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Tools/GitHubGitHub/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit
Cloud Infrastructure SecurityDefensive ToolsVulnerability ScannersContainer SecurityConfiguration AuditingWeb SecurityNetwork SecurityCryptographyDevSecOpsIncident ResponseArchived
11 day agoNot yet reviewed
GitHub
andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit

ca-trust-audit

eMudhra CA Compromise CVE-2026-111943 CVE-2026-114406 CVE-2026-91403 CVE-2026-113812

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ca-trust-audit

CA Trust Audit: the same compromised CA can be rejected by a host and accepted by a container; illustrative results

CI Release

Read-only certificate trust auditing for Linux hosts and running Docker containers. One standalone Go binary for AMD64 / ARM64, including WSL; also available as a reusable Go library.

Install · Usage · Results · Coverage · Go API · Technical reference

Why this needs attention

[!IMPORTANT] eMudhra intermediate CA compromise — CVE-2026-111943 (October 2026). The incident advisory reports compromised signing keys for six TLS intermediate CAs and two code-signing CAs, including cross-signed chains. Systems that still accept an affected TLS chain may trust attacker-issued HTTPS certificates.

RiskWhy act promptly?
HTTPS impersonation / MITMAn attacker able to intercept or redirect traffic could impersonate services, steal credentials/session tokens, or read and alter traffic.
Fresh fraudulent certificatesA compromised CA key can sign new certificates. Renewing your own website certificate does not remove that trust.
Stale container or application bundlesUpdating the host does not replace CA bundles baked into existing images. PHP, curl, Python/certifi and Node.js can use different trust sources.

Recommended response:

  1. Audit the host, running containers, and relevant runtime clients.
  2. Apply vendor guidance: distrust/runtime updates, replacement of stale CA bundles, and rebuilding/redeploying affected images.
  3. Rescan and resolve incomplete coverage before treating an application as protected.

Incident keywords: CVE-2026-111943 · eMudhra · emSign · Sectigo cross-signing · compromised CA · intermediate CA · TLS/SSL certificate validation · trust store audit · Linux · Docker security.

Install and scan

Install the latest release with automatic AMD64/ARM64 selection:

curl -qfsSL https://github.com/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh

Then scan the host and every running container:

ca-trust-audit
InstallationBehavior
Destination/usr/local/bin; sudo is used only when required.
Installer requirementscurl and common POSIX utilities; verified HTTPS, no checksum downloads.
Scanner requirementsNo Go, Python, OpenSSL, curl or Java installation required to run the binary. Installed clients provide optional runtime evidence.
Failed updateCompleted downloads are staged; replacement is atomic.
Custom directory or pinned release
curl -qfsSL https://github.com/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh -s -- --install-dir "$HOME/.local/bin"
curl -qfsSL https://github.com/andersundsehr/ca-trust-audit/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh -s -- --version v0.2.2

Add $HOME/.local/bin to PATH for a user-local installation. See installer details or inspect install.sh.

Self-update

ca-trust-audit self-update --check    # check only
ca-trust-audit self-update            # update; use sudo if the directory requires it
ca-trust-audit self                   # short alias for self-update

self and selfupdate are aliases for self-update, with the same options (--check, --force, --timeout, --color). Suggested commands in permission errors are highlighted in cyan on terminals; NO_COLOR, redirection or --color never keep them plain. This explicit command replaces the executable; ordinary scans remain read-only. It selects the matching architecture, validates standalone Go/ELF metadata and installs atomically over verified HTTPS. No external tools or checksum file are required. Update options and trust boundary.

Usage

TaskCommand
Host + running containersca-trust-audit
Host onlyca-trust-audit --host (--host-only is equivalent)
Running containers onlyca-trust-audit --containers-only
One running containerca-trust-audit --container webapp
Offline bundled-chain analysisca-trust-audit --offline
Additional public CA files/directories--ca-file /opt/app/ca.pem / --ca-dir /opt/app/public-cas (repeatable)
Terminal + JSON fileca-trust-audit --json report.json
JSON-only stdoutca-trust-audit --json -
Require sufficient coverageca-trust-audit --strict
Detailed per-chain resultsca-trust-audit --verbose
Default / controlMeaning
--workersAvailable logical CPUs (nproc equivalent, using Go); override with any positive integer. Bounds concurrent containers and total simultaneous TLS checks across all targets.
--timeout 10sPer-operation deadline, range 1ms–5m; signals cancel the scan.
--progress autoProgress on terminal stderr; always enables plain CI logs, never disables it.
--color autoMeaningful terminal colors; NO_COLOR, redirection and TERM=dumb disable automatic colors. always / never override detection.

Progress: counters and times stay first, the target stays last. Terminal redraws are limited to four per second and fitted to the terminal width.

[progress] 2/4 targets processed | elapsed    18s | ETA       ~12s | checking PHP cURL | container webapp

Parallel checks: the host is scanned first, then running containers in parallel. Within each client, chain requests also run in parallel; their shared global limit is --workers, so a single target benefits too. Clients within a target are tested one after another, each with its own positive control.

Conservative ETA: uses twice the slowest completed container duration plus a 10-second buffer, worker concurrency and queued work. Before measurements, it starts with a generous budget (normally 1 minute per online target, 15 seconds offline). Long-running targets expand the estimate; it never gets stuck at ~1s. Before Docker discovery, target ETA covers only the active target. Estimates can increase and are not deadlines. JSON remains free of progress and color escapes.

Selection rules: stopped containers are excluded. --host conflicts with container-only selection. CA paths refer to paths inside each selected target. Missing Docker leaves host results available; inaccessible Docker is reported as incomplete coverage. All CLI semantics and limits.

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