
Proof-of-concept server demonstrating CVE-2026-38903: unauthenticated HTML injection in Alertus Desktop Alert via DSA certificate validation bypass, enabling script execution.
Alertus Desktop Alert v5.4.98.0 for Windows accepts forged alert messages from the network and renders attacker controlled HTML with no user interaction. The client's PKI module never validates the certificate chain, accepting any certificate the response provides. The injected HTML executes in a Trident (IE) WebBrowser control with active scripting enabled, allowing JavaScript execution, protocol handler navigation, and process spawning on the endpoint.
The Alertus Desktop Alert client polls its configured server over HTTP. An attacker who can redirect that DNS resolution serves forged responses signed with an attacker generated DSA key pair.
Root cause: Alertus.PKI.dll validates the DSA signature against whichever certificate the response provides, but never validates that certificate against a trusted root or chain. The attacker generates their own key pair and the client accepts it.
Injection path: When the server response sets FullHtmlMode=false (or omits HtmlTemplate), the client takes the PlainText render path, which concatenates the PlainText field directly into a Trident WebBrowser control via DocumentText with no sanitization.
Consequence: The attacker's HTML renders with active scripting in a WebBrowser control that has no IE Feature Control hardening. JavaScript executes, `` navigates Windows protocol handlers, and registered executables spawn as children of the Alertus client process.
Note: Beyond what this PoC demonstrates, the following were confirmed in a controlled environment: server-side C2 loop with per-client targeted payload delivery via XMLHTTP from an attacker-origin iframe, real-time keystroke capture with exfiltration to the attacker server, clipboard content theft without user prompt, and internal network port scanning via timing side-channel.
DNS redirect -> forged poll response (attacker-signed DSA)
-> PlainText HTML injection (bypasses HtmlTemplate signature requirement)
-> Trident renders attacker HTML with active scripting
-> JavaScript execution + protocol handler navigation
-> user-level process spawn
microsoft-edge:, ms-settings:, ms-screenclip: handlers fire from injected HTML, spawning their registered executablesThe poc/ directory contains a Python server that demonstrates the certificate bypass and HTML injection.
pip install -r poc/requirements.txt
python3 poc/poc-server.py --callback YOUR_IP --payload alert
Payloads:
alert: injects a styled fullscreen notification into the Alertus popup (visual demonstration)edge: spawns Microsoft Edge to an attacker controlled URL via microsoft-edge: protocol handlerPoint the client's DNS at your server and wait for it to poll. The server handles registration, version check, OCSP, and CRL responses automatically.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-03-28 | Vulnerability discovered |
| 2026-03-29 | Vendor notified via email |
| 2026-06-11 | CVE-2026-38903 reserved by MITRE |
| 2026-06-27 | 90-day coordinated disclosure window expired with no vendor response |
| 2026-10-26 | Public disclosure |