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seccomp-tools — Provide powerful tools for seccomp analysis | Kitploit
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GitHubdavid942j/seccomp-tools

seccomp-tools

Provide powerful tools for seccomp analysis

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1.1k737314 days agoReviewed by Kitploit
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# Seccomp Tools
Powerful tools for seccomp analysis.

This project is aimed primarily (but not exclusively) at analyzing seccomp sandboxes in CTF pwn challenges.
Some features are CTF-specific, but they're just as useful for analyzing real-world seccomp filters.

## Features
* Dump - Automatically dumps seccomp BPF from executables.
* Disasm - Converts seccomp BPF to a human-readable format.
  - With simple decompilation.
  - With syscall names and arguments whenever possible.
  - Colorful!
* Asm - Makes writing seccomp rules as easy as writing code.
* Emu - Emulates seccomp rules.
* Explain - Summarizes a filter as a per-action policy (which syscalls are allowed/killed, and when).
* Audit - Scans a filter for weaknesses and escape routes (missing arch/x32 guards, dangerous syscalls, ...).
* Multi-architecture support.

## Installation

Available on RubyGems.org!
```
$ gem install seccomp-tools
```

If compilation fails, try:
```
sudo apt install gcc ruby-dev make
```
then install seccomp-tools again.

## Command Line Interface

### seccomp-tools

```bash
$ seccomp-tools --help
# Usage: seccomp-tools [--version] [--help] <command> [<options>]
#
# List of commands:
#
# 	asm	Seccomp bpf assembler.
# 	audit	Assess a seccomp filter for weaknesses and escape routes.
# 	completion	Print a shell completion script.
# 	disasm	Disassemble seccomp bpf.
# 	dump	Automatically dump seccomp bpf from executable(s).
# 	emu	Emulate seccomp rules.
# 	explain	Summarize a seccomp filter as a per-action policy.
#
# See 'seccomp-tools <command> --help' to read about a specific subcommand.

$ seccomp-tools dump --help
# dump - Automatically dump seccomp bpf from executable(s).
# NOTE: This command is only available on Linux.
#
# Usage: seccomp-tools dump [EXEC] [options]
#     -c, --sh-exec <command>          Executes the given command (via sh) and dumps its seccomp.
#                                      Use this to pass arguments or pipe things to the executable.
#                                      e.g. use `-c "./bin > /dev/null"` to keep the program output out of the result.
#                                      Takes precedence over the positional argument.
#     -l, --limit LIMIT                Dump only the first LIMIT installed filters.
#                                      Only meaningful when the input is an executable or --pid. Default: 1
#                                      An executable is killed once it reaches LIMIT.
#     -p, --pid PID                    Dump the seccomp filters installed on an existing process.
#                                      You must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. be root) to use this option.
#     -t, --timeout SEC                Timeout (seconds) for the execution. Default: no timeout
#                                      This option is ignored when --pid is given.
#     -f, --format FORMAT              Output format. FORMAT can only be one of <disasm|raw|inspect>.
#                                      Default: disasm
#     -o, --output FILE                Write output to FILE instead of stdout.
#                                      If multiple seccomp syscalls have been invoked (see --limit),
#                                      results are written to FILE, FILE_1, FILE_2, etc.
#                                      For example, with "--output out.bpf" the output files are out.bpf, out_1.bpf, ...
```

### dump

Dumps the seccomp BPF from an executable, using the `ptrace` syscall.

NOTE: the target executable is actually run, so be careful with untrusted binaries.
```bash
$ file spec/binary/twctf-2016-diary
# spec/binary/twctf-2016-diary: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=3648e29153ac0259a0b7c3e25537a5334f50107f, not stripped

$ seccomp-tools dump spec/binary/twctf-2016-diary
#  line  CODE  JT   JF      K
# =================================
#  0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
#  0001: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000002  if (A != open) goto 0003
#  0002: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0003: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000101  if (A != openat) goto 0005
#  0004: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0005: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x0000003b  if (A != execve) goto 0007
#  0006: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0007: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000038  if (A != clone) goto 0009
#  0008: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0009: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000039  if (A != fork) goto 0011
#  0010: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0011: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x0000003a  if (A != vfork) goto 0013
#  0012: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0013: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000055  if (A != creat) goto 0015
#  0014: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0015: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000142  if (A != execveat) goto 0017
#  0016: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0017: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW

$ seccomp-tools dump spec/binary/twctf-2016-diary -f inspect
# "\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x01\x01\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x3B\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x38\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x39\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x3A\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x55\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\x01\x42\x01\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\x7F"

$ seccomp-tools dump spec/binary/twctf-2016-diary -f raw | xxd
# 00000000: 2000 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 0200 0000   ...............
# 00000010: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 0101 0000  ................
# 00000020: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 3b00 0000  ............;...
# 00000030: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 3800 0000  ............8...
# 00000040: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 3900 0000  ............9...
# 00000050: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 3a00 0000  ............:...
# 00000060: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 5500 0000  ............U...
# 00000070: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 4201 0000  ............B...
# 00000080: 0600 0000 0000 0000 0600 0000 0000 ff7f  ................

```

### disasm

Disassembles raw seccomp BPF into a readable format.
```bash
$ xxd spec/data/twctf-2016-diary.bpf | head -n 3
# 00000000: 2000 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 0200 0000   ...............
# 00000010: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 0101 0000  ................
# 00000020: 0600 0000 0000 0000 1500 0001 3b00 0000  ............;...

$ seccomp-tools disasm spec/data/twctf-2016-diary.bpf
#  line  CODE  JT   JF      K
# =================================
#  0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
#  0001: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000002  if (A != open) goto 0003
#  0002: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0003: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000101  if (A != openat) goto 0005
#  0004: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0005: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x0000003b  if (A != execve) goto 0007
#  0006: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0007: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000038  if (A != clone) goto 0009
#  0008: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0009: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000039  if (A != fork) goto 0011
#  0010: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0011: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x0000003a  if (A != vfork) goto 0013
#  0012: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0013: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000055  if (A != creat) goto 0015
#  0014: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0015: 0x15 0x00 0x01 0x00000142  if (A != execveat) goto 0017
#  0016: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#  0017: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW

```

### asm

Assembles seccomp rules into raw bytes.
Useful when you want to write your own seccomp rules.

Supports jump labels and syscall names. See the examples below.
```bash
$ seccomp-tools asm
# asm - Seccomp bpf assembler.
#
# Usage: seccomp-tools asm IN_FILE [options]
#     -o, --output FILE                Write output to FILE instead of stdout.
#     -f, --format FORMAT              Output format. FORMAT can only be one of <inspect|raw|c_array|c_source|assembly>.
#                                      Default: inspect
#     -a, --arch ARCH                  Specify architecture.
#                                      Supported architectures are <aarch64|amd64|i386|riscv64|s390x>.
#                                      Default: auto-detected from the host machine.
#                                      Set it when the filter targets an architecture other than the host.

# Input file for asm
$ cat spec/data/libseccomp.asm
# # check if arch is X86_64
# A = arch
# A == ARCH_X86_64 ? next : dead
# A = sys_number
# A >= 0x40000000 ? dead : next
# A == write ? ok : next
# A == close ? ok : next
# A == dup ? ok : next
# A == exit ? ok : next
# return ERRNO(5)
# ok:
# return ALLOW
# dead:
# return KILL

$ seccomp-tools asm spec/data/libseccomp.asm
# " \x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x00\b>\x00\x00\xC0 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x005\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00@\x15\x00\x04\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x03\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x02\x00 \x00\x00\x00\x15\x00\x01\x00<\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x05\x00\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\x7F\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"

$ seccomp-tools asm spec/data/libseccomp.asm -f c_source
# #include <linux/seccomp.h>
# #include <stdio.h>
# #include <stdlib.h>
# #include <sys/prctl.h>
#
# static void install_seccomp() {
#   static unsigned char filter[] = {32,0,0,0,4,0,0,0,21,0,0,8,62,0,0,192,32,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,53,0,6,0,0,0,0,64,21,0,4,0,1,0,0,0,21,0,3,0,3,0,0,0,21,0,2,0,32,0,0,0,21,0,1,0,60,0,0,0,6,0,0,0,5,0,5,0,6,0,0,0,0,0,255,127,6,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
#   struct prog {
#     unsigned short len;
#     unsigned char *filter;
#   } rule = {
#     .len = sizeof(filter) >> 3,
#     .filter = filter
#   };
#   if(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { perror("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS)"); exit(2); }
#   if(prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &rule) < 0) { perror("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)"); exit(2); }
# }

$ seccomp-tools asm spec/data/libseccomp.asm -f assembly
# install_seccomp:
#   push   rbp
#   mov    rbp, rsp
#   push   38
#   pop    rdi
#   push   0x1
#   pop    rsi
#   xor    eax, eax
#   mov    al, 0x9d
#   syscall
#   push   22
#   pop    rdi
#   lea    rdx, [rip + _filter]
#   push   rdx /* .filter */
#   push   _filter_end - _filter >> 3 /* .len */
#   mov    rdx, rsp
#   push   0x2
#   pop    rsi
#   xor    eax, eax
#   mov    al, 0x9d
#   syscall
#   leave
#   ret
# _filter:
# .ascii "\040\000\000\000\004\000\000\000\025\000\000\010\076\000\000\300\040\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\065\000\006\000\000\000\000\100\025\000\004\000\001\000\000\000\025\000\003\000\003\000\000\000\025\000\002\000\040\000\000\000\025\000\001\000\074\000\000\000\006\000\000\000\005\000\005\000\006\000\000\000\000\000\377\177\006\000\000\000\000\000\000\000"
# _filter_end:


# let's asm then disasm!
$ seccomp-tools asm spec/data/libseccomp.asm -f raw | seccomp-tools disasm -
#  line  CODE  JT   JF      K
# =================================
#  0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004  A = arch
#  0001: 0x15 0x00 0x08 0xc000003e  if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0010
#  0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
#  0003: 0x35 0x06 0x00 0x40000000  if (A >= 0x40000000) goto 0010
#  0004: 0x15 0x04 0x00 0x00000001  if (A == write) goto 0009
#  0005: 0x15 0x03 0x00 0x00000003  if (A == close) goto 0009
#  0006: 0x15 0x02 0x00 0x00000020  if (A == dup) goto 0009
#  0007: 0x15 0x01 0x00 0x0000003c  if (A == exit) goto 0009
#  0008: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00050005  return ERRNO(5)
#  0009: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW
#  0010: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL

```

Since v1.6.0 [not released yet], `asm` has switched to a yacc-based parser, which allows a more flexible and intuitive syntax!

```bash
$ cat spec/data/example.asm
# # An example of supported assembly syntax
# if (A == X)
#   goto next # 'next' is a reserved label, means the next statement ("A = args[0]" in this example)
# else
#   goto err_label # custom defined label
# A = args[0]
# if (
#   A # put a comment here is also valid
#     == 0x123
#   ) goto disallow
# if (! (A & 0x1337)) # support bang in if-conditions
#   goto 0 # equivalent to 'goto next'
# else goto 2 # goto $ + 2, 'mem[0] = A' in this example
# A = sys_number
# A = instruction_pointer >> 32
# mem[0] = A
# A = data[4] # equivalent to 'A = arch'
# err_label: return ERRNO(1337)
# disallow:
# return KILL

$ seccomp-tools asm spec/data/example.asm -f raw | seccomp-tools disasm -
#  line  CODE  JT   JF      K
# =================================
#  0000: 0x1d 0x00 0x07 0x00000000  if (A != X) goto 0008
#  0001: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000010  A = args[0]
#  0002: 0x15 0x06 0x00 0x00000123  if (A == 0x123) goto 0009
#  0003: 0x45 0x02 0x00 0x00001337  if (A & 0x1337) goto 0006
#  0004: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
#  0005: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x0000000c  A = instruction_pointer >> 32
#  0006: 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  mem[0] = A
#  0007: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004  A = arch
#  0008: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00050539  return ERRNO(1337)
#  0009: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL

```

The output of `seccomp-tools disasm <file> --asm-able` is valid input for `asm`:
```bash
$ seccomp-tools disasm spec/data/x32.bpf --asm-able
# 0000: A = arch
# 0001: if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0011
# 0002: A = sys_number
# 0003: if (A < 0x40000000) goto 0011
# 0004: if (A == x32_read) goto 0011
# 0005: if (A == x32_write) goto 0011
# 0006: if (A == x32_iopl) goto 0011
# 0007: if (A != x32_mmap) goto 0011
# 0008: A = args[0]
# 0009: if (A == 0x0) goto 0011
# 0010: return ERRNO(5)
# 0011: return ALLOW


# disasm then asm then disasm!
$ seccomp-tools disasm spec/data/x32.bpf --asm-able | seccomp-tools asm - -f raw | seccomp-tools disasm -
#  line  CODE  JT   JF      K
# =================================
#  0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004  A = arch
#  0001: 0x15 0x00 0x09 0xc000003e  if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0011
#  0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
#  0003: 0x35 0x00 0x07 0x40000000  if (A < 0x40000000) goto 0011
#  0004: 0x15 0x06 0x00 0x40000000  if (A == x32_read) goto 0011
#  0005: 0x15 0x05 0x00 0x40000001  if (A == x32_write) goto 0011
#  0006: 0x15 0x04 0x00 0x400000ac  if (A == x32_iopl) goto 0011
#  0007: 0x15 0x00 0x03 0x40000009  if (A != x32_mmap) goto 0011
#  0008: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000010  A = addr # x32_mmap(addr, len, prot, flags, fd, pgoff)
#  0009: 0x15 0x01 0x00 0x00000000  if (A == 0x0) goto 0011
#  0010: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00050005  return ERRNO(5)
#  0011: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW

```

### Emu

Emulates seccomp given `sys_nr`, `arg0`, `arg1`, etc.
```bash
$ seccomp-tools emu --help
# emu - Emulate seccomp rules.
#
# Usage: seccomp-tools emu [options] BPF_FILE [sys_nr [arg0 [arg1 ... arg5]]]
#     -a, --arch ARCH                  Specify architecture.
#                                      Supported architectures are <aarch64|amd64|i386|riscv64|s390x>.
#                                      Default: auto-detected from the host machine.
#                                      Set it when the filter targets an architecture other than the host.
#     -q, --[no-]quiet                 Run quietly, only show emulation result.
#     -i, --ip=VAL                     Set instruction pointer.

$ seccomp-tools emu spec/data/libseccomp.bpf write 0x3
#  line  CODE  JT   JF      K
# =================================
#  0000: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000004  A = arch
#  0001: 0x15 0x00 0x08 0xc000003e  if (A != ARCH_X86_64) goto 0010
#  0002: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  A = sys_number
#  0003: 0x35 0x06 0x00 0x40000000  if (A >= 0x40000000) goto 0010
#  0004: 0x15 0x04 0x00 0x00000001  if (A == write) goto 0009
#  0005: 0x15 0x03 0x00 0x00000003  if (A == close) goto 0009
#  0006: 0x15 0x02 0x00 0x00000020  if (A == dup) goto 0009
#  0007: 0x15 0x01 0x00 0x0000003c  if (A == exit) goto 0009
#  0008: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00050005  return ERRNO(5)
#  0009: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x7fff0000  return ALLOW
#  0010: 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00000000  return KILL
#
# return ALLOW at line 0009

```

### Explain

Summarizes a whole filter as a per-action policy: which syscalls end in `ALLOW`, `KILL`, `ERRNO`, etc.,
and under what argument constraints. The input can be a dumped BPF file, an executable (its seccomp is
dumped first, like `dump`), or a running process via `--pid`.
```bash
$ seccomp-tools explain --help
# explain - Summarize a seccomp filter as a per-action policy.
#
# Usage: seccomp-tools explain [options] [BPF_FILE|EXEC]
#     -c, --sh-exec <command>          Executes the given command (via sh) and explains its seccomp.
#                                      Use this to pass arguments or pipe things to the executable.
#                                      e.g. use `-c "./bin > /dev/null"` to keep the program output out of the result.
#                                      Takes precedence over the positional argument.
#     -l, --limit LIMIT                Explain only the first LIMIT installed filters.
#                                      Only meaningful when the input is an executable or --pid. Default: 1
#                                      An executable is killed once it reaches LIMIT.
#     -p, --pid PID                    Explain the seccomp filters installed on an existing process.
#                                      You must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. be root) to use this option.
#     -t, --timeout SEC                Timeout (seconds) for the execution. Default: no timeout
#                                      This option is ignored when --pid is given.
#     -a, --arch ARCH                  Specify architecture.
#                                      Supported architectures are <aarch64|amd64|i386|riscv64|s390x>.
#                                      Default: auto-detected from the host machine.
#                                      Set it when the filter targets an architecture other than the host.
#                                      With an executable or --pid the architecture is auto-detected instead.

$ seccomp-tools explain spec/data/libseccomp.bpf -a amd64
# Seccomp policy for spec/data/libseccomp.bpf
#
# Architecture: amd64
#
#   ALLOW:
#     write, close, dup, exit
#
#   ERRNO(5):
#     <default> (any other syscall)
#
#   KILL:
#     sys_number >= 0x40000000  (x32 ABI)
#
# Other architectures: KILL
```

A more involved example - the 0CTF/TCTF 2023 "Nothing is True" filter, which has separate 32/64-bit
allowlists and argument checks on `open`, `mmap` and `execve`:
```bash
$ seccomp-tools explain spec/data/tctf-2023-nothing-is-true.bpf -a amd64
# Seccomp policy for spec/data/tctf-2023-nothing-is-true.bpf
#
# Architecture: i386
#
#   ALLOW:
#     exit, read, write, brk, mmap, munmap, exit_group
#
#   KILL:
#     <default> (any other syscall)
#
# Architecture: amd64
#
#   ALLOW:
#     close, munmap, brk, exit, exit_group
#     open when filename == 0x31337 && flags == 0x0
#     mmap when prot == 0x2
#     execve when filename == 0x7ffea12f7d0e
#
#   KILL:
#     sys_number >= 0x40000000  (x32 ABI)
#     <default> (any other syscall)
#
# Other architectures: KILL
```

### Audit

Scans a filter for weaknesses and likely escape routes - a missing architecture or x32 guard, a
permissive (denylist) default, equivalent-syscall gaps (e.g. `execve` blocked but `execveat` not),
an open/read/write chain, or dangerous syscalls reachable as `ALLOW` - and reports each with a
severity. It runs on every supported architecture (architecture-specific quirks like amd64's x32 are
applied only where they exist), and takes the same input as `explain` (a BPF file, an executable, or
`--pid`).
```bash
$ seccomp-tools audit --help
# audit - Assess a seccomp filter for weaknesses and escape routes.
#
# Usage: seccomp-tools audit [options] [BPF_FILE|EXEC]
#     -c, --sh-exec <command>          Executes the given command (via sh) and audits its seccomp.
#                                      Use this to pass arguments or pipe things to the executable.
#                                      e.g. use `-c "./bin > /dev/null"` to keep the program output out of the result.
#                                      Takes precedence over the positional argument.
#     -l, --limit LIMIT                Audit only the first LIMIT installed filters.
#                                      Only meaningful when the input is an executable or --pid. Default: 1
#                                      An executable is killed once it reaches LIMIT.
#     -p, --pid PID                    Audit the seccomp filters installed on an existing process.
#                                      You must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. be root) to use this option.
#     -t, --timeout SEC                Timeout (seconds) for the execution. Default: no timeout
#                                      This option is ignored when --pid is given.
#     -a, --arch ARCH                  Specify architecture.
#                                      Supported architectures are <aarch64|amd64|i386|riscv64|s390x>.
#                                      Default: auto-detected from the host machine.
#                                      Set it when the filter targets an architecture other than the host.
#                                      With an executable or --pid the architecture is auto-detected instead.
#     -f, --format FORMAT              Output format, one of <human|json>.
#                                      Default: human
```

Auditing a denylist with several escape routes (the TokyoWesterns CTF 2016 "diary" filter):
```bash
$ seccomp-tools audit spec/data/twctf-2016-diary.bpf -a amd64
# Seccomp audit of spec/data/twctf-2016-diary.bpf
# Architectures: amd64
#
# [HIGH] Architecture is never validated
#     The filter checks syscall numbers without ever comparing data[4] (arch). Numbers mean different syscalls under
#     another AUDIT_ARCH, so the checks can be dodged by invoking through a different ABI (e.g. i386 numbering on amd64).
#     fix:  Compare data[4] against your AUDIT_ARCH_* and KILL every architecture you do not explicitly handle.
#
# [HIGH] io_uring_setup is allowed (amd64)
#     io_uring_setup reaches ALLOW - reads/writes/opens as ring operations, bypassing filters on those syscalls.
#     fix:  Block io_uring_setup unless the program genuinely needs it.
#
# [HIGH] process_vm_readv is allowed (amd64)
#     process_vm_readv reaches ALLOW - read another process's memory.
#     fix:  Block process_vm_readv unless the program genuinely needs it.
#
# [HIGH] process_vm_writev is allowed (amd64)
#     process_vm_writev reaches ALLOW - write another process's memory.
#     fix:  Block process_vm_writev unless the program genuinely needs it.
#
# [HIGH] ptrace is allowed (amd64)
#     ptrace reaches ALLOW - inspect/inject into other processes.
#     fix:  Block ptrace unless the program genuinely needs it.
#
# [HIGH] A file can be opened and its contents copied out (amd64)
#     openat2, read and write all reach ALLOW, so the contents of an arbitrary file (e.g. the flag) can be copied straight
#     back out.
#     fix:  Deny the open-family syscalls unless the program genuinely needs arbitrary files.
#
# [HIGH] Default action is ALLOW (denylist) (amd64)
#     Any syscall the filter does not explicitly block is allowed; a denylist is bypassable by any syscall the author
#     overlooked.
#     fix:  Use an allowlist: default to KILL/ERRNO and permit only the needed syscalls.
#
# [HIGH] open/openat blocked but openat2 allowed (amd64)
#     open, openat denied, but the equivalent openat2 reaches ALLOW - same capability, different syscall number.
#     fix:  Deny every equivalent in the group: also block openat2.
#
# [HIGH] x32 ABI is not guarded (amd64)
#     Syscalls blocked by their native number are reachable via their x32 number (nr | 0x40000000): open, clone, fork,
#     vfork, execve, creat, openat, execveat.
#     fix:  After the arch check, KILL when sys_number >= 0x40000000 (or jset 0x40000000).
#
# [MEDIUM] connect is allowed (amd64)
#     connect reaches ALLOW - network access (exfiltration).
#     fix:  Block connect unless the program genuinely needs it.
#
# [MEDIUM] socket is allowed (amd64)
#     socket reaches ALLOW - network access (exfiltration).
#     fix:  Block socket unless the program genuinely needs it.
#
# [MEDIUM] fork/vfork/clone blocked but clone3 allowed (amd64)
#     fork, vfork, clone denied, but the equivalent clone3 reaches ALLOW - same capability, different syscall number.
#     fix:  Deny every equivalent in the group: also block clone3.
```

Use `--format json` for CI or tooling:
```bash
$ seccomp-tools audit spec/data/gctf-2019-quals-caas.bpf -a amd64 -f json
# {
#   "stacked_filters": 1,
#   "reports": [
#     {
#       "source": "spec/data/gctf-2019-quals-caas.bpf",
#       "arches": [
#         "amd64"
#       ],
#       "truncated": false,
#       "findings": [
#         {
#           "id": "dangerous-allow",
#           "severity": "medium",
#           "title": "connect is allowed",
#           "detail": "connect reaches ALLOW - network access (exfiltration).",
#           "arch": "amd64",
#           "syscalls": [
#             "connect"
#           ],
#           "condition": null,
#           "remediation": "Block connect unless the program genuinely needs it."
#         },
#         {
#           "id": "dangerous-allow",
#           "severity": "medium",
#           "title": "socket is allowed",
#           "detail": "socket reaches ALLOW - network access (exfiltration).",
#           "arch": "amd64",
#           "syscalls": [
#             "socket"
#           ],
#           "condition": "family == 0x2 && type == 0x1 && protocol == 0x0",
#           "remediation": "Block socket unless the program genuinely needs it."
#         }
#       ]
#     }
#   ]
# }
```

## Shell Completion

`seccomp-tools completion <bash|zsh|fish>` prints a completion script for the given shell. Load it from your shell's startup file:

```bash
# bash (~/.bashrc)
eval "$(seccomp-tools completion bash)"

# zsh (~/.zshrc, after `compinit`)
eval "$(seccomp-tools completion zsh)"

# fish (~/.config/fish/config.fish)
seccomp-tools completion fish | source
```

To avoid the startup cost of evaluating it every time, write the script to the directory your shell loads completions from instead, e.g. `seccomp-tools completion zsh > "${fpath[1]}/_seccomp-tools"`.

## Screenshots

### Dump
![dump](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/david942j/seccomp-tools/master/examples/dump-diary.png?raw=true)

### Emu
![emu](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/david942j/seccomp-tools/master/examples/emu-libseccomp.png?raw=true)

![emu](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/david942j/seccomp-tools/master/examples/emu-amigo.png?raw=true)

## Supported Architectures

- [x] x86_64
- [x] x32
- [x] x86
- [x] arm64 (@saagarjha)
- [x] s390x (@iii-i)
- [x] riscv64

Pull requests adding support for more architectures are welcome!

## Development

I recommend using [rbenv](https://github.com/rbenv/rbenv) to manage your Ruby environment.

### Setup

- Install bundler
  - `$ gem install bundler`
- Clone the source
  - `$ git clone https://github.com/david942j/seccomp-tools && cd seccomp-tools`
- Install dependencies
  - `$ bundle install`

### Run tests

`$ bundle exec rake`

## I Need You

Any suggestions or feature requests are welcome!
Feel free to file issues or send pull requests.
And if you like this project, consider giving it a [star](https://github.com/david942j/seccomp-tools/stargazers) :grimacing:
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