Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ツールエクスプロイトブログ
提出
ツールエクスプロイトブログ
提出

ハッキング、侵入テスト、サイバーセキュリティツールをあなたのセキュリティアーセナルに!

Kitploitはハッキング、サイバーセキュリティ、ペネトレーションテストのツールディレクトリです。最新のプロジェクトアップデートを見つけて、脆弱性の発見、システム分析、テストの自動化、セキュリティの強化を行いましょう。

··フィード·お問い合わせ·プライバシー·© 2026 Kitploit

ツールディレクトリ

カテゴリ

すべてのカテゴリを見る
Loading categories
tfo-connect-bypass — Using TCP Fast Open to bypass syscall-based networking rules (CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 PoC) | Kitploit
ツール/GitHubGitHub/4n4s4zi/tfo-connect-bypass
ExploitationIDS/IPS EvasionWeb Application ExploitationPost-ExploitationNetwork SecurityRed Teaming
GitHub4n4s4zi/tfo-connect-bypass

tfo-connect-bypass

Using TCP Fast Open to bypass syscall-based networking rules (CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 PoC)

リポジトリを見る
1416日前未レビュー

人気

すべて見る →

コミュニティで最も使われているツールを見つけましょう。

すべてのツールを探索

ツールコレクションを閲覧

すべてのツールを見る →
共有
要求された言語のコンテンツは利用できません。英語版を表示しています。

Using TCP Fast Open to Bypass Syscall-based Networking Rules (CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 PoC)

TCP Fast Open (TFO) is a method of initializing and using a TCP connection where the client can send data in the initial SYN packet sent to the server. This extension to the TCP protocol was implemented for speed benefits because the back and forth of the initial TCP handshake can be skipped for repeated connections. There's more to the implementation details if you care about using it in a production-level setting, but it's useful for evading some syscall-based rule engines because it's one way of opening TCP connections without using the connect syscall explicitly.

From a syscall perspective, a basic TCP connection generally looks like:

root@kitploit:~
socket() -> connect() -> write()/read()

A TFO connection, however, is initialized using a sendto syscall with the MSG_FASTOPEN flag:

root@kitploit:~
socket() -> sendto(...,MSG_FASTOPEN,...) -> write()/read()

I kind of explored this as a side quest for something else I was working on but in doing more research on TFO, CVE-2026-63828/CVE-2026-72243 came up as a (recent) known bypass specific to networking-confined processes in AppArmor/SELinux. It applies to more than just AppArmor and SELinux though (many eBPF-based montoring engines also specifically hook connect syscalls for detection rules) so I thought I'd post a basic poc here.

Say you wanted to query a Kubernetes API server from inside a container as part of post-ex recon but there are eBPF-, AppArmor-, SELinux-, or some other syscall-based monitoring/blocking rules in place. If you don't want to use a more heavy networking implementation/library in userland and other syscall evasion primitives like io_uring aren't available, TFO might be useful. Again, this is just a simple PoC and not a robust TFO stack.

Portable build:

root@kitploit:~
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 go build test.go

References:

  • https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-72243
  • https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-63828
  • https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2026-63828
ツールをダウンロード