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CVE-2026-111585 — Containerized PoC lab for CVE-2026-111585, a TeamViewer CBitmapBuffer integer overflow leading to heap overflow, with Frida triggers and vulnerable/fixed differential evidence. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-111585
Container SecurityMemory ForensicsVulnerability AnalysisExploitationReverse EngineeringDebuggersFuzzingPapers & ResearchBinary ExploitationLabs & Practice
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googlesky/cve-2026-111585

CVE-2026-111585

Containerized PoC lab for CVE-2026-111585, a TeamViewer CBitmapBuffer integer overflow leading to heap overflow, with Frida triggers and vulnerable/fixed differential evidence.

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CVE-2026-111585 — TeamViewer Remote-Control Screen Decompression Integer Overflow → Heap Buffer Overflow

Complete containerized lab + PoC for the viewer-side integer overflow in TeamViewer CBitmapBuffer (CWE-190, CVSS 3.1 8.8, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, fixed in 15.83, bulletin TV-2026-1011, found by Omri Dar / Remedio).

A malicious (or compromised) remote host announces an oversized screen geometry (DisplayParams) to a connecting viewer. The viewer sizes its decode surface with 32-bit arithmetic; the product wraps, so a ~4.3 GB surface is "allocated" as ~4 MB while every later bounds check still uses the un-truncated declared dimensions and stride. Screen updates (lossless RLE tiles) are then decoded past the end of the allocation → controlled heap overflow → viewer DoS/RCE.

What this repo proves, on the real shipping binaries

#ClaimEvidence (all generated by this lab)
1The constructor wrapsevidence/driver_vuln.log: intended=0x100400400 WRAPPED to 0x400400 (live, 15.82.6)
2TeamViewer itself computes the wrapped sizeevidence/TV_vuln.log: CBitmapBuffer::CBitmapBuffer Failed to create buffer, width 32784, height 32784, buffer size 4195328
3The RLE tile decoder writes OOB, deterministicallyguard-page run: fault exactly at base + byteSize (frida_final_vuln.log: access violation accessing 0x7f84cc7f8000 = base+0x401000)
4Viewer process dies (DoS)evidence/TV_vuln.log: Process received fatal SIGSEGV + TeamViewer's own .stack dump
5The crash IS the CVE write instructionevidence/crash_vuln_132819.stack: frame TeamViewer[0x1475569] = xor dword [rax], r8d — the decoder's OOB write loop (0x01475569)
615.83 is fixedevidence/TV_fixed.log: Buffer too big: width 32784, height 32784, stride 131136, buffer size 4299162624 — 64-bit size, explicit rejection, no wrap, no OOB

Layout

binaries/    teamviewer_15.82.6_amd64.deb (vulnerable), 15.83.3 (fixed), 14.7.48657 (legacy)
lab/         Containerfile, entrypoint, guard_alloc.c (guard-page malloc shim),
             compose.yaml (attacker/victim nodes), bring-up & run scripts
poc/         poc_final.js   — Frida trigger: wrap + guard-page OOB (deterministic fault address)
             poc_dos.js     — Frida variant, real-heap smear
             driver.c       — LD_PRELOAD trigger (no frida): real heap corruption → viewer death
             driver_fixed.cpp — negative control on 15.83.3
research/    ROOT-CAUSE.md  — annotated disassembly of the vulnerable ctor, the XOR-RLE decoder,
             the fix diff (15.82.6 ↔ 15.83.3), binary layout notes
             *.txt          — raw disassembly dumps
evidence/    logs, crash dumps, screenshots captured during validation

Root cause (15.82.6, amd64)

tvgfxprimitives::CBitmapBuffer::CBitmapBuffer(const ColorFormat&, uint w, uint h, uint stride, const Dimensions&, deleter) @ 0x017af084 (ET_EXEC — addresses are load-time fixed):

; per plane (stride-override branch):
0x017af288   mov  eax, [rsp+0x40]        ; arg5 (stride, from DisplayParams path)
0x017af28c   mov  [rbp+0x20], eax        ; plane->stride  (UN-truncated, 32-bit)
0x017af28f   imul esi, r8d               ; byteSize = stride * sheight  ← 32-BIT WRAP
0x017af293   mov  qword [rbp+8], rsi     ; plane->byteSize (wrapped)
...
0x017af29f   call 0x17ae66d              ; allocate(byteSize) → WRAPPED size

DeCompress XOR-RLE tile decoder @ 0x014753ea — f(URect* rect, CBitmapBuffer* bb, u8* src, u8* end): rect is validated against the declared surface only; pixel writes are xor dword [rax], pixel; rax += 4 and rows advance by plane->stride — never checked against the allocation:

0x01475569   xor dword [rax], r8d        ; ← the OOB write (appears in the crash stack)
0x0147556c   dec r15d
0x0147556f   add rax, 4

Wire record format (reconstructed): run = [0x7693b09e][count:u32][pixel:u32], literal = [pixel:u32] — decoded by XOR into the destination rows.

Fix (15.83.3): same ctor at 0x016ec3ca computes the plane size with imul rax, qword [stride] (64-bit) and rejects totals > 0x7fffffff ("Buffer too big …" → error 400/4), plus a new "Stride too small" guard.

Reproduce (validated end-to-end, both flows PASS from scratch)

./run_poc.sh build   # build vulnerable (15.82.6) + fixed (15.83.3) node images
./run_poc.sh vuln    # → RESULT: PASS — wrap → OOB write → viewer killed (4 assertions)
./run_poc.sh fixed   # → RESULT: PASS — 64-bit size, explicit rejection, no wrap/OOB
./run_poc.sh clean   # remove lab containers

run_poc.sh vuln asserts, end-to-end inside one container:

  1. driver log shows WRAPPED (0x100400400 → 0x400400),
  2. TeamViewer's own log shows the fatal SIGSEGV,
  3. the process is dead,
  4. the emitted .stack contains frame 0x1475569 (the OOB write instruction).

run_poc.sh fixed asserts TeamViewer's own guard fires with the un-wrapped 64-bit size (buffer size 4299162624) and rejects the geometry.

Frida variants for interactive inspection: poc/poc_final.js (deterministic guard-page fault at base+byteSize), poc/poc_dos.js, poc/sweep_dims.js.

Two-node session lab (optional)

cd lab && podman-compose up -d    # attacker 172.28.111.10 ↔ victim 172.28.111.20

Contains the GUI bring-up/automation scripts (EULA click-through, partner-ID connect, accept flow) used during this research, plus lab/image/guard_alloc.c (guard-page malloc shim).

Delivery-path note (honest scoping)

The CVE's real-world delivery is a malicious host feeding DisplayParams and tile payloads over an established, encrypted session. This lab drives the identical code path inside the viewer process (post-decryption bytes), the same technique Remedio used for their demo ("a host-side hook … drives the identical path"). A full protocol-level fake host (victim's viewer connects over direct LAN TCP/5938 to an attacker endpoint speaking the Dyngate handshake) is sketched in research/AUDIT-NOTES.md as future work; the two-node lab containers and session bring-up scripts are included.

Audit notes / further leads

See research/AUDIT-NOTES.md — decoder family inventory (RLE_Decode128 colortable path, RLE_DecodeWithColTable, TileDecoder::ProcessProgressiveJpeg), and the specific property that all pixel writes are XOR (differential corruption primitive: repeat-application = heap grooming without overwrite).

References

  • CVE record: https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111585
  • TeamViewer bulletin TV-2026-1011 (fix 15.83)
  • Remedio write-up (Omri Dar): https://remedio.io/research/vulnerability-disclosures/remote-code-execution-in-teamviewer

Standalone exploit

python3 exploit/exploit.py runs the full chain (exit 1 exploited, 0 safe).

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