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해킹, 침투 테스트 및 사이버 보안 도구를 당신의 보안 무기고에!

Kitploit은 해킹, 사이버 보안 및 침투 테스트 도구 디렉토리입니다. 최신 프로젝트 업데이트를 발견하여 취약점을 찾고, 시스템을 분석하고, 테스트를 자동화하고, 보안을 강화하세요.

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tfo-connect-bypass — Using TCP Fast Open to bypass syscall-based networking rules (CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 PoC) | Kitploit
도구/GitHubGitHub/4n4s4zi/tfo-connect-bypass
ExploitationIDS/IPS EvasionWeb Application ExploitationPost-ExploitationNetwork SecurityRed Teaming
GitHub4n4s4zi/tfo-connect-bypass

tfo-connect-bypass

Using TCP Fast Open to bypass syscall-based networking rules (CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 PoC)

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요청한 언어로 콘텐츠를 사용할 수 없습니다. 영어 버전을 표시합니다.

Using TCP Fast Open to Bypass Syscall-based Networking Rules (CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 PoC)

TCP Fast Open (TFO) is a method of initializing and using a TCP connection where the client can send data in the initial SYN packet sent to the server. This extension to the TCP protocol was implemented for speed benefits because the back and forth of the initial TCP handshake can be skipped for repeated connections. There's more to the implementation details if you care about using it in a production-level setting, but it's useful for evading some syscall-based rule engines because it's one way of opening TCP connections without using the connect syscall explicitly.

From a syscall perspective, a basic TCP connection generally looks like:

root@kitploit:~
socket() -> connect() -> write()/read()

A TFO connection, however, is initialized using a sendto syscall with the MSG_FASTOPEN flag:

root@kitploit:~
socket() -> sendto(...,MSG_FASTOPEN,...) -> write()/read()

I kind of explored this as a side quest for something else I was working on but in doing more research on TFO, CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 came up as a (recent) known bypass specific to networking-confined processes in AppArmor/SELinux. It applies to more than just AppArmor and SELinux though (many eBPF-based montoring engines also specifically hook connect syscalls for detection rules) so I thought I'd post a basic poc here.

Say you wanted to query a Kubernetes API server from inside a container as part of post-ex recon but there are eBPF-, AppArmor-, SELinux-, or some other syscall-based monitoring/blocking rules in place. If you don't want to use a more heavy networking implementation/library in userland and other syscall evasion primitives like io_uring aren't available, TFO might be useful. Again, this is just a simple PoC and not a robust TFO stack.

Portable build:

root@kitploit:~
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build test.go

References:

  • https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-72243
  • https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-63828
  • https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2026-63828
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