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GitHubd4ytox/cve-2026-119618

CVE-2026-119618

Differential lab and PoC driver for CVE-2026-119618, an unauthenticated HTTP/2 race in Apache httpd mod_http2 assign_headers() that corrupts the heap and crashes workers.

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CVE-2026-119618 - Apache httpd mod_http2 heap corruption in assign_headers()

assign_headers() in mod_http2 writes a synthesised Content-Length: 0 into the wrong table. It belongs in the request-private r->headers_in; it goes into req->headers, which lives on the stream pool that the HTTP/2 connection thread still owns. When that table happens to be full the write grows it, allocating from a pool whose allocator has no mutex, while the connection thread is allocating from and freeing to the same allocator. Both threads can be handed the same memory, and the child process's heap is corrupted.

Reaching it takes one unauthenticated HTTP/2 request shape and no credentials.

Affects httpd 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 and standalone mod_h2 2.0.8 through 2.0.42. Fixed in httpd 2.4.71 on 11 November 2026. icing/mod_h2 is archived at 2.0.42 with no fixed release, so this targets httpd.

Usage

./run-lab.sh build       # compile httpd 2.4.70 and 2.4.71, build the runner
./run-lab.sh up          # start vulnerable, fixed and mitigated servers
./run-lab.sh diff        # classify both, no race driven
./run-lab.sh exploit     # drive the race against the vulnerable server
./run-lab.sh probe       # every request shape, trigger and control
./run-lab.sh down

Tuning

The hit rate is dominated by --pad, the length of each filler header value:

./run-lab.sh sweep-pad          # find the local optimum, once per host
PAD=1536 ./run-lab.sh exploit   # then drive the race at it

On the build below that took the rate from 36.6 to 277.3 events per 10,000 requests. The response is quantised, not proportional — 512 and 1536 are peaks, 768 and 1024 are dead zones that produce almost nothing. Do not inherit the number; measure it, because a dead value looks like a working exploit finding nothing. ./run-lab.sh sweep-streams, sweep-fill and sweep-conn tune the rest. Read sweep-streams rather than sweep-conn for concurrency: the contending threads belong to a single connection, so spreading a fixed request budget over more connections lowers the pressure on each allocator and the rate falls.

Exit codes

0not affected
1affected build identified, or corruption confirmed
2unreachable
3no request reached the vulnerable code, so not a valid test
4mitigated: HTTP/2 is not offered
5affected build, but the race did not land in this run

5 exists because a probabilistic miss is a property of the run, not a clean bill of health for the target.

Results

Measured on the event MPM, aarch64, engine kernel 7.0.14-linuxkit, 2 CPUs per container, 14 November 2026. Every figure below is reproducible with the commands above.

Events are sanitizer reports naming this code path, or children killed by a fatal signal, per 10,000 requests the server's access log shows reached a handler. Five matched runs per arm, 15,000 requests offered to each:

buildreached handlereventsper 10,000
vulnerable 2.4.7061,59938061.69, SD 4.14
fixed 2.4.7172,47800.00
  • Not an instrumentation artifact: with no sanitizer the vulnerable build crashes more, 114 dead children over 12,803 requests against zero.
  • 40 of 61 reports fault inside APR's allocator, on the connection thread. That is the free side of the race; googlesky's ThreadSanitizer output catches the allocating side.
  • Only the trigger shapes corrupt anything. Five controls, each varying one condition at a matched header count, produced zero over 120,000 to 180,000 requests each.
  • The rate scales with streams in flight on one connection, 22.45 per 10,000 at one rising to 69.52 at 32. That dose-response is what makes it a race.

A full table turns out to be necessary but not sufficient: the growth must also be large enough to miss apr_palloc()'s fast path, so 8, 18 and 38 filler headers fill the table and produce nothing while 78 and 158 corrupt.

What this shows

  • Denial of service, by crashing worker processes. Under the event MPM each crashed child takes every connection it was serving with it.

patches/ holds two diagnostic instruments: an allocator-level concurrency assertion for APR, and a window-widening delay that must be applied to both builds or it proves nothing. Both supplement the unmodified-binary result.

Affected versions

FieldValue
CVECVE-2026-119618
ComponentApache HTTP Server, mod_http2 (standalone mod_h2)
Affectedhttpd 2.4.55 - 2.4.70; mod_h2 2.0.8 - 2.0.42
Fixed inhttpd 2.4.71; mod_h2 archived at 2.0.42, no fixed release
Fix commit824beab9b9424d6cfb29595248fdbf6c3dddeab1 (Eric Covener, PRs #975/#977)
CWECWE-362 (ASF)
Vectornetwork, unauthenticated, HTTP/2 over h2c or TLS h2
Workaroundremove h2 and h2c from Protocols
Published11 November 2026

Origin

RoleWho
Discovered and reportedAnthropic's OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-MAPKT6MZ); Anthony Weems and Simon Scannell, Google Cloud Vulnerability Research
Vendor advisory and fixThe Apache HTTP Server project, httpd 2.4.71
Reference PoC and lab designgooglesky (Le Hieu), MIT
Reference root-cause analysisblkph0x, MIT
This implementationd4ytox

The vulnerability is not mine. The HTTP/2 client, the PoC driver, the lab build, the controls and the sweeps are. The request-shape taxonomy and the functional-probe idea follow googlesky's public lab; the root-cause reading cross-checks against blkph0x's analysis. Both are MIT licensed and credited in the file headers.

References

  • Apache HTTP Server security advisory
  • NVD - CVE-2026-119618
  • Red Hat vulnerability record and RHSB-2026-017
  • Debian and Ubuntu trackers
  • Upstream fix commit 824beab9b9424d6cfb29595248fdbf6c3dddeab1 in httpd 2.4.71
  • googlesky/CVE-2026-119618 - reference PoC, and the ThreadSanitizer output this lab could not reproduce locally
  • blkph0x/CVE-2026-119618-mod_http2-lab - reference analysis, Helgrind reports, and a gated pointer disclosure
  • icing/mod_h2 - the standalone module

Licence

MIT, see LICENSE. The grant covers this implementation. The vulnerability was found by the researchers named above; the reference PoC and analysis are MIT-licensed work by googlesky and blkph0x, credited in the file headers and the Origin table, and this is not a relicensing of their work.

Legal

For authorised testing and research only. The PoC drives a heap-corruption race that crashes the target's httpd child processes, so it is disruptive by nature, and under the event MPM each crashed child takes every connection it was serving with it. Running this against a system you do not own, or do not have written permission to test, is illegal in most places. The lab is self-contained and reachable only from inside the container engine.

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