Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
FerramentasExploitsBlog
Log in
Enviar
FerramentasExploitsBlog
Enviar

Ferramentas de Hacking, PenTest e Cibersegurança para o seu Arsenal de Segurança!

Kitploit é um diretório de ferramentas de hacking, cibersegurança e pentesting. Descubra as últimas atualizações de projetos para encontrar vulnerabilidades, analisar sistemas, automatizar testes e fortalecer sua segurança.

FeedsContatoPrivacidade© 2026 Kitploit

Diretório de Ferramentas

Categorias

Ver todas as categorias
Loading categories
keycloak-saml-scanner — Detection-only triage for CVE-2026-117691 (CVSS 9.1): Keycloak SAML HTTP-Redirect binding signature bypass, fixed in 26.8.2 | Kitploit
Ferramentas/GitHubGitHub/foxcornlab/keycloak-saml-scanner
Defensive ToolsVulnerability ScannersIdentity ManagementVulnerability AnalysisConfiguration AuditingWeb SecurityAuthentication
GitHubfoxcornlab/keycloak-saml-scanner

keycloak-saml-scanner

Detection-only triage for CVE-2026-117691 (CVSS 9.1): Keycloak SAML HTTP-Redirect binding signature bypass, fixed in 26.8.2

Ver Repositório
há 14 diasAinda não revisado
Compartilhar
Conteúdo não disponível no idioma solicitado. Mostrando versão em inglês.

keycloak-saml-scanner

Local triage for CVE-2026-117691 (CVSS 9.1), a signature bypass in Keycloak's SAML HTTP-Redirect binding. Give it a Keycloak version you own, point it at an install directory, or point it at a Keycloak base URL, and it tells you whether that install is still open. It never sends a SAML message, never sends a crafted request, never logs in.

The flaw

CVE-2026-117691 is improper verification of cryptographic signature (CWE-347) in Keycloak's SAML HTTP-Redirect binding. Keycloak processes percent-encoded query parameter names (%53AMLResponse) while its signature verification only checks literal parameter names. An unauthenticated attacker supplies a crafted, unsigned SAML message, placed before the legitimately signed one in the request, and the server acts on the unsigned message instead. The result is full account takeover of federated users: log in as any user, get their roles and data, no credentials, no user interaction.

Only SAML is exposed. A realm that brokers SAML identity providers, or serves a SAML client over the HTTP-Redirect binding, is in scope. OIDC-only realms are not. Use --saml-usage no if you know no SAML is in use: a vulnerable version then grades NOT-EXPOSED instead of VULNERABLE, and the version grade is still shown.

The fix is Keycloak 26.8.2, released 5 November 2026. It is the only release carrying the fix, and it fixes 33 CVEs in one release, including the Brotli4j dependency flaw CVE-2026-111497 (graded separately by node2shell-inventory-scanner).

The traps: backports without the fix, and a dead line

SignalGradeWhy
26.8.2 or newerPATCHEDThe only release carrying the fix
26.8.0, 26.8.1VULNERABLEFix only in 26.8.2. 26.8.0 also carries the ; separator variant fixed in 26.8.1, so it has two bypasses in the same code path
26.7.xVULNERABLEEnd of life, no fix released at all
26.6.x up to 26.6.9VULNERABLEThe 26.6.9 backport does not include the fix. Taking the backport is not enough
26.4.x up to 26.4.18VULNERABLEThe 26.4.18 backport does not include the fix either
26.5.x and olderUNKNOWNThe advisory carries no affected-version data below 26.4, and no fix exists for those lines. Assume exposure if you use SAML redirect binding, and upgrade to 26.8.2. UNKNOWN is not clean
26.9.0-SNAPSHOT or any snapshotUNKNOWNA snapshot built before the fix commit is still vulnerable, so a snapshot cannot be graded as a release
26.4.2.redhat-00001 (RHBK)graded on the base versionRed Hat Build of Keycloak is affected too. Red Hat had no fixed RHBK build and no usable mitigation as of 6 November 2026

What it checks

  • A version you supply (--version 26.8.1): graded against the 26.8.2 fix
  • A version from a file (--version-file version.txt): reads the first line, or the version= line of a keycloak-version.properties file
  • An install directory (--local /opt/keycloak): detects the version from bin/kc.sh --version, from keycloak-version.properties inside the keycloak-common jar, from versioned jar filenames under lib/, or from the directory name. If the sources disagree it reports UNKNOWN with the conflict, never a silent pick
  • A live Keycloak you own (--url https://id.example.com): two plain unauthenticated GETs, the welcome page and the master-realm login page, and reads the version Keycloak itself prints in its theme resource URLs (resources/26.8.1/...). Verified against the Keycloak source: the welcome page builds that path from Version.RESOURCES_VERSION, which is the running version. It also reads the OIDC discovery document to confirm the target is Keycloak. It never logs in, never submits a form, never sends SAML
  • An offline inventory (--inventory-json keycloak.json): a JSON list of {label, version} or {label, path} entries, for a fleet of installs. Entries can carry their own "saml": "yes|no|unknown"
  • SAML usage (--saml-usage yes|no|unknown): no turns a vulnerable version into NOT-EXPOSED, because the flaw is not reachable without SAML. Default is unknown, which keeps the VULNERABLE grade and tells you to confirm
  • The CVE summary (--list): the flaw, the fix, and the backport situation

Usage

# vulnerable: one patch behind the fix
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --version 26.8.1

# fixed
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --version 26.8.2

# the backport trap: newest 26.6, still open
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --version 26.6.9

# Red Hat build, graded on its upstream base version
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --version 26.4.2.redhat-00001

# OIDC-only deployment: vulnerable code, not reachable
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --version 26.8.1 --saml-usage no

# from an install directory (kc.sh, jars, or directory name)
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --local /opt/keycloak

# from a live Keycloak you own (reads the version off its own pages)
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --url https://id.example.com

# a fleet, from a file you own
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --inventory-json keycloak.json

# machine-readable output
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --version 26.8.1 --json

# the CVE summary
python3 keycloak_saml_scanner.py --list

Exit codes: 0 = nothing vulnerable found, 2 = vulnerable finding, 1 = scan error. UNKNOWN does not change the exit code, but it is not clean. An unparseable version, a snapshot build, or a version below 26.4 has not been cleared. It has simply not been graded.

Tests

python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v

47 tests, all passing: patched and vulnerable grades across the 26.8, 26.7, 26.6 and 26.4 lines, the backport traps, UNKNOWN grades below 26.4 and for snapshots, RHBK suffix handling, the --saml-usage verdicts, version extraction from welcome and login page HTML, kc.sh / jar / directory-name detection including a source-disagreement case, and CLI exit codes, JSON output, inventory grading, and live probes against a mock Keycloak server.

Sources

  • Keycloak 26.8.2 release notes, keycloak.org, 5 November 2026: the fix, issue #54714, 33 CVEs in the release
  • Red Hat CVE-2026-117691 page: CVSS 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N), the percent-encoding mechanism, no mitigation, reporter Mayssen Aidoudi (Think-it GmbH)
  • GHSA-c85j-3hq2-q6wj: published 5 November 2026, CVSS 9.1, no affected or patched version data
  • phasetwo.io, Keycloak 26.8.2: 33 CVEs and a Critical SAML Bypass, updated 6 November 2026: the ; separator variant fixed in 26.8.1, and the 26.6.8/26.6.9 and 26.4.17/26.4.18 backports lacking the fix, with 26.7 end of life
  • Keycloak source, WelcomeResource.java and Version.java (current main): the welcome page builds resourcesPath as resources/ + Version.RESOURCES_VERSION, and RESOURCES_VERSION is the running version lowercased, which is what --url reads

Two disagreements to note. First, the advisory says nothing about which versions are affected, so this tool grades 26.4 through 26.8.1 as vulnerable on the strength of the fix release and the backport analysis, and everything below 26.4 as UNKNOWN rather than guessing. Second, the Red Hat page carries an AI-generated mitigation block claiming fixed RHBK builds exist; the same page's own statement says Red Hat currently offers no mitigation meeting its criteria, so this tool follows the Red Hat statement and flags RHBK versions as having no confirmed fixed build as of 6 November 2026. phasetwo counts 33 fixes while 36 CVE IDs appear in the release notes; three are cited only as earlier issues the release repairs, so this tool says 33.

Baixar ferramenta

Mais Populares

Ver todos →

Descubra as ferramentas mais usadas pela nossa comunidade.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 O kit definitivo de OSINT: grafo de investigação, pontuação de confiança, famílias de alias, mapa, linha do tempo e relatórios. 49 módulos, mais de 400 sites, sem necessidade de chaves de API.

    1.1k
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    # Aplicativo de Execução em Um Toque GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499)

    600
  • 3

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    Plataforma CSIRT que ingere relatórios do Shadowserver no MongoDB e os reproduz como mapas interativos, análises, descobertas, avisos e painéis executivos.

    391
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    Plataforma autônoma de testes de penetração multiagente com LLM, com agentes planejador/executor, grafos de ativos e de exploração, registro de tráfego MITM e reteste de vulnerabilidades.

    321
  • 5

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    O sistema de ação para cibersegurança nativa em IA—onde a intenção se torna execução governada, a evidência se torna memória operacional, e cada operação melhora a próxima.

    292
  • 6

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Kit de ferramentas de red team do lado do navegador com 102 ferramentas offline para reconhecimento, geração de payloads, ataques a credenciais, criptografia, codificação e relatórios de engajamento.

    257

Explore todas as ferramentas

Navegue pela nossa coleção de ferramentas

Ver todas as ferramentas →