
Write-up and proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-125399, a zero-click unauthenticated OS command injection in Fluxion via eval() on attacker-controlled 802.11 ESSID.
Note for English-speaking readers: This document starts in Turkish. A complete English translation of the entire write-up is included at the bottom of this file, under the heading "ENGLISH VERSION".
| Product | Fluxion (FluxionNetwork/fluxion) |
| Tested Version | v6.32 (also present on GitHub master, internal version string is FLUXION V6.38) |
| Vulnerability Class | CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) via CWE-95 (Eval Injection), root cause CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation of untrusted 802.11 data) |
| Affected Component | fluxion.sh → fluxion_get_target(), lines ~1839–1844 |
| Attack Vector | Adjacent (802.11 / Wi-Fi radio range) |
| Privilege Requirement | None (on the attacker side) |
| User Interaction | None (the victim is only performing a routine Wi-Fi scan) |
| Obtained Privilege | Privileges of the Fluxion process — usually root (required for monitor mode) |
| CVSS 3.1 | AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H → 8.8 (High), approaching Critical in practice due to running as root |
| CVE | CVE-2026-125399 |
| Status | Patched (v6.39) |
| Discovery Date | November 4, 2026 |
| Vendor Notification Date | November 4, 2026 |
Fluxion parses the list of scanned Wi-Fi networks from airodump-ng output as CSV. To correctly display possible non-ASCII bytes in the SSID field, the code passes the SSID value to Bash's eval builtin after a single and incomplete sanitization step (escaping embedded single quotes). Because this sanitization does not account for a backslash character immediately preceding a single quote within the SSID, an attacker can broadcast a crafted SSID to break out of the quoting context and execute arbitrary shell commands via eval.
The critical point: this code path runs unconditionally for every scanned access point, before the target selection list is shown to the operator. No attack mode needs to be selected and no target needs to be chosen — simply scanning nearby networks is enough. Since Fluxion usually runs as root for monitor mode, the injected command executes with root privileges.
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| AV | Adjacent | Only Wi-Fi radio range is required, no network authentication/association needed |
| AC | Low | Payload is a static, reliably craftable SSID string; no race condition/timing dependency |
| PR | None | No credentials required |
| UI | None | No interaction required on the victim side beyond a routine scan |
| S | Unchanged | |
| C/I/A | High/High/High | Arbitrary command execution on the operator's machine, usually as root |
Base Score: 8.8 (High)
fluxion.sh, fluxion_get_target() function, approximately lines 1839–1844:
# Parse any non-ascii characters by letting bash handle them.
# Escape all single quotes in ESSID and let bash's $'...' handle it.
local sanitizedESSID=$(
echo "${candidateAPInfo//\'/\\\'}" | cut -d , -f 14
)
candidatesESSID[i]=$(eval "echo \$'$sanitizedESSID'")
candidateAPInfo, a CSV line produced by airodump-ng; the 14th field is ESSID. According to the 802.11 standard, this field is a free-form byte array of up to 32 bytes that is fully controlled by the attacker. The only sanitization applied is replacing every single quote (') in the SSID with an escaped single quote (\'); after that, the result is embedded in a Bash ANSI-C-quoted string ($'...') and passed to eval.
The ${candidateAPInfo//\'/\\\'} substitution only rewrites quote characters that already exist in the SSID; it does not account for a backslash character that the attacker places immediately before one of these quotes. If the SSID begins with the bytes \ (backslash) and ' (single quote), the substitution turns this pair into three characters: \\' (backslash, backslash, quote).
When this is evaluated inside Bash's $'...' ANSI-C quoting: the \\ sequence is a recognized escape and is decoded to a single literal backslash, consumed as a unit. The quote character that immediately follows is now unescaped and is interpreted as the actual, closing delimiter of the $'...' string. Everything after this quote is parsed and executed by eval as ordinary shell syntax.
An SSID consisting of the following literal bytes (21 bytes, below the 802.11 limit of 32 bytes) is sufficient:
\'; touch /tmp/pwned #
| Byte(s) | Purpose |
|---|---|
\ | A literal backslash immediately before the quote to bypass the sanitizer |
' | When combined with the escaped quote produced by the sanitizer, it closes the $'...' string early |
; | A shell separator that starts a new command within the line being eval'd |
touch /tmp/pwned | An arbitrary, attacker-chosen command (the PoC payload) |
# | Turns the rest of the original line into a comment, ensuring it fails safely |
The final string reaching eval takes the form: eval "echo $'...\\'; touch /tmp/pwned #...'" — Bash parses this as follows: print the (truncated) SSID text, separately execute the touch /tmp/pwned command, and treat the rest of the original line as a comment.
What makes this vulnerability particularly severe is that it requires no conscious interaction on the victim's side:
The payload's "concealment" stems not from the attacker visually camouflaging the SSID, but from the architecture of the vulnerable code path:
eval call executes while the fluxion_get_target() function builds the candidate network list, that is, before this list is displayed on screen to the operator (see Sections 2.3–2.4 and Section 4).