
Find which images and containers run a vulnerable Alpine + OpenSSH combination (CVE-2026-123158) — five-condition check, zero network, first-hour playbook.
Check whether your Alpine images and containers are actually exposed to the OpenSSH musl password bypass (CVE-2026-123158) — five live conditions, one verdict, zero network.
On 5 November 2026, OpenSSH shipped emergency release 10.6p2 for a bypass nicknamed "sshole": on Linux systems where sshd links against musl libc and runs without PAM, a 257–1024 byte password logs in to any account whose password field is a single * — an account that was supposed to never accept any password. Alpine Linux is the common case. A CVE list cannot tell you which of your images is actually exposed. This tool can, in one command.

A target is EXPOSED only when all five hold at the same time (Alpine security advisory, 2026-11-05):
/etc/alpine-release exists.openssh-server built without PAM, or openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no.* account plus a salt donor — at least one account with password field exactly * (for example root:*, shipped since Alpine 3.16), and at least one other account with a $5$ or $6$ hash that can supply a salt.Why it works: musl's crypt() returns "*" on failure for passwords over 256 bytes, and "*" is exactly what the stored field contains for an account with no password — so the comparison succeeds. OpenSSH 10.6p2 refuses stored fields shorter than four characters.
npm publishing is pending an owner decision on the registry token. Until then, install from source — three steps:
git clone https://github.com/techdevfun/alpinegate.git
cd alpinegate
npm install && npm run build
Then run it with node dist/cli.js ... (or link it: npm link).
The repo ships two fixtures built from the real Alpine 3.18.9 minirootfs plus real openssh APKs — one pre-fix, one patched (see fixtures/PROVENANCE.md for URLs, digests, and what is synthetic):
node dist/cli.js scan fixtures/exposed fixtures/patched
TARGET ALPINE OPENSSH PAM PASSAUTH `*` ACCOUNTS DONOR VERDICT
---------------- ------ --------- --- -------- ------------ ----- -------
fixtures/exposed 3.18.9 9.3_p2-r3 no yes root $6$ EXPOSED
fixtures/patched 3.18.9 9.3_p2-r4 no yes root $6$ SAFE
fixtures/exposed: all five conditions hold: Alpine 3.18, openssh 9.3_p2-r3 < fixed 9.3_p2-r4, no PAM, password auth on, * accounts (root) + $6$ salt donor
fixtures/patched: openssh 9.3_p2-r4 is at or above the fixed version 9.3_p2-r4 for Alpine 3.18
Exit code is 1 when any target is EXPOSED, 0 otherwise. Then print the first-hour stopgap for the exposed target:
node dist/cli.js playbook fixtures/exposed
alpinegate scan [targets...] [--format table|json] [--fail-on exposed|at-risk]
alpinegate check <target> [--format table|json]
alpinegate playbook <target>
Targets, all read-only and offline:
| Target | What it scans |
|---|---|
A rootfs directory (or / for the live host) | The directory tree as-is |
An image tarball (.tar, .tar.gz, docker save output) | Layers merged in order, whiteouts applied |
A local Docker image name (alpine:3.18) | Exported read-only via /var/run/docker.sock; no registry pull |
Flags: --format table|json (default table), --fail-on exposed|at-risk (default exposed; at-risk also fails the run on AT-RISK targets, for CI gates).
Exit codes: 0 = no EXPOSED target; 1 = at least one EXPOSED target (or AT-RISK with --fail-on at-risk); 2 = usage or config error (unknown flag, no target, unresolvable image, missing Docker socket). An unresolvable target is never reported as SAFE.
| Verdict | Meaning |
|---|---|
EXPOSED | All five conditions hold. Fix it in the first hour (see playbook). |
AT-RISK | A vulnerable openssh version is present, but at least one condition is missing (for example password auth already off). Still patch it — one config change away from exposed. |
SAFE | Patched openssh version, or PAM in use, or no sshd at all. |
UNKNOWN | Not enough data to decide — for example /etc/shadow not readable, or not an Alpine rootfs. UNKNOWN is not SAFE. |
Checked 2026-11-06 against the Alpine advisory (https://alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-05-openssh-password-authentication-bypass/) and the OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes. Alpine did not move stable branches to 10.6p2 — each branch got the fix backported onto the version it already shipped. Looking for "10.6p2" on a stable branch is wrong:
| Branch | Fixed openssh version |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 | 9.6_p1-r3 |
| 3.18 | 9.3_p2-r4 |
| 3.17 | 9.1_p1-r7 |
| 3.16 | 9.0_p1-r6 |
CVE-2026-123158, CVSS 3.1 score 8.1 (High). Researcher: Özgün Kültekin (Wakefield); write-up at sshhole.com. No confirmed exploitation in the wild was reported at disclosure (per the Alpine advisory and OpenSSH notes); watchTowr reported active exploitation attempts on 2026-11-06, driven by automated botnets and cryptominers — treat exposure as urgent.
alpinegate playbook <target> prints the stopgap; it never applies it. In short, from the Alpine advisory:
PasswordAuthentication no (drop-in file /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf; Alpine reads that directory from 3.19 on, older releases need the main file edited too), then sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart. Make sure key login works first and keep your current session open.apk upgrade -U -a, then rc-service sshd restart. The upgrade alone does not replace the running daemon.grep 'Accepted password for' /var/log/messages. Any accepted password login for an account with no password means the machine was compromised./etc/shadow, and does not inventory a fleet.Sources and check dates for the rival claims are in the blueprint's competitor scan (2026-11-06): Trivy 0.76.1 reported zero PHP2Shell findings on php:8.4.26-fpm while Grype flagged both (LiveWyer drill, 29 Oct 2026), and reported "Clean" for end-of-life alpine:3.18 (revisit.tech drill, 20 Oct 2026).