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Salat-Stealer-Telegram-Proxy-Decoy-C2-Analysis — "Reverse engineering analysis of Salat Stealer, a Go-based info-stealer that uses a Telegram proxy decoy, C2 communication, and encrypted memory blocks. Includes C2 domains, Go build ID, and obfuscated payload extraction." | Kitploit
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GitHubkaandemir993/salat-stealer-telegram-proxy-decoy-c2-analysis

Salat-Stealer-Telegram-Proxy-Decoy-C2-Analysis

"Reverse engineering analysis of Salat Stealer, a Go-based info-stealer that uses a Telegram proxy decoy, C2 communication, and encrypted memory blocks. Includes C2 domains, Go build ID, and obfuscated payload extraction."

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51603 months agoNot yet reviewed

1. Telegram Proxy Decoy – Camouflage & Evasion

When executed, Salat Stealer displays a fully functional Telegram Proxy interface. This decoy serves as a camouflage to trick the user into thinking they are running a legitimate proxy application, while the malware executes its malicious operations in the background.

Key Observations:

  • Interface: The window mimics a legitimate Telegram Proxy client (proxy.telegram.org).
  • Port: Uses port 443 (standard HTTPS port) to blend in with normal traffic.
  • Protocol: MTProto 2.0 (Telegram's protocol) is displayed to appear authentic.
  • Behavior: Clicking "Connect" establishes a connection, but the malware's payload is already active in the background.

Why This Matters:

  • Camouflage: The user is less likely to suspect a harmless proxy app.
  • Evasion: Security tools may overlook the process as legitimate Telegram traffic.
  • Persistence: The malware can continue running even if the user closes the window.

Visual Reference:

Salat Stealer Telegram Proxy Decoy The fake Telegram Proxy interface used by Salat Stealer to disguise its malicious activity.

2. Strings Analysis – C2 Addresses & Go Build ID

One of the most critical findings in this analysis is the presence of plaintext C2 addresses and a Go Build ID in the binary's strings section. This oversight reveals the malware's infrastructure and helps track its origins.

Key Observations:

  • C2 Addresses:
    • j.sni.global.fastly.net – Likely a CDN-based C2 server.
    • ton.access.orbs.network – Possibly related to TON or Orbs Network, used for crypto wallet theft.
  • Go Build ID: soaSZ3gtdf5oZjHHPnzB/... – This unique identifier can be used to track the malware's build environment.

Why This Matters:

  • C2 Communication: These addresses are used for data exfiltration and command delivery.
  • Tracking: The Go Build ID helps link this sample to other variants or campaigns.
  • Detection: Network security tools can block these domains.

Visual Reference:

Salat Stealer Strings Analysis Process Hacker strings view showing C2 addresses and Go Build ID.

3. Token Manipulation – Privilege Escalation

Salat Stealer uses token manipulation to grant itself full access to system resources. The code constructs a security descriptor with FILE_ALL_ACCESS permissions, allowing the malware to read, write, and delete critical files.

What This Code Does:

  • GetCurrentProcess() – Gets the current process handle.
  • TokenUser – Retrieves the user SID for ACL creation.
  • TokenAppContainerSid – Retrieves the AppContainer SID (if applicable).
  • ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW – Converts a string-based ACL to a binary security descriptor.
  • FILE_ALL_ACCESS – Grants full control over files and directories.

Why This Matters:

  • Privilege Escalation: The malware can bypass security restrictions.
  • Persistence: Full access allows the malware to modify registry keys and system files.
  • Evasion: With high privileges, the malware can hide from security tools.

Visual Reference:

Salat Stealer Token Manipulation Ghidra view of the token manipulation and security descriptor creation code.

4. Obfuscated Payload – Encrypted Memory Block

One of the extracted PAGE_READWRITE memory blocks (64 KB) contains heavily obfuscated data. The hex dump shows repeating patterns and structured bytes, indicating this is likely an encrypted configuration or compressed payload.

Key Observations:

  • Size: 64 KB – Large enough to contain a configuration or payload.
  • Pattern: Repeating structures (\x50\xd7\x5c\x22 type patterns) suggest a structured format.
  • Readable Strings: None visible, confirming the data is encrypted or compressed.
  • Location: Found in a PAGE_READWRITE memory region, typical of obfuscated malware payloads.

Why This Matters:

  • Payload Extraction: This block may contain the final stealer components or C2 configuration.
  • Encryption: The data is likely protected with XOR or AES, requiring a key for decryption.
  • Analysis Challenge: Obfuscation prevents direct static analysis, making dynamic analysis essential.

Visual Reference:

Salat Stealer Obfuscated Payload Binary Ninja view of the obfuscated hex data from a 64KB PAGE_READWRITE memory block.

5. Second Obfuscated Block – Turkish Error Message

A second PAGE_READWRITE memory block (32 KB) was analyzed and found to contain the Turkish error message: "vaya erişilmeye çalışıldı." (roughly: "Oops, attempted to access."). This suggests the malware developer may be Turkish or the sample was developed in a Turkish-speaking environment.

Key Observations:

  • Size: 32 KB – Smaller than the previous block.
  • Turkish String: "vaya erişilmeye çalışıldı." – Likely a debug or error message.
  • Obfuscation: The rest of the block is heavily obfuscated or encrypted.
  • Possible Context: Could indicate failed file access or API call.

Why This Matters:

  • Developer Origin: The Turkish string suggests the author may be Turkish.
  • Debugging Artifact: This message may have been left unintentionally, revealing developer habits.
  • Threat Intelligence: This can help link this sample to other campaigns.

Visual Reference:

Salat Stealer Second Obfuscated Block Binary Ninja view of the 32KB obfuscated block with the Turkish error message.

Conclusion

This analysis uncovered Salat Stealer, a sophisticated Go-based info-stealer that uses a Telegram proxy decoy to evade detection. Despite heavy obfuscation, the malware left critical artifacts in its strings section, revealing C2 addresses, a Go Build ID, and a Turkish error message.

Key Takeaways:

  • Telegram Proxy Decoy: The malware disguises itself as a legitimate Telegram Proxy to trick users.
  • C2 Infrastructure: Domains like j.sni.global.fastly.net and ton.access.orbs.network are used for data exfiltration.
  • Token Manipulation: The malware grants itself full access (FILE_ALL_ACCESS) to system resources.
  • Obfuscated Payload: Two PAGE_READWRITE memory blocks (32KB and 64KB) were found to contain encrypted or compressed data.
  • Turkish Error Message: "vaya erişilmeye çalışıldı." suggests the developer may be Turkish.

Detection Recommendations:

  • Monitor for Telegram Proxy decoy behavior.
  • Block C2 domains: j.sni.global.fastly.net, ton.access.orbs.network.
  • Detect token manipulation and FILE_ALL_ACCESS attempts.
  • Investigate PAGE_READWRITE memory regions in suspicious processes.

Sample Download

The analyzed Salat Stealer sample is available on MalwareBazaar for those who wish to conduct their own analysis:

🔗 Salat Stealer Sample on MalwareBazaar

Tools Used: Ghidra, Binary Ninja, Process Hacker, WinDbg

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