
Proof-of-concept and advisory for CVE-2026-120318: missing authorization in WooCommerce Product Gallery Slider Codestar backup handlers enabling Shop Manager privilege escalation.
Product Gallery Slider for WooCommerce — missing authorization on the Codestar Framework backup handlers.
A WooCommerce Shop Manager can read, write and delete arbitrary wp_options rows, and
by rewriting wp_user_roles promote every Subscriber to Administrator.
| CVE | CVE-2026-120318 |
| Plugin | Product Gallery Slider & Additional Variation Images for WooCommerce (woo-product-gallery-slider) |
| Vendor | Codeixer |
| Affected | >= 2.3.23, < 2.3.26 |
| Fixed in | 2.3.26 (2026-10-31) |
| Class | Missing Authorization (CWE-862) → Privilege Escalation (CWE-269) |
| Privilege required | manage_woocommerce (Shop Manager) |
| CVSS 4.0 | 8.6 High — AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (as published) |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.8 High — AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (analyst assessment, see CVSS) |
| Reporter | Youssef Alaoui Hichami — LinkedIn · @7xd10 |
Through 2.3.22 the plugin's settings screen required manage_options, so only an
Administrator could reach it and mint the csf_backup_nonce. 2.3.23 lowered that menu
capability to manage_woocommerce, which is what puts the nonce — and therefore the three
unguarded AJAX handlers — in reach of a Shop Manager. The handlers themselves were never
guarded by current_user_can(); 2.3.26 finally added the check.
Registered with no capability check in includes/codestar/functions/actions.php:
| Action | Sink | Effect |
|---|---|---|
csf-export | get_option( $_GET['unique'] ) | read any option |
csf-import | update_option( $_POST['unique'], $data ) | overwrite any array option |
csf-reset | delete_option( $_POST['unique'] ) | delete any option |
The only gate is wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, 'csf_backup_nonce' ), and that nonce is rendered
as a data-nonce attribute on the settings page the Shop Manager can open.
csf-import rejects non-array payloads, so the target is wp_user_roles — array-shaped by
definition. Export it, copy administrator.capabilities over subscriber.capabilities,
import it back. Every Subscriber on the site is now an Administrator, while still reading
roles=subscriber.
As published by VulnCheck — CVSS v4.0, 8.6 High:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
| Metric | Value | Reason |
|---|---|---|
AV | N | admin-ajax.php over plain HTTP |
AC | L | The nonce is printed in the settings page HTML; no race, no special condition |
AT | N | No additional attack conditions |
PR | H | Requires a Shop Manager account (manage_woocommerce) |
UI | N | No victim interaction — the attacker drives every request with their own session |
VC | H | Any wp_options row readable, including API keys and SMTP credentials |
VI | H | Any array-shaped option writable; wp_user_roles rewritten |
VA | H | csf-reset deletes siteurl, home, active_plugins, template |
SC SI SA | N | v4.0 scores no subsequent-system impact |
Scored independently in v3.1 terms as AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8.
The one parameter that differs from a plain S:U reading is S:U → S:C. A WooCommerce
Shop Manager is scoped to one store's commerce data: orders, products, coupons. csf-export /
csf-import / csf-reset let that account write wp_user_roles, which is not store data —
it is the site's authentication and authorization authority. The vulnerable component
(Codestar backup handlers, reachable at store-manager privilege) and the impacted component
(site-wide role table, consumed by WP_User::has_cap()) are different components with
different security authorities, which is what a scope change encodes in v3.1.
v3.1 metrics:
| Metric | Value | Reason |
|---|---|---|
AV | N | admin-ajax.php over HTTP |
AC | L | Nonce printed into the settings page HTML |
PR | H | Requires a Shop Manager account |
UI | N | No victim action |
S | C | Store-scoped role → site-wide authorization authority |
C | H | Arbitrary wp_options read |
I | H | Arbitrary option write; wp_user_roles rewritten |
A | H | Arbitrary option delete |
If shop_manager is scored as a low-privileged account rather than an administrative one,
v3.1 yields AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.3. The record of authority is the
8.6 v4.0 score above; the v3.1 figures are here for readers who score in v3.1.
python3 poc/poc.py --url http://target --user shopmgr --password 'secret'
The script logs in, harvests the nonce, demonstrates arbitrary option read, performs the
wp_user_roles escalation, verifies it, and restores the original role table. Add
--reset-option blogdescription for the arbitrary-delete proof; add --no-restore to leave
the escalation in place.
A pure-curl walkthrough is in poc/poc.sh. The unedited run against
WordPress 7.1.4 / WooCommerce 11.2.1 / plugin 2.3.25 is in
evidence/transcript.txt.
advisory.md — root cause with verbatim source, the 2.3.26 diff, nonce
provenance, step-by-step reproduction, impact and remediation.
Upgrade to 2.3.26 or later. If that is not possible, add
current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) to csf_export(), csf_import_ajax() and
csf_reset_ajax(), or remove the three add_action() registrations.
Youssef Alaoui Hichami
Published for defensive purposes. The proof of concept is intended for use against systems you own or are explicitly authorised to test.