DugganUSA — IETF Hackathon Contributions

Real-world threat-intelligence contributions from DugganUSA LLC to the IETF Hackathon, offered to project champions as empirical grounding for standards work.

We are a bootstrapped threat-intelligence shop. We run a public STIX 2.1 feed, an edge-blocking worker, and MCP servers, and we publish detection research daily. Our confidential-computing / formal-verification analysis was already cited in the IETF 126 hackathon CVE-2026-33697 project's motivation set — this repo is us showing up to help, not just to be cited.

Everything here is testable against our live data

These aren't slideware. Run them now — two flagship tools need no key:

node recon-toolkit/enrich.js 45.131.66.106        # live multi-source enrichment of a real ENCFORGE C2
node recon-toolkit/origin-recon.js dugganusa.com  # CT + DNS + Shodan origin discovery (OpenNHP)
node tls-revocation-braid/served-vs-issued-monitor.js github.com --selftest
node agent-security-benchmark/reference-scorer/dependency-reputation.js --selftest

Public (no key): the enrichment endpoint, feed-uniqueness, status, AIPM read, and the jeevesus MCP (search / enrich-ioc / check-package, on the official MCP Registry). Deeper surface (full STIX feed, /search, /correlate) is a free 30-second key at analytics.dugganusa.com/stix/register. See recon-toolkit/ for the full map, including which tool tests which contribution. We also ship 16 published integration tools (CLI, VS Code, Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic, edge Worker, …) that consume the same feed.

What we bring that a spec doesn't

The security drafts in this hackathon are, correctly, written from first principles. What we can add is empirical grounding — a corpus of documented, real-world attacks against AI agents, agent communication, and attestation, drawn from incidents we tracked and published as they happened. A benchmark needs real attack vectors; a threat model needs real adversaries. That is the gap we can fill.

Contributions in this repo

Integrity boundary (please read)

• We claim no IETF endorsement, adoption, or interoperability result. These are offered contributions for champions to accept, reject, or ignore on their merits.
• We distinguish our original data from our synthesis. Where a finding is our own detection/capture, we say so and cite our published receipt. Where it is another researcher's work (e.g. Pillar Security's sandbox escapes, Sysdig's JADEPUFFER analysis, Sardar's attestation draft), we cite them as the source and present ourselves only as the party organizing it for this benchmark.
• We cap our own certainty at 95%. Threat intelligence is probabilistic; we flag confidence and we name what we don't know.
• Real vs. synthetic: attack vectors here reference real, publicly-disclosed incidents. No live credentials, no victim PII, no attacker infrastructure is republished beyond indicators already public in vendor reporting.

Contact

Patrick Duggan — DugganUSA LLC · https://www.dugganusa.com · STIX feed: https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/stix-feed

Collaboration, co-authoring, replication, and distribution/partnership inquiries are welcome — [email protected]. We are a registered U.S. business (D-U-N-S 14-363-3562, SAM UEI TP9FY7262K87) and are set up to work through in-region partners and resellers where local presence, invoicing, or procurement is the right structure. If you champion a draft here and want the empirical grounding worked up further, say so — that's what this is for.

Built with the same daily-sweep discipline that produced the analysis IETF 126 cited.