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CVE-2026-112611 — Research artifact for CVE-2026-112611, a CoreGraphics PDF ShadingType5 out-of-bounds write, with PoC generators and verified write primitives in the privileged CGPDFService. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/skvlent/cve-2026-112611
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GitHubskvlent/cve-2026-112611

CVE-2026-112611

Research artifact for CVE-2026-112611, a CoreGraphics PDF ShadingType5 out-of-bounds write, with PoC generators and verified write primitives in the privileged CGPDFService.

921 day agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-112611

Research artifact (v0.4). Verified PDF write primitives on the vulnerable build; no code execution yet. Reproduction reports, static analysis, and research on the remaining stages are welcome - see CONTRIBUTING.md, ROADMAP.md, and SECURITY.md.

Apple fixed an out-of-bounds write in the CoreGraphics PDF stack in iOS 27.2 / iPadOS 27.2; the fix is credited in the iOS 27.2 security advisory (HT149230) as CVE-2026-112611.

A PDF page can make CoreGraphics write to a memory address chosen by the document.

Tested on iPhone18,1 / iOS 27.0.1 (24A446) (the vulnerable build). The primitive was observed in an ordinary app process, in a fault-guarded harness, and in the privileged QuickLook PDF renderer CGPDFService (CGPDFService.xpc, reachable from QLThumbnailGenerator / qlstart). A public fix-diff analysis of iOS 27.2 attributes the defect to _cg_shading_type5_draw and identifies the 27.2 bounds-check gate; see Credits.

Status

Works - PDF-selected 4-byte zero write. A ShadingType 5 (lattice-form Gouraud) shading whose /Function returns more components than the colour space has overflows the per-vertex record. The draw code later executes:

df0e00b9   str wzr, [x22, #0xc]

with x22 derived from spilled fields, so the PDF chooses the address. The store is a fixed 4-byte zero (value is constrained by the instruction encoding), and it faults on read-only and PROT_NONE pages - which is how the address control is proven (write fault, WnR=1, far equals the chosen address).

Works - attacker-controlled heap spill with per-component values. With VerticesPerRow >= 130 and a large /Function output count, the record buffer is allocated on the heap and the per-vertex evaluation writes attacker-chosen IEEE-754 doubles past the chunk. Each output component is controlled independently (component k lands at a deterministic offset beyond the chunk). This turns the bug into a controlled heap overflow, not just a crash oracle.

Works - arbitrary-target write of a heap pointer in CGPDFService. In the privileged QuickLook PDF service, the spilled values are later reused by ColorSync's CMMMemMgr block allocator: a spilled value becomes the next field of a CMMBase block, and CMMBase::NewInternal performs str x19,[x10] - a store of a fresh CMM block pointer P into the target address X if [X] == 0. Consequences on device:

  • X read-only: SIGBUS/KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE, far = X - proves the store executed at the chosen address;
  • X mapped and writable: the write succeeds and the service survives and keeps serving thumbnail requests (a live arbitrary-target write primitive in a privileged system process);
  • X non-zero: the list walk dereferences X, and the crash report's far reveals the qword stored at X (a read oracle for machine-word checks).

The spill index that becomes the block's next field was mapped exactly (out[1231] = next for the 64 KiB page-rounded chunk layout used here), so a single-field, low-noise document is available (out[1231] = TBI(X), all other outputs 0.0).

Does not work (yet). The primitive writes a fixed zero or a heap pointer, not an arbitrary value. There is no arbitrary read, no data-only read/write primitive, and no control-flow hijack at this point. On arm64e, all indirect calls in the graphics/color code are pointer-authenticated (blraa/blraaz), so turning a data-corruption primitive into execution requires further work (a write-through consumer, a signed-pointer replay path, or a signing oracle). Code execution in CGPDFService remains the goal, not a current result.

What the v0.2 work added (details in the linked analyses and evidence):

  • Deferred subsystems are reachable. Image decoding after the shading adds a measurable latency delta and changes the thumbnail hash; text shaping changes the hash. Negative consumer results therefore reflect missing consumers, not unreached code (analysis/reachability.md).
  • The ICC/ColorSync parser rejected 27k structural mutations without a fault. The historical mAB offset class is rejected; CMYK profiles are not applied through the tested image path. The parser is hardened against this mutation style (analysis/icc-parser.md).
  • A latent write-what-where exists in the CMM block destructor. The list unlink would write a document-chosen qword to a document-chosen address if a corrupted block were destroyed. The block currently lives in a cached transform, so the destructor is not reached; eviction, memory pressure and group-destination attempts were negative (analysis/cmm-block-lifetime.md).
  • A direct indirect-call site and a reproducible PAC-authenticated pointer were observed. A CoreGraphics lazy function-pointer slot is a genuine call target; in the service it holds a PAC-authenticated pointer that was identical across two cold launches. The current primitive cannot write into the occupied slot. This is an observation, not a PAC bypass (analysis/pac-observations.md).

What the v0.3 work added:

  • The write budget is now precisely established. The pointer write is paired with an unconditional 4-byte zero write at Z + 0xcac (the same spilled value selects both), and the whole pair fires once per cold ColorSync transform (evidence/store-coupling.md).
  • The lazy-pointer table is fully authenticated. A static cross-reference of CoreGraphics and ColorSync (~534k instructions) found only two readers of the lazy slots and both use authenticated calls (braaz/blraaz); no plain-blr hijack site exists.
  • Multi-walk escalation is closed. DeviceGray/DeviceRGB conversions bypass ColorSync, so additional walks per process are not achievable; the budget stays at one walk, one pointer write, one zero write, and one read oracle per cold process.
  • The stack-route zero write is not survivable in the service. After a successful store the renderer crashes in a colour-copy phase; the zero write cannot be combined with a later pointer write in one service render.

What the v0.4 work added:

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