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lxd-scanner — Detection-only local triage scanner for CVE-2026-112816 (CVSS 10.0) in Canonical LXD and MicroCloud: grades LXD, MicroCloud and Incus versions against the fixed builds, catches the 6.10.0 trap. No payloads, no remote probing. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/foxcornlab/lxd-scanner
Defensive ToolsVulnerability ScannersContainer SecurityVulnerability AnalysisConfiguration AuditingCloud SecurityUtilities & FrameworksIncident Response
GitHubfoxcornlab/lxd-scanner

lxd-scanner

Detection-only local triage scanner for CVE-2026-112816 (CVSS 10.0) in Canonical LXD and MicroCloud: grades LXD, MicroCloud and Incus versions against the fixed builds, catches the 6.10.0 trap. No payloads, no remote probing.

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lxd-scanner

Local triage for CVE-2026-112816, the 10.0 certificate-validation flaw in Canonical LXD and MicroCloud, published 30 October 2026. Give it a version you own, it tells you whether that install is still open. It never touches the network, never probes a server, never crafts a certificate chain, never sends a payload.

The flaw

LXD lets remote clients reach its API over mutual TLS: the client presents a certificate, and a trusted client is one whose certificate sits in the server trust store. The server checked every certificate the client attached to the chain, but a TLS connection only proves the client owns the private key for the leaf certificate. The rest of the chain is whatever the client chose to attach.

So an attacker with network access to the HTTPS API and a trusted client's public certificate, which is not secret, could attach that certificate behind their own and be accepted as that client. Full access to the cluster and its virtual machines follows, and root on the host if the impersonated client is privileged. The Incus project, a community fork of LXD, reported it; Canonical confirmed it hit LXD too.

What it checks

  • A version you supply (--version 6.9), for LXD, MicroCloud or Incus (--product)
  • This host (--local): lxd --version, microcloud --version or incus --version, falling back to snap list
  • An offline inventory (--inventory-json inventory.json): a JSON list of {product, version} entries, for fleets
  • The full table (--list): every affected range and fixed build in the tool
  • Exposure, separately from version (--network-api): assert core.https_address is set, so a vulnerable build is flagged as remotely reachable, not just vulnerable code

A standalone LXD server does not expose the HTTPS API by default. It listens on a local socket unless an administrator turns it on with core.https_address. That is why the tool does not probe: a vulnerable build on a local-socket-only host is still unpatched code, but it is not remotely reachable through this flaw, and the tool says so instead of merging the two.

The trap: narrow ranges, and 6.10 is not fixed

ProductAffectedFixed in
LXD4.0.14 to before 4.0.154.0.15
LXD5.0.10 to before 5.0.115.0.11
LXD5.21.8 to before 5.21.95.21.9
LXD6.9.0 to before 6.10.16.10.1
MicroCloudbelow fixed, lower bound not published2.1.5 (2.x) / 3.4.1 (3.x)
Incusbelow fixed, lower bound not published7.6.0

Two things to not get wrong. First, 6.10.0 is still vulnerable. It was a fixed build for the September LXD flaws, not for this one: the 6.x fix here is 6.10.1. A host that upgraded to 6.10 in September and stopped there is still open. Second, a version below the lower bound of its LXD branch, 6.8 or 5.21.7 for example, grades UNKNOWN, not clean and not vulnerable. The CNA record does not list it as affected, and calling it either way would be a guess. UNKNOWN is not clean: check the Canonical advisory before calling that host fixed.

Usage

# vulnerable build
python3 lxd_scanner.py --version 6.9

# the trap: 6.10 looks patched, it is not
python3 lxd_scanner.py --version 6.10

# fixed build
python3 lxd_scanner.py --version 6.10.1

# MicroCloud and Incus
python3 lxd_scanner.py --product microcloud --version 3.4.0
python3 lxd_scanner.py --product incus --version 7.5

# on the host itself, with network-API exposure noted
python3 lxd_scanner.py --local

# vulnerable build that is actually reachable
python3 lxd_scanner.py --version 6.9 --network-api

# machine-readable output for fleets
python3 lxd_scanner.py --version 5.21.8 --json

# the full fixed-version table
python3 lxd_scanner.py --list

Exit codes: 0 = nothing vulnerable found, 2 = vulnerable finding, 1 = scan error. UNKNOWN does not change the exit code, but it is not clean.

Snap versus .deb, and the rolling fix

The vulnerable code is in the snap packages. Ubuntu lists its archive (.deb) packages of LXD as not affected or not shipped for this CVE, so --package deb reports that position instead of grading the number against a snap table. Do not grade a .deb build with snap numbers.

One more snap gotcha, straight from the advisory: the fixed point releases were still rolling out from the candidate channel to stable at disclosure time. A snap refresh that reports no updates available does not prove you are patched if your channel had not synced yet. Check the version you actually have after the refresh, with --local or --version, rather than assuming the fix arrived.

Where sources disagree, and what is still unverified

First, the GHSA advisory link carried on the Ubuntu CVE page did not resolve when checked for this build, so the fixed table here is corroborated across the Ubuntu CVE page (publication 30 October 2026, description and fixed builds), The Hacker News (1 November 2026, fixed snap table and Incus 7.6.0), and independent CVE records carrying the same CNA ranges and the CVSS 4.0 10.0 score with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H. If you hold the advisory itself, confirm the table against it and open an issue if anything differs.

Second, MicroCloud and Incus are graded on a different footing from LXD, and the tool does not hide that. The CNA record publishes narrow ranges for LXD only. For MicroCloud (2.1.5 / 3.4.1) and Incus (7.6.0), only the fixed releases are published in the sources checked, with no lower bound, so below-fixed grades VULNERABLE as a conservative advisory grade, not as a CNA range claim. That is the safe direction for patching, and it is labelled as such in the output.

Third, exploitation: no public sign of use in an attack, not on CISA KEV, and the CISA assessment dated 30 October 2026 says not known to be exploited. Proof-of-concept repositories for this CVE have since appeared on GitHub; this tool does not use them, does not link to them, and does not reproduce them. Its job is version triage, not exploitation.

Mitigation if you cannot patch today

Upgrade is the fix; there is no configuration workaround, per both Canonical and Incus. Until you can upgrade, limit who can reach the HTTPS API: this flaw needs network access to it and a trusted client's public certificate, so a local-socket-only install is not remotely reachable through it, and a MicroCloud cluster is most exposed while a member is joining, when its public certificate can be captured. Rotate the credentials of any trusted client whose public certificate was exposed to an untrusted network while unpatched: a patch closes the hole, it does not un-expose a certificate.

Tests

python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v

18 tests: version parsing, all four LXD branches vulnerable and fixed, the 6.10.0 trap, below-lower-bound UNKNOWN, unlisted-branch UNKNOWN, MicroCloud and Incus grading, CLI exit codes, JSON output, the network-API note, the inventory file, the .deb position, and the full table count.

Thanks to

  • Canonical, for the disclosure and the fixed snap releases this tool grades against
  • The Incus project, for reporting the flaw in the first place
  • Ubuntu security and The Hacker News, whose records corroborated the fixed table while the advisory link did not resolve
  • The CVE project and CNA records, for the affected ranges and the 10.0 score

Disclaimer

Defensive triage only. This tool checks version strings and reports whether an install is below a fixed build. It sends no traffic, probes no server, crafts no certificate chain, and is not a substitute for the vendor advisory. Use it on systems you own or are authorised to audit.

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