overlooked and Overprivileged Blog Post
    • Misconfiguration Manager: Overlooked and Overprivileged (SO-CON 2024)
    • Misconfiguration Manager: Overlooked and Overprivileged (TROOPERS24)
    • Misconfiguration Manager: Still Overlooked, Still Overprivileged Blog Post


    How to use this project

    Refer to the SCCM Attack Matrix and SCCM Attack and Defense Matrix below, which map attack techniques to their MITRE ATT&CK framework tactics, as well as to their detection and prevention strategies.

    Offensive security practitioners may also benefit from reviewing the list of known and documented Attack Techniques, which identifies the security context and network access that are required for each technique.

    Defenders and IT administrators may benefit from reviewing the list of known and documented Defense Techniques, which identifies the administrator roles we think are most likely to be involved in the implementation of each item.

    Curious about how a hierarchy can be completely compromised in certain, mostly default conditions? Check out the list of TAKEOVER techniques.

    If you aren't familiar with a term used in a technique's description, refer to the glossary page, which contains definitions for terms commonly used in SCCM.

    If you'd like to test these techniques in a lab environment or learn more about SCCM attack and defense, please refer to the resources page, which contains links to all the SCCM lab and attack/defense resources that we are aware of, many of which inspired and informed the information in this repository.

    We've included a script that will audit many of the misconfigurations included in this repo. For more information about the script and how to use it, please reference our blog post.

    If we've overlooked anything or are missing credits for prior work, please reach out to us or submit a pull request and we'd be happy to make updates.



    SCCM Attack Matrix

    Initial AccessExecutionPersistencePrivilege EscalationDefense EvasionCredential AccessDiscoveryLateral MovementCollectionCommand and ControlExfiltration
    PXE CredentialsApp DeploymentApp DeploymentRelay to Site System (SMB)App DeploymentPXE CredentialsLDAP EnumerationRelay to Site DB (MSSQL)CMPivotCMPivot
    Script DeploymentScript DeploymentRelay Client Push InstallationScript Deployment

    SCCM Attack and Defense Matrix

    The SCCM Attack and Defense Matrix is maintained as a CSV file for full-width viewing and as the authoritative source of truth on mappings.

    Matrix current as of: 2026-02-09

    CRED‑1CRED‑2CRED‑3CRED‑4CRED‑5CRED‑6CRED‑7CRED‑8ELEVATE‑1ELEVATE‑2ELEVATE‑3ELEVATE‑4ELEVATE‑5EXEC‑1EXEC‑2RECON‑1RECON‑2RECON‑3RECON‑4RECON‑5RECON‑6RECON‑7TAKEOVER‑1TAKEOVER‑2TAKEOVER‑3TAKEOVER‑4TAKEOVER‑5TAKEOVER‑6TAKEOVER‑7TAKEOVER‑8TAKEOVER‑9
    CANARY‑1XXXXX
    DETECT‑1XXXXXXXXXXXX
    DETECT‑2X
    DETECT‑3XXX
    DETECT‑4X
    DETECT‑5XXXXXXXX
    DETECT‑6XXX


    Taxonomy Overview

    At the time of release, TAKEOVER-1 through TAKEOVER-9, in our opinion, are ordered in descending order of likelihood based on system defaults and our experiences testing SCCM hierarchies. Further additions will follow sequential order by release date.

    With the exception of TAKEOVER, these techniques are numbered in no particular order. A higher or lower number does not represent our opinion of the item's importance, likelihood, or how it should be prioritized.

    Attack Techniques

    CRED

    Techniques coded with a CRED moniker primarily abuse credential access. CRED techniques are the most common we've seen and often lead to direct hierarchy takeover or domain compromise.

    ELEVATE

    Techniques coded with an ELEVATE moniker can be used for either local or domain privilege escalation. In some cases, these can be chained with other techniques for a hierarchy takeover primitive.

    EXEC

    Techniques coded with an EXEC moniker can be used to execute commands, scripts, code, etc. on a remote target through SCCM's builtin functionality.

    RECON

    Techniques coded with a RECON moniker relate to either performing reconnaissance against SCCM infrastructure or using SCCM to conduct further reconnaissance.

    TAKEOVER

    Techniques coded with a TAKEOVER moniker describe the various steps necessary to compromise an SCCM hierarchy.

    COERCE

    Techniques coded with a COERCE moniker describe the various ways to coerce NTLM authentication from SCCM accounts (systems or users).



    Defense Techniques

    CANARY

    Defensive strategies coded with a CANARY moniker describe deception strategies that could be used to deceive adversaries in tripping a high-fidelity detection.

    DETECT

    Defensive strategies coded with a DETECT moniker describe strategies for detecting offensive techniques. In some cases, multiple DETECT strategies may be required for a stronger detection.

    PREVENT

    Defensive strategies coded with a PREVENT moniker describe configuration changes to mitigate one or more aspects of an offensive technique. In some cases, multiple PREVENT strategies may be needed to fully mitigate an offensive technique.

    NOTE: We strongly recommend proper and thorough testing of any changes before configuring them in a production environment. The authors and contributors of this repository are not responsible for any breaking changes. Use as a guide at your own risk.



    Contributors

    Duane Michael, Chris Thompson, and Garrett Foster are the primary authors of this project, with contributions from:

    • Diego Lomellini
    • Josh Prager
    • Marshall Price
    • Alberto Rodriguez
    • Dylan Bradley
    • Adam Chester

    Please reach out to us on Twitter or join us in the #sccm channel on the BloodHoundGang Slack if you have any questions or are interested in contributing!

    Download Tool
    Policy Request Credentials
    SMB Enumeration
    Relay to Site DB (SMB)
    Relay to AD CSRelay to Site DB (MSSQL)DPAPI CredentialsHTTP EnumerationRelay Between HA
    Relay to LDAPRelay to LDAPLegacy CredentialsCMPivotApp Deployment
    Relay to Site DB (SMB)Site Database CredentialsSMS Provider EnumerationScript Deployment
    Relay to ADCSClient Push Installation AccountSite Server EnumerationRelay to Site System (SMB)
    Relay CAS to ChildDistribution Point LootingLocal File EnumerationRelay Client Push Installation
    Relay to AdminServiceAdminService API CredentialsRelay CAS to Child
    Relay to SMS Provider (SMB)Policy Creds MP RelayRelay to SMS Provider (SMB)
    Relay Between HASQL Linked as DBA
    SQL Linked as DBA
    Relay to Site DB (SMB)
    X
    X
    X
    X
    X
    X
    X
    DETECT‑7XXX
    DETECT‑8XX
    DETECT‑9X
    PREVENT‑1XX
    PREVENT‑2XX
    PREVENT‑3XXXXX
    PREVENT‑4XXX
    PREVENT‑5XX
    PREVENT‑6XXX
    PREVENT‑7X
    PREVENT‑8XX
    PREVENT‑9XXXXX
    PREVENT‑10XXXXXXXX
    PREVENT‑11XXX
    PREVENT‑12XXXXXXX
    PREVENT‑13X
    PREVENT‑14XXX
    PREVENT‑15X
    PREVENT‑16XX
    PREVENT‑17XXXXX
    PREVENT‑18X
    PREVENT‑19XX
    PREVENT‑20XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
    PREVENT‑21XX
    PREVENT‑22X