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ship-safe — The independent security agent for AI-written software. Finds issues, investigates whether they are real, and shows you the evidence. Deterministic core, no API key needed, JSON and SARIF output. | Kitploit
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ship-safe

The independent security agent for AI-written software. Finds issues, investigates whether they are real, and shows you the evidence. Deterministic core, no API key needed, JSON and SARIF output.

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Ship Safe Logo

The independent security agent for AI-written software. It finds issues, investigates whether they are real, and shows you the evidence.

Website · Docs · Security & Data Flow · Benchmark · Pricing · Blog · Contribute

npm version npm downloads CI License: MIT

GitHub stars
Sponsor

Ship Safe CLI

Ship Safe runs locally in your repo and works in two layers.

A deterministic engine finds issues across application code, AI agents, MCP configs, prompts, dependencies, CI/CD, secrets, and cloud-adjacent configuration. Fast, repeatable, and benchmarked — this is the sensor layer.

An investigation layer then decides what the findings are worth. It traces the value that reaches a sink, searches the project for controls a rule says are missing, builds attack chains across configuration no single file contains, and — when you ask it to — probes a leaked key against its provider. Every conclusion carries the pass that reached it and the lines it read:

root@kitploit:~
CONFIRMED — traced end to end (10)

    NoSQL Injection via $where [high]
    app/data/allocations-dao.js:78  NOSQL_INJECTION_WHERE
    why: threshold is assigned from the HTTP request and reaches the sink without validation on that path.
    decided by: dataflow
      1. value reaches NOSQL_INJECTION_WHERE here  app/data/allocations-dao.js:78
      2. getByUserIdAndThreshold is called here with threshold  app/routes/allocations.js:23
      3. threshold is assigned here  app/routes/allocations.js:20
    fix: Replace $where with standard MongoDB operators ($eq, $gt, $regex, etc.)

Real output from ship-safe investigate against OWASP NodeGoat. The tainted value is destructured in a route file and passed into a DAO three directories away.

Start with one command:

root@kitploit:~
npx ship-safe

No signup. No API key required for scanning. Works offline for core checks. AI-backed red-team modes use your configured provider when available.

Use --no-ai to guarantee a fully local scan. Provider-backed classification, deep analysis, and GPT-Red send bounded context directly to your selected provider after best-effort credential masking. See Security & Data Flow for exact boundaries and context limits.

Ship Safe REPL demo


Quick Start

root@kitploit:~
# Interactive REPL: scan, fix, and ask questions in one session
npx ship-safe

# Full audit: secrets + 29 agents + deps + remediation plan
npx ship-safe audit .

# Investigate: confirmed / likely / unresolved / refuted, with the evidence
npx ship-safe investigate .
npx ship-safe investigate . --all       # also detail unresolved and refuted
npx ship-safe investigate . --verify    # probe leaked keys against their providers

# What can an AI agent working in this repo actually reach?
npx ship-safe capabilities .

# AI agent red-team scenarios for agent-readable content
npx ship-safe red-team . --gpt-red

# Interactive fix agent: plan, diff, approve, verify the path closed
npx ship-safe agent .
npx ship-safe agent . --severity critical   # critical findings only
npx ship-safe agent . --branch --pr         # fix on a branch + open a PR

# Undo the last fix
npx ship-safe undo

# CI/CD mode — fails on any critical finding
npx ship-safe ci . --sarif results.sarif
npx ship-safe ci . --fail-on high              # stricter: critical or high

# Gate on evidence instead of severity: block only what was established
npx ship-safe ci . --fail-on-verdict confirmed
npx ship-safe ci . --ignore-refuted            # do not block on what was argued away

For pull requests, compare a trusted base scan with the head scan so existing repository debt remains visible without blocking unrelated changes:

root@kitploit:~
# On the trusted base revision
npx ship-safe ci . --fail-on none --no-deps \
  --write-baseline-report /tmp/ship-safe-base.json

# On the pull request head
npx ship-safe ci . --base-report /tmp/ship-safe-base.json --fail-on high

The base artifact contains hashed finding identities, relative paths, and rule metadata. It does not store raw matched secrets. PR results classify findings as introduced, resolved, unchanged, or uncertain; ambiguous matches are shown but do not block the pull request.

What Ship Safe Finds

AreaExamples
AI and LLM securityPrompt injection, agent hijacking, excessive agency, memory poisoning, RAG poisoning, unsafe tool calls
MCP and agent configsOver-broad tool permissions, poisoned registries, untrusted transports, dangerous allowlists
Application securitySQL/NoSQL injection, XSS, SSRF, auth bypass, path traversal, insecure API routes
Secrets and complianceAPI keys, tokens, credentials, PII, leaked secrets in git history
Supply chainTyposquatting, dependency confusion, risky install scripts, unpinned AI actions
CI/CDPipeline poisoning, unpinned GitHub Actions, secret logging, unsafe workflow triggers

How It Works

  1. Scan locally - Ship Safe inspects your repo with targeted agents and skips checks that do not apply.
  2. Investigate each finding - Separate passes decide whether it is real, ranked so a cheaper one never overturns a more expensive one: a traced data path outranks a model's reading of the same file, and a probe that authenticated outranks both.
  3. Read the evidence - Findings resolve to confirmed, likely, unresolved, or refuted, each citing the lines it was concluded from, so you can disagree with a step instead of a severity label.
  4. Fix with control - The agent proposes a plan and diff, asks before writing, verifies the result, and keeps changes reversible.
  5. Gate in CI - Use ship-safe ci to fail risky builds and upload SARIF into GitHub code scanning.

Ship Safe agent demo


"Why not just ask my coding agent to review the repo?"

You can, and you should. It will find real things. But there are three questions it structurally cannot answer about its own work.

Did the agent that wrote this code just mark its own homework? Asking the author whether the author made a mistake is not a review. Ship Safe is a separate reviewer with a separate method, and it disagrees with itself in public — a data-flow trace overturns the heuristic pass, and a live probe overturns both.

Can it see what it can reach? A coding agent reviewing your repo cannot read your MCP server config, cannot enumerate the permissions it was launched with, and is the actor whose reach is in question. ship-safe capabilities reads all of it from outside and reports the combinations that are dangerous together while unremarkable apart:

root@kitploit:~
  CRITICAL  Repository-controlled instructions reach an unattended write capability
    1. CLAUDE.md is read as instructions and can be changed by anyone who lands a commit
       CLAUDE.md:1
    2. Claude Code runs without per-action approval
       .claude/settings.json:2
    3. shell execute granted: Bash(git push:*)
       .claude/settings.json:3
    4. filesystem write granted: Write
       .claude/settings.json:3
    5. mcp-tool write granted: mcp__github__create_pull_request
       .claude/settings.json:3
    Impact: Text committed to this repository can direct the agent to write files
            or run commands with no human in the loop.
    Boundary: Require approval for write and execute tools during sessions on
              untrusted branches, or remove the pre-granted entries.

Each of those lines is unremarkable on its own. Together they are a path from a pull request to a privileged write, and no single-file review can see it, because no single file contains it.

Is it consistent, and can you prove it got better? Ask twice, get two answers. Ship Safe's engine is deterministic, and its conclusions are gated in CI by a benchmark that scores conclusion quality, not pattern coverage: how many known-real findings it settles, how much known noise it refutes, and whether it ever refutes something real. That last number's budget is zero — it is the only error class that loses a vulnerability silently. See benchmarks/.

Why Developers Use It

  • Built for AI-native apps: catches risks in agents, MCP servers, prompts, RAG flows, managed-agent configs, and AI-powered CI.
  • Works with AI clients: expose Ship Safe to Codex, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, and other MCP clients through the local stdio server.
  • Fast local feedback: run it before a PR, during review, or inside CI without sending code to a hosted scanner.
  • Fixes are reviewable: every suggested change is shown as a diff before it touches your files.
  • Works with your stack: JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, config files, infrastructure files, GitHub Actions, and more.
  • Open source core: MIT-licensed CLI with docs, examples, and a growing agent system.

Free CLI, Paid Team Workflows

The open-source CLI is the fastest way to scan any repo locally. Upgrade when you need a hosted workflow around the same scanner:

NeedUse
Local scans, audits, and agent-assisted fixesFree CLI
Scan history, cloud dashboard, and PDF reportsPro
Shared workspace, PR Guardian, team reports, and collaborationTeam

Compare plans at shipsafe.sh/pricing.

Ship Safe Cloud, the hosted dashboard for scan history, PR Guardian, billing, and team workflows, is developed in a private repository because it contains commercial product code and hosted infrastructure workflows. The public ship-safe repo remains focused on the MIT-licensed CLI, security agents, rules, fixtures, CI integrations, and documentation. See Ship Safe Cloud for the repo boundary.


Security Agents

All agents run in parallel. Each skips irrelevant projects automatically.

AgentCategoryWhat It Detects
InjectionTesterCode VulnsSQL/NoSQL injection, command injection, XSS, path traversal, XXE, ReDoS, prototype pollution
AuthBypassAgentAuthJWT flaws (alg:none, weak secrets), CSRF, OAuth misconfig, BOLA/IDOR, TLS bypass
SSRFProberSSRFUser input in fetch/axios, cloud metadata endpoints, internal IPs
SupplyChainAuditSupply ChainTyposquatting, wildcard versions, suspicious install scripts, dependency confusion
ConfigAuditorConfigDocker (root user, :latest), Terraform, Kubernetes, CORS, CSP, Firebase, Nginx
SupabaseRLSAgentAuthservice_role key in client code, tables without RLS, anon key inserts
LLMRedTeamAI/LLMOWASP LLM Top 10: prompt injection, excessive agency, system prompt leakage
MCPSecurityAgentAI/LLMMCP server misuse, tool poisoning, typosquatting, unvalidated inputs
AgenticSecurityAgentAI/LLMOWASP Agentic AI Top 10: agent hijacking, privilege escalation, Kimi K3/OpenAI-compatible tool-call misuse
RAGSecurityAgentAI/LLMContext injection, document poisoning, vector DB access control
MemoryPoisoningAgentAI/LLMInstruction injection in agent memory files, hidden Unicode payloads (ASI-01, ASI-05)
PIIComplianceAgentComplianceSSNs, credit cards, emails, phone numbers in source code
VibeCodingAgentCode VulnsAI-generated code anti-patterns: no validation, empty catches, TODO-auth
ExceptionHandlerAgentCode VulnsEmpty catches, unhandled rejections, leaked stack traces (OWASP A10:2025)
AgentConfigScannerAI/LLMPrompt injection in .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, malicious Claude Code hooks
MobileScannerMobileOWASP Mobile Top 10 2024: insecure storage, WebView injection, debug mode

Investigation passes, in the order their evidence outranks each other:

PassRankWhat it establishes
VerifierAgentheuristicPattern check around the finding. Never states more than "likely"
DeepAnalyzeranalysisLLM taint reading of the finding and its file, with the citation validated
DataflowInvestigatordataflowTraces the value back to its origin, across one function boundary and into other files. JavaScript, TypeScript, and Python
AbsenceInvestigatorpresenceSearches the project, or the handler, for the control a rule says is missing
LiteralContextInvestigatorpresenceDecides findings about a written-in value by what surrounds it — prose, a help string, or a reserved address
CapabilityGraphchainBuilds attack chains from configuration no single file contains
RedosReproducerreproductionRuns a flagged pattern against generated input in a worker with a deadline
SecretsVerifierreproductionPresents a leaked key to its provider. Opt-in: this discloses the key

A claim whose cited file or line does not resolve is recorded but never decides a verdict. Two passes of equal rank that disagree resolve to unresolved rather than to whichever verdict is scarier.

Also: ScoringEngine


The REPL

root@kitploit:~
$ ship-safe

  ███████╗██╗  ██╗██╗██████╗     ███████╗ █████╗ ███████╗███████╗
  ...

  v9.4.1  ·  DeepSeek  ·  ~/my-project

  /scan to find issues  ·  /agent to fix them  ·  /help for more

shipsafe ›
CommandWhat it does
/scanRe-scan the project
/agentRun the interactive fix loop
/findingsList findings from the last scan
/show <n>Full detail on finding n
/plan <n>Preview fix plan for finding n (no writes)
/undo [--all]Revert the last fix (or all fixes)
/sharePublish scan report as a public URL (7 days)
/diffShow git working-tree diff
/provider <name>Switch LLM provider mid-session
/quitExit (also Ctrl-D or Ctrl-C)

Anything not starting with / is sent to the LLM as a free-form question, with your latest scan results as context.


CI/CD

root@kitploit:~
# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Audit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  security:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Security gate
        run: npx ship-safe ci . --sarif results.sarif
      - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        if: always()
        with:
          sarif_file: results.sarif

A GitLab CI version is in docs/examples/gitlab-security-workflow.yml.

GitHub Action with inline PR findings

Use the Action from a pull_request workflow when you want critical and high findings attached to the changed lines. Keep pull_request_target out of this path for forked contributions: Ship Safe refuses that privileged combination because the checkout may contain untrusted code.

root@kitploit:~
name: Ship Safe
on:
  pull_request:

permissions:
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write
  security-events: write

jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: asamassekou10/[email protected]
        with:
          fail-on: high
          inline: true

Inline comments are opt-in and only post critical/high findings. Re-running the job updates the summary without creating duplicate inline comments.


LLM Support

Works with any provider — auto-detected from environment variables. Use --provider <name> to override.

Anthropic · OpenAI · Google · DeepSeek · Kimi K3 / Moonshot · Groq · Together · Mistral · xAI · Perplexity · Ollama · LM Studio · any OpenAI-compatible endpoint

Kimi defaults to kimi-k3 through MOONSHOT_API_KEY or KIMI_API_KEY. Use --provider kimi --model kimi-k3 for long-context GPT-Red and deep-analysis runs.

For Kimi K3-specific long-context red teaming:

root@kitploit:~
npx ship-safe red-team . --gpt-red --provider kimi --model kimi-k3 --k3-long-context

Ship Safe also checks Kimi K3 / OpenAI-compatible tool-call implementations for dynamic tool loading from prompt context, missing tool allowlists, forced tool calls on untrusted input, and replayed tool results without the original assistant tool-call message.

No API key required for core scanning. AI classification and red-team --gpt-red use your configured provider when available, with deterministic offline fallback for GPT-Red checks.


Suppress False Positives

root@kitploit:~
password = get_password()  # ship-safe-ignore

critical findings are always reported. An inline comment cannot hide one, and an attempt to suppress one is recorded in the scan. The comment is meant for a human ruling out a false positive, and anything that can write a line of your source — including an AI agent — can write the comment too, so the highest severities do not honor it. Every suppression is counted, so a scan that silenced findings never reads like one that had none.

Ordinary code rules do not grade Markdown prose or fenced code examples as deployed source. Secrets are still scanned everywhere, and agent-readable files such as AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md keep their dedicated prompt-injection and trust-boundary checks. To review fenced examples intentionally, use --include-doc-examples with scan, audit, or ci.

root@kitploit:~
# .ship-safeignore
tests/fixtures/
docs/

How noisy is it?

Recall is the easy half of a scanner. A tool that flags everything catches everything and is useless, so we measure the other half: what Ship Safe says about code that is almost certainly fine.

projectfindingscriticalgrade
express260C
requests151C
flask280D
chalk40B

Down from 1031 findings across the same four projects before v9.6.3, verified against NodeGoat and DVWA so the drop is reduced noise rather than lost detection. The 1 remaining critical is a false positive and the benchmark says which and why.

Corpus pinned by commit, reproducible with one command, limits documented: benchmarks/false-positives/

How does it compare to Semgrep, Gitleaks, Trivy, CodeQL?

Run Ship Safe alongside them, not instead of them. CodeQL does interprocedural taint analysis Ship Safe does not attempt, Gitleaks is the specialist for secrets, and Trivy has a real CVE database behind it.

Ship Safe covers a narrower question: what an AI coding agent just did to your repository, your CI, and your local tool configuration. MCP client config, agent memory poisoning, hallucinated-package imports and AIBOM are the areas where we found no equivalent public rules in the other four.

Full coverage matrix, verified against their public registries, including where they beat us: docs/comparison.md


Add a Badge

root@kitploit:~
[![Ship Safe](https://img.shields.io/badge/Ship_Safe-A+-22c55e)](https://shipsafe.sh)

What's Next

10.0 is verified Hermes Agent coverage. The baseline is Hermes v0.21.0 at an immutable upstream commit. Existing plugin and adapter checks are partial; terminal posture, ACP/TUI, current cron lifecycle, and credential reachability remain explicit work rather than implied coverage. See the coverage matrix.

See the roadmap for what is planned and what is deliberately not, and the 10.0 milestone for claimable work. Everything in it is open to contributors.

Contributing

Ship Safe is open source, and the best contributions are small, focused improvements that make AI-assisted development safer.

Good first areas:

  • Add a focused security agent for an AI, MCP, CI, cloud, or supply-chain risk
  • Add a precise security rule to an existing agent
  • Add vulnerable fixtures and regression tests
  • Write examples for local scans, CI gates, red-team workflows, and MCP/agent setup

Start here:

  • Good first issues
  • Contributor guide
  • Add an agent
  • Add a security rule
  • Write a custom agent plugin
  • Handle MCP environment variables safely
  • Use Ship Safe with Codex
  • Use Ship Safe with Claude Code
  • Release process

Sponsors

Ship Safe is MIT-licensed and free forever.

Sponsor Ship Safe


Star History

Star History Chart


Ship fast. Ship safe. — shipsafe.sh

Scarica lo strumento
GitHistoryScannerSecretsLeaked secrets in git commit history
CICDScannerCI/CDPipeline poisoning, unpinned actions, secret logging (OWASP CI/CD Top 10)
APIFuzzerAPIRoutes without auth, mass assignment, GraphQL introspection, debug endpoints
ManagedAgentScannerAI/LLMClaude Managed Agent misconfigs: always_allow policies, unrestricted networking (ASI-03–ASI-07)
HermesSecurityAgentAI/LLMTool registry poisoning, function-call injection, skill permission drift (ASI-01–ASI-10)
AgentAttestationAgentSupply ChainUnpinned agent versions, missing integrity hashes, unsigned manifests (ASI-10, SLSA L0)
AgenticSupplyChainAgentSupply ChainOver-privileged AI CI actions, OAuth scope creep, unsigned AI webhook receivers (ASI-02, ASI-06)
RobloxSecurityAgentSupply ChainMalicious Roblox/Luau Toolbox assets (runtime asset injection, rbxassetid:// loaders, HttpEnabled, payloads hidden in instance attributes)
ModelScanAgentSupply ChainCode-execution payloads in ML model weights (pickle opcodes in .pt/.pkl/.ckpt), torch.load without weights_only, scanner-evasion archives (CWE-502, CWE-506)
TrustBoundaryAgentAgenticGhostApproval symlink attacks (config-named links into ~/.ssh/~/.aws/.env), repo symlinks escaping the tree, and Friendly Fire run-on-review instructions in agent-read docs (CWE-59, CWE-61)
SlopSquatAgentSupply ChainHallucinated / phantom package imports (slopsquatting) — bare imports not declared, installed, or builtin, plus known AI-hallucinated names (CWE-1357)
ClickFixAgentSupply ChainClickFix / fake-CAPTCHA paste-and-run lures (fake error + Win+R/Ctrl+V/command-bar keystrokes, PowerShell cradles) and fake-installer npm lifecycle scripts (CWE-1357, CWE-506)
InstallGuardAgentSupply Chainnpm worm behaviors in lifecycle scripts (credential harvesting, env exfiltration, destructive rm -rf, obfuscated node -e) and weaponized binding.gyp node-gyp actions (CWE-506, CWE-829)