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malware-analysis-fake-hwmonitor — Analisi tecnica, writeup e regole YARA per una campagna di DLL Sideloading mascherata da HWMonitor | Kitploit
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GitHubdmitry-matvienko/malware-analysis-fake-hwmonitor

malware-analysis-fake-hwmonitor

Analisi tecnica, writeup e regole YARA per una campagna di DLL Sideloading mascherata da HWMonitor

Vedi Repository
62 giorni faNon ancora revisionato
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Analisi della Minaccia: Campagna di DLL Sideloading e Infostealer con Falso HWMonitor

Threat Level Attack Type YARA Rules License

⚠️ DISCLAIMER / ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ
This repository is created strictly for educational, defensive, and threat research purposes. It contains technical post-mortem analysis, Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), and defensive YARA signatures. No active malware binaries are distributed in this repository.


📌 Executive Summary / Краткая сводка

Questo repository documenta l'analisi tecnica di un kit multi-stadio di distribuzione malware camuffato da utility di diagnostica hardware CPUID HWMonitor (versione fittizia 6.77.7).

L'analisi dinamica in sandbox e i classificatori comportamentali (Tria.ge / Recorded Future) hanno confermato che il payload finale è (, Punteggio: ).

Blakcsee Stealer
BLAKCSEE_STEALER
10/10 Malevolo
  • Report Sandbox Interattivo: Tria.ge Analysis #260922-xxymqadf35

Il reverse engineering ha verificato che la campagna utilizza:

  1. DLL Sideloading (Search Order Hijacking) sfruttando un updater legittimo di Notepad++ rinominato (GUP.exe).
  2. In-Memory Import Address Table (IAT) Hooking mirato a ntdll.dll.
  3. Dynamic Stack-String Arithmetic (XOR Obfuscation) per nascondere invocazioni WinAPI sensibili (ReadFile, VirtualProtect).
  4. Binary Inflation & Anti-Analysis Ballast tramite un autentico assembly Microsoft da 16,5 MB (System.ServiceModel.dll) e un container payload cifrato da 93,8 MB (ProfilerTools.dll).

🧩 Attack Chain & Execution Flow (Цепочка атаки)

root@kitploit:~
flowchart TD
    subgraph Stage1["1. Initial Access & Sideloading"]
        Victim(["User executes downloaded file"]) --> Carrier["hwmonitor-...-6.77.7.exe<br/>(Legitimate Notepad++ GUP.exe)"]
        Carrier -->|Auto-loads via Search Order| Loader["libcurl.dll<br/>(Malicious C++ Hook Loader)"]
    end

    subgraph Stage2["2. Evasion & Memory Hijacking"]
        Loader --> CheckEnv{"Environment Check<br/>fcn.180005700"}
        CheckEnv -->|Sandbox detected / Network isolated| ExitClean["Clean exit (Timeout 10s)"]
        CheckEnv -->|Target host confirmed| StackXOR["Stack-String XOR Resolution<br/>('ReadFile' via 0x180005cf0)"]
        StackXOR --> IATHook["Patch Host IAT table<br/>(ntdll.dll via fcn.180009ac0)"]
    end

    subgraph Stage3["3. Payload Delivery & Ballast"]
        IATHook --> ReadBox["Read & decrypt in memory"]
        ReadBox --> SafeBox["ProfilerTools.dll (93.8 MB)<br/>Ciphertext Container (Entropy 8.0)"]
        SafeBox --> StealerRAM["Decrypted Infostealer in RAM<br/>(RedLine / Lumma / Vidar)"]
        Carrier -.->|Ignored by loader| Ballast["ui_framework.dll (16.5 MB)<br/>Clean Microsoft WCF Ballast"]
        Carrier -.->|Ignored by loader| Decoy["config.txt (Decoy GitHub links)"]
    end

📂 Repository Contents / Файлы в репозитории

FileDescription
malware_analysis_report_en.txtReport tecnico completo di reverse engineering in 9 fasi (Inglese).
malware_analysis_report.txtПолный подробный отчет о реверс-инжиниринге и методологии (Русский).
rules_hwmonitor_sideload_en.yarRuleset YARA pronto per la produzione con descrizioni e metadati in inglese.
rules_hwmonitor_sideload.yarКомплект сигнатур YARA с русскими комментариями.

🔬 Component Breakdown

1. hwmonitor-windows-github-io-6.77.7.exe (Carrier)

  • Real Identity: Official Notepad++ Generic Updater Package (GUP.exe).
  • SHA-256: b9c965aa538c21b4702ec7e4f3ac47fc999e1cd505d69e0896a309f7956bb351
  • Role: Trusted application abused to sideload libcurl.dll without triggering static executable heuristics.

2. libcurl.dll (Loader & IAT Hooker)

  • SHA-256: 22a6cea4d2069935a7c621b9a96ba82d46a2d058dffca4d11917721c63ae341a
  • Imports: Restrictive import table (only kernel32.dll).
  • Stack Strings: Dynamic runtime calculation of ReadFile:
    root@kitploit:~
    (0x23 + 0x07) ^ 0x78 = 'R' (0x52)
    (0x23 + 0x26) ^ 0x2c = 'e' (0x65)
    (0x23 + 0x45) ^ 0x09 = 'a' (0x61)
    (0x23 + 0x64) ^ 0xe3 = 'd' (0x64)
    (0x23 - 0x7d) ^ 0xe0 = 'F' (0x46)
    (0x23 - 0x5e) ^ 0xac = 'i' (0x69)
    (0x23 - 0x3f) ^ 0x88 = 'l' (0x6c)
    (0x23 - 0x20) ^ 0x66 = 'e' (0x65)
    

3. ProfilerTools.dll (Encrypted Payload Container)

  • Size: 93,862,336 bytes (~93.8 MB, 80% of archive volume).
  • Entropy: 8.00 (Dense ciphertext, Non-PE).
  • Header Magic: 5B 28 B3 C0 5A 13 73 1F 1A B0 0A A9 53 3C 16 72
  • SHA-256: 242e5a415c7efb1f86b408e238d24835c72836f1e8e2439b0a6713e0b1f8d638
  • MD5: 133710d5b04ef72c22c48b43d0ad39af

4. ui_framework.dll (Inflation Ballast)

  • Size: ~16.5 MB.
  • Real Identity: Authentic Microsoft System.ServiceModel.dll (WCF Framework v4.8.3928.0).
  • Heuristic Disambiguation: Often falsely flagged as (Heur) Malware: Stealer by static scanners due to legitimate WCF security token class names. Serves purely as file-pumping ballast.

🎯 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechnique IDTechnique Name
Defense EvasionT1574.002Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
Defense EvasionT1027.001Binary Padding (Binary Inflation / File Pumping)
Defense EvasionT1027Obfuscated Files or Information (Stack Strings XOR)
Defense EvasionT1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (GetSystemInfo checks)
Persistence / ExecutionT1055Process Injection: IAT Hooking
Command and ControlT1568.002Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA)

🛡️ Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

root@kitploit:~
# SHA-256 Hashes
64e602e1c744da32c53b5761fa7b15dba72023df0176cc03a48c0c0bb52f2c37  Desktop.7z (Parent Delivery Archive / Tria.ge Sample)
b9c965aa538c21b4702ec7e4f3ac47fc999e1cd505d69e0896a309f7956bb351  hwmonitor-windows-github-io-6.77.7.exe (GUP.exe)
22a6cea4d2069935a7c621b9a96ba82d46a2d058dffca4d11917721c63ae341a  libcurl.dll (Malicious Loader)
242e5a415c7efb1f86b408e238d24835c72836f1e8e2439b0a6713e0b1f8d638  ProfilerTools.dll (Encrypted Container)

# MD5 Hashes
7744ed6fac4775706938298f9cb5ba0d  hwmonitor-windows-github-io-6.77.7.exe
866da3588ceacbb854f95f6d581ca464  libcurl.dll
133710d5b04ef72c22c48b43d0ad39af  ProfilerTools.dll

# Magic Header (Offset 0x0)
5B 28 B3 C0 5A 13 73 1F 1A B0 0A A9 53 3C 16 72  ProfilerTools.dll

🔍 How to Use the YARA Rule

Per scansionare directory o file alla ricerca di questa campagna, utilizzare lo strumento ufficiale YARA CLI:

root@kitploit:~
# Scan a specific directory recursively
yara64 -r rules_hwmonitor_sideload_en.yar /path/to/target/folder

📚 References & Research Tools

  • Ghidra Decompiler Engine
  • Cutter / Rizin
  • Detect It Easy (DiE)
  • dnSpy
  • System Informer
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