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fivem-backdoor-scanner — Find backdoors in FiveM resources before you start them: hidden loaders, remote load(), obfuscated payloads, leaked tokens. CLI, CI step, library. | Kitploit
Outils/GitHubGitHub/rpscripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner
Defensive ToolsStatic AnalysisVulnerability ScannersCode AnalysisScripting & AutomationMalware AnalysisDevSecOpsSecret DetectionSupply Chain Security
GitHubrpscripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner

fivem-backdoor-scanner

156il y a 1 jourPas encore vérifié

Find backdoors in FiveM resources before you start them: hidden loaders, remote load(), obfuscated payloads, leaked tokens. CLI, CI step, library.

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FiveM Backdoor Scanner

Checks FiveM resources for backdoors before you start them. It reads .lua and .js files, parses the Lua and looks for the patterns known FiveM backdoors use: a loader hidden behind thousands of spaces, code downloaded over HTTP and passed to load(), obfuscated payloads, reads of your license key or RCON password, and tokens left in the files. It also flags executables and unsafe paths in a package.

Nothing is executed and nothing is uploaded. Same rules as the free browser version on RPScripts, which also takes a ZIP or a whole server folder by drag and drop.

Usage

Node.js 18 or newer. No install needed:

npx github:rpScripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner ./resources

Scan a single resource, several folders, a ZIP (up to 300 MB), or get JSON for your own tooling:

npx github:rpScripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner ./resources/[shops]/my_shop ./resources/[jobs]
npx github:rpScripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner ./downloaded-pack.zip
npx github:rpScripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner ./resources --json > report.json

Exit code 0 = nothing found, 1 = findings, 2 = wrong usage, 3 = a scan could not run (missing path, ZIP that is not readable or over 300 MB). That makes it usable as a CI step:

# .github/workflows/backdoor-scan.yml
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
        with: { node-version: 20 }
      - run: npx --yes github:rpScripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner ./resources

What it checks

CodeSeverityFinds
LAB-SEC-107errorCode pushed out of view after 400+ spaces or tabs (the loader trick of a known backdoor family)
LAB-SEC-101warningload() / loadstring() on the body of an HTTP response
LAB-SEC-102warningload() on text decoded at runtime (string.char, escaped bytes, base64/hex decoders)
LAB-SEC-103warningObfuscated data: long escaped-byte strings, 400+ character base64/hex, long string.char lists
LAB-SEC-104warningReads sv_licenseKey, rcon_password, sv_tebexSecret, or the MySQL string in a file that sends HTTP
LAB-SEC-105warningHTTP requests to a public raw IP or to an address decoded at runtime
LAB-SEC-106warningos.execute, io.popen, JavaScript child_process, writes outside the own resource, SaveResourceFile into other resources
LAB-SEC-108warningA real-shaped Discord bot token, Discord webhook, Cfx license key or GitHub token in the files
LAB-SEC-109warningExecuteCommand("add_principal identifier.license:<hex> …") or add_ace identifier.… with a hard-coded person (an admin planted in the file)
LAB-SEC-110warningload() / loadstring() on a parameter of an event handler: anyone who can trigger the event runs code
LAB-SEC-111warningJavaScript with eval, new Function or vm.run* in a file that also fetches (fetch, http(s)) or decodes (atob, base64, fromCharCode) text
LAB-SEC-112warningA string of the Blum / Warden / Cipher / GFX Panel backdoor (C2 hosts, operator keys, txAdmin tampering markers), or a manifest that loads a .js from a dot file or folder or after a commented-out entry
LAB-PKG-004warning.exe, .dll, .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .sh, .vbs, .jar, .scr in a folder or archive (.dll is expected next to a *.net.dll, a C# resource)
LAB-PKG-005warningArchive entry with .., an absolute path or a drive letter: extracting it can write outside the target folder

Warnings are patterns, not proof: a webhook logger can legitimately call a raw IP. Read the reported line and decide. An error (LAB-SEC-107) means treat the package as compromised. Every finding carries severity, confidence, method, a fix text and references; the texts are in rules/catalog.json, versions in rules/CHANGELOG.md. Rule codes never change meaning.

Verdicts

  • hidden: hidden code found.
  • suspicious: at least one warning.
  • partial: nothing found, but some files could not be checked in full (escrow-encrypted .fxap folders, compiled Lua, Lua that did not parse, JavaScript where only the text checks run, files over 2 MB, archives inside the upload).
  • clean: every Lua file was parsed and checked, nothing found.

Findings always win over coverage. A clean result covers these patterns only. It does not prove a resource is safe.

Limits

  • Escrow-protected code can only be read by FXServer, so no scanner can check it.
  • The Lua checks need a parse. CfxLua syntax (+=, ?., <const>, backtick hashes, /* */) is supported.
  • JavaScript gets the hidden-code and credential checks plus the text patterns above (LAB-SEC-111, child_process), no parser. A JavaScript backdoor that avoids those words is not seen.
  • Not detected: a function name decoded at runtime and called as _G[name], load(LoadResourceFile(other, …)), a remote <script src> in NUI HTML, escrowed or compiled code. Tested on 11 well-known open-source resources (ox_lib, qb-core, esx_core, txAdmin, …): no hidden-code finding, a few expected warnings (rcon_password in the runcode dev tool, SaveResourceFile).
  • Archives inside a ZIP (.zip, .rar, .7z) are listed, not unpacked. Only .zip is read.
  • 2 MB per file and 120 MB of code in total. ZIP entries whose header, size or CRC disagree with the central directory, or that an extractor would write under another name, are reported as unreadable, never as clean.
  • node_modules and .git are skipped in a folder scan. stream folders are scanned.

Library use

import { scanFiles, scanPath, securityRules } from "fivem-backdoor-scanner";

const one = securityRules("server.lua", source); // { findings, parsed }
const report = await scanPath("./resources"); // folder, ZIP or file
const inMemory = scanFiles({ "server.lua": source });
console.log(report.verdict, report.findings);

Contributing

Found a backdoor the scanner misses, or a false positive in a well-known resource? Open an issue with the pattern (never a live payload or a token); see CONTRIBUTING.md. To report a family without publishing it, see SECURITY.md.

git clone https://github.com/rpScripts/fivem-backdoor-scanner.git
cd fivem-backdoor-scanner && npm ci && npm test

Maintained by RPScripts. MIT licensed. The software is provided "as is", without warranty of any kind.

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