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Ferramentas/GitHubGitHub/glen-testing/low-int-cert-monitor
Defensive ToolsVulnerability ScannersVulnerability AnalysisNetwork SecurityCryptographyIncident Response
GitHubglen-testing/low-int-cert-monitor

low-int-cert-monitor

Monitor Certificate Transparency logs for certificates with trivially small EC private keys (the eMudhra weak-key class). P-256/384/521.

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low-int-cert-monitor

Detect X.509 certificates whose elliptic-curve private key is a trivially small integer (public point Q = d*G for small d) which is the same as eMudhra. Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521.

Layout

  • p4mon/ — production monitor: in-memory Rust checker, CT-log tailer, systemd units
  • common/ — targets.tsv, answers.tsv (known-answer vectors)
  • benchmarks/ — rust c cpp go detector implementations
  • reference/ — Python detector and CCADB / BSGS sweepers

Performance (single core, ~24h steady state)

metricvalue
certificates seen2,622/s
distinct after cross-log dedup423/s (84% dedup)
weak keys found0
CPU~5% of one core (I capped mine @1core)
RAM~580 MB (peak 642 MB, 1 GB cap)
network~30–40 Mbit/s ingress (~300–430 GB/day)
disk I/O~none (table loads once from page cache; findings are written only for hits)

Scales with CT issuance volume. Measured on AWS m7g.large (aarch64), 16 CT logs ingested.

p4mon

cargo build --release --manifest-path p4mon/Cargo.toml
cd p4mon
curl -fsSo loglist.json https://www.gstatic.com/ct/log_list/v3/log_list.json
./target/release/p4mon build table.bin     # precompute d*G, d=1..1_000_000 (~80s, once)
./target/release/p4mon selftest            # known-answer gate
./target/release/p4mon cert <file>         # -> WEAK d=<n> <subject> valid for: ... | clean
python3 ct_tail_live.py | ./target/release/p4mon stream table.bin   # live tail
cargo test --release && python3 -m unittest test_report.py           # tests

Each hit appends one JSON line to findings.jsonl (ts, d, sha256, subject) plus the certificate's scope: ca, tls_server (extended key usage allows TLS server auth), names (SAN DNS names and IPs, legacy CN if there is no SAN), names_omitted, and name-constraint permitted/excluded lists. Alerts turn that into a "valid for" line: the hostnames for a leaf, "ANY website" for a CA without name constraints, or "no websites" when the key usage excludes TLS. Only strict hostnames and IPs are kept; other SAN text is dropped and counted.

CT tailer (ct_tail_live.py)

Reads both kinds of log in the Chrome log list: RFC 6962 logs (get-sth / get-entries) and static-ct-api "tiled" logs (checkpoint / tile/data, e.g. Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, Geomys, IPng). For tiled logs, issuer certificates are fetched by fingerprint, checked against it, and emitted once per process across all logs; leaves seen in several logs are skipped by DEDUP downstream. The log list is re-read every day, so new shards start and expired ones stop without a restart; a list is used only if its log_list.sig verifies against Chrome's key, pinned in p4mon/log_list_pubkey.pem (SHA-256 of the DER key f1d8b68e…62e6fd85), it is not older than the stored list, and it selects at least one log (otherwise the tailer keeps the old list, or exits at start). Response bodies are limited before and after gzip, and an issuer that keeps failing is skipped for a while so it cannot stall its log. It starts at each log's head (no catch-up). Every 60 s it logs certs fed and HTTP requests made, cumulative and per second.

variabledefaultmeaning
P4MON_CONTACTunsetcontact address added to the User-Agent; Geomys/Sunlight logs throttle readers without one
P4MON_MAXLOGS16logs tailed in total (0 = every current log, 56 as of Nov 2026)
P4MON_MAX_PER_OP4logs per operator (0 = no cap)
P4MON_WINDOW_DAYS400tail shards whose expiry window overlaps the next N days
P4MON_POLL_SEC10idle head-poll interval once caught up
P4MON_PARTIAL_WAIT_SEC60how long to wait for a tiled log's partial tile to fill before reading it
P4MON_LOGLISTloglist.jsonlog list path; fetched at start if missing
P4MON_LOGLIST_URLChrome v3 listwhere the list is fetched from
P4MON_LOGLIST_REFRESH_SEC86400log list refresh interval
P4MON_LOGLIST_SIG_URLChrome v3 log_list.sigsignature over the list
P4MON_LOGLIST_PUBKEYlog_list_pubkey.pem beside the scriptkey the signature must verify against
P4MON_MAX_TILE_BYTES3200000tile / issuer / checkpoint body limit (5x the largest tile seen, 631,255 B)
P4MON_MAX_JSON_BYTES8500000RFC 6962 JSON body limit (5x the largest get-entries seen, 1,690,418 B)
P4MON_ISSUER_MAX_FAILS3consecutive failures before an issuer is skipped
P4MON_ISSUER_COOLDOWN_SEC3600how long a failing issuer is skipped before one more try

Tests: python3 -m unittest discover -s p4mon/tests (from the repository root).

Deploy (systemd)

Units assume the checkout is at /home/ec2-user/p4-inventory/p4mon; adjust paths otherwise.

cd p4mon
python3 -m pip install --user apprise         # delivery library (alerts)
mkdir -p ~/.config/p4mon && cp apprise.txt.example ~/.config/p4mon/apprise.txt
chmod 600 ~/.config/p4mon/apprise.txt         # then edit: add your target URL(s)
sudo cp systemd/p4mon-*.service systemd/p4mon-*.path systemd/p4mon-*.timer /etc/systemd/system/
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable --now p4mon-ct.service p4mon-find.path p4mon-report.timer

p4mon-ct fetches loglist.json (and loglist.json.sig) when missing or unverified and refreshes it daily; set P4MON_CONTACT in the unit. Alerts (find + daily) deliver via Apprise to whatever targets you list in ~/.config/p4mon/apprise.txt — email, ntfy, Pushover, Telegram, Slack, webhook, etc. (see apprise.txt.example). No LLM involved. With no target configured, the report is logged to the journal instead of sent.

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