
Ephemeral root for Samsung Galaxy devices via CVE-2026-43284 — stability fork of DirtyFrag. Reboot to undo.
Root on a locked bootloader. No custom kernel, no Odin, no data wipe — and gone on reboot.
Quick start · What this fork changes · How it works · Build · Troubleshooting · Credits
GalaxyCrash exploits CVE-2026-43284, a page-cache write in the Android kernel's IPsec ESP path, to load a kernel module and start an SU daemon on a device whose bootloader is still locked and whose kernel is still stock. Nothing is flashed. Nothing survives a reboot.
Actual app on a Galaxy S26 Ultra (SM-S948B), Android 17, September 2026 patch.
KernelSU in LKM mode, all eight markers through dfm6, SELinux back to Enforcing after the run.
[!IMPORTANT] Root is ephemeral by design. The kernel module,
su, and every module you load are gone the moment the device reboots. A reboot is also the recovery path: it always returns the phone to a clean, unrooted state. This is not a persistence tool.
This fork of mitschud/DirtyFrag (renamed GalaxyCrash) is a stability pass, built and verified on real hardware rather than read from source. Two defects were found, fixed, and each proven with a failing test first.
Fixed: modules toggle aborted the runSetting KernelSU Modules → Disabled on a fresh KernelSU install — where
That is the worst possible partial state, and it is the same failure as upstream issue #42. A
missing modules directory now means "nothing to disable" — success, which is what the user asked
for. Real errors ( |
Fixed: a failed run displayed as
|
/proc/modules was rejected as the check| File | Change |
|---|---|
app/src/main/jni/bootstrap.c | disable_modules(): return errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1; |
app/src/main/java/df/root/RootState.java | new — one definition of "rooted", used by both callers |
app/src/main/java/df/root/MainActivity.java | 5 root checks routed through RootState, failedRun set on failure |
app/src/main/java/df/root/BootReceiver.java | root check routed through RootState |
The first attempt at the root check read /proc/modules for the kernelsu entry. It worked from
adb shell and always failed from inside the app, because SELinux hides /proc/modules from
untrusted_app. A check that silently always fails is worse than no check, so it was replaced with
the /dev/df + /dev/dfm6 pair — both created mode 0666, both stat-able from the app's own
domain.
Both fixes were verified with a forced-failure negative test, not just a happy path.
Requirements
libksud.so:
adb if you want to drive it from a PC. Shizuku is not needed.Steps
bootstrap: starting SU daemon; the pill then reads Rooted
and your manager shows the module as live.To undo: reboot. To undo permanently, uninstall the app.
The kernel decrypts AES-CBC ESP packets directly into the page cache of files opened for
splice(). By crafting
IV = AES_ECB_DEC(key, current_content) XOR desired_content
any 16-byte-aligned block of any mapped shared library can be overwritten — without write permission, and without triggering copy-on-write. The file on disk is untouched; only the cached page changes, so it lasts until the page is evicted or the device reboots.