Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
HerramientasExploitsBlog
Log in
Enviar
HerramientasExploitsBlog
Enviar

¡Herramientas de Hacking, PenTest y Ciberseguridad para tu Arsenal de Seguridad!

Kitploit es un directorio de herramientas de hacking, ciberseguridad y pentesting. Descubre las últimas actualizaciones de proyectos para encontrar vulnerabilidades, analizar sistemas, automatizar pruebas y fortalecer tu seguridad.

FeedsContactoPrivacidad© 2026 Kitploit

Directorio de Herramientas

Categorías

Ver todas las categorías
Loading categories
CVE-pipeshub — CVE-2026-119712 (CVSS 8.5 High) — PipesHub < 0.10.0 SSRF via image URLs in indexed documents (CWE-918). Verified PoC. | Kitploit
Herramientas/GitHubGitHub/hyderpwn/cve-pipeshub
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityPenetration TestingAuthenticationRed TeamingAPI Security
GitHubhyderpwn/cve-pipeshub

CVE-pipeshub

CVE-2026-119712 (CVSS 8.5 High) — PipesHub < 0.10.0 SSRF via image URLs in indexed documents (CWE-918). Verified PoC.

hace 21 díasAún no revisado
Ver Repositorio

Más Populares

Ver todos →

Descubre las herramientas más usadas por nuestra comunidad.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 El kit de herramientas OSINT definitivo: grafo de investigación, puntuación de confianza, familias de alias, mapa, línea de tiempo e informes. 49 módulos, más de 400 sitios, sin necesidad de claves API.

    1.1k
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    # Aplicación de Ejecución con un Solo Toque GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499)

    601
  • 3

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    Plataforma CSIRT que ingiere informes de Shadowserver en MongoDB y los reproduce como mapas interactivos, análisis, hallazgos, avisos y paneles ejecutivos.

    403
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    Plataforma de pruebas de penetración autónoma multiagente basada en LLM con agentes planificadores/trabajadores, grafos de activos y de exploración, registro de tráfico MITM y reevaluación de vulnerabilidades.

    319
  • 5

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    El sistema de acción para la ciberseguridad nativa de IA—donde la intención se convierte en ejecución gobernada, la evidencia se convierte en memoria operativa y cada operación mejora la siguiente.

    265
  • 6

    Aliens_eye

    arxhr007/aliens_eye

    Motor de OSINT impulsado por IA para descubrir y mapear más de 7.700 identidades en redes sociales en toda la web

    263

Explora todas las herramientas

Explora nuestra colección de herramientas

Ver todas las herramientas →
Compartir
Contenido no disponible en el idioma solicitado. Mostrando versión en inglés.

PipesHub — CVE exploits (pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai)

Proof-of-concept exploits for vulnerabilities in PipesHub, a workplace AI platform for enterprise search and workflow automation.

CVESeverityTypeExploit
CVE-2026-1197128.5 HighSSRF via image URLs in indexed documentsCVE-2026-119712.py
CVE-2026-1197108.1 HighUnauthorized connector deletion via the crawling-manager schedule routeCVE-2026-119710.py
CVE-2026-1197117.3 HighRate-limit bypass via a spoofed X-Forwarded-For headerCVE-2026-119711.py

Authorized security testing and research only. The PoCs are dependency-free (Python 3 stdlib) and were verified against the repository source.


CVE-2026-119712 — SSRF via image URLs in indexed documents

PipesHub's image parser fetches image URLs taken from document content — a synced mailbox, a crawled page, or an authenticated upload — with a raw HTTP request that is not routed through the project's SSRF "blocked-host" policy. A URL embedded in a document makes the indexing service issue a server-side request to an internal, loopback, or cloud-metadata address.

CVECVE-2026-119712
Vendor / productPipesHub — github.com/pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai
Affected< 0.10.0 (fixed in 0.10.0)
Componentbackend/python/app/modules/parsers/image_parser/image_parser.py
ClassCWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery)
CVSS v3.18.5 (High)

Root cause

# backend/python/app/modules/parsers/image_parser/image_parser.py
# _fetch_single_url  :140-145
if not ImageParser._is_valid_image_url(url):        # :141  returns True for ANY http(s) URL
    return None
async with session.get(                             # :145  the SSRF sink
    url, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=10), allow_redirects=True
) as response:
    ...

_is_valid_image_url (:75-103) requires only that the URL start with http:// or https://; the file-extension check is a fast-path that falls through to "If we can't determine from URL, allow it…". The response is later gated on Content-Type image/*, but:

  • the outbound request has already been made — a blind SSRF reaches the target regardless of what it returns; and
  • allow_redirects=True with no per-hop revalidation lets an attacker URL ending in .png 302-redirect into an internal target.

The project already built the safe path — app.utils.url_fetcher.resolve_public_http_target

  • app.utils.public_http.PublicUrlFetcher — which resolves and pins every hop to a validated public address, re-checks each redirect, blocks private/loopback/link-local/ reserved ranges, and disables proxies. The 2026-09-14 fix 23f85354d routed image_utils, the skills importer and fetch_url through it — but not this image parser path. Reachable loopback/internal targets therefore include 127.0.0.1, RFC-1918 ranges, and the cloud metadata endpoint 169.254.169.254 — none of which the image parser blocks.

Exploit

CVE-2026-119712.py stands up an in-process internal service (returns Content-Type: image/png + a secret body) and an attacker image host (/evil.png → 302 → internal), then drives the vulnerable fetch:

  • [A] direct SSRF — fetch http://127.0.0.1:<internal>/latest/meta-data/iam/creds.png; the internal service receives the request and its body is exfiltrated back as base64 (the parser embeds it into the document).
  • [B] redirect bypass — fetch the attacker's …/evil.png (passes _is_valid_image_url); the 302 is followed into the internal target.
  • [C] control — run the SSRF guard the code skipped (resolve_public_http_target); it rejects the same URL, proving the fix exists but is not applied to this path.

Two modes:

  • --real (default when importable) drives the actual ImageParser._fetch_single_url from the repo. Needs the PipesHub source and its deps:
    python3 -m venv venv && ./venv/bin/pip install aiohttp httpx pydantic
    ./venv/bin/python CVE-2026-119712.py --real --src /path/to/pipeshub-ai/backend/python
    
  • --standalone faithfully reproduces image_parser.py:140-145 (aiohttp, falling back to stdlib urllib so it runs with zero third-party deps). Auto-selected if the real import fails.
    python3 CVE-2026-119712.py --standalone
    

Verified output

[A] direct SSRF to a loopback/internal target: http://127.0.0.1:<p>/latest/meta-data/iam/creds.png
    internal service received the request: True
    exfiltrated internal body: 'INTERNAL-SECRET-…-metadata-token'
[B] redirect bypass — attacker '.png' URL 302 -> internal
    attacker host hit: True; redirect followed into internal: True
[C] the SSRF guard the code skipped: blocks this URL = True
    resolve_public_http_target raised FetchError: Blocked unsafe URL address: 127.0.0.1

 EXPLOIT CONFIRMED — a content-supplied image URL drove a server-side request
 to an internal/loopback target (directly and via a .png redirect).

Confirmed both ways: driving the real ImageParser._fetch_single_url (against the repo source) and the standalone reproduction.

Impact

  • Server-side requests to internal services, loopback, RFC-1918 hosts, and the cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) — reachable from document content an attacker can plant via a synced mailbox, a crawled page, or an authenticated upload.
  • Where a fetched target returns an image/* content type, its response body is exfiltrated back into the indexed document as base64; otherwise it is a blind SSRF (port scanning, hitting internal unauthenticated endpoints, request smuggling via the redirect hop).

Remediation

  • Route this fetch through the existing policy: resolve and validate the URL with resolve_public_http_target / PublicUrlFetcher (connection-pinning and per-hop revalidation), instead of calling session.get directly — the same change already made for image_utils, the skills importer and fetch_url in 23f85354d.
  • Re-check every redirect hop rather than relying on allow_redirects=True, and clear proxy environment variables for these fetches.
  • Consider a single fetch_external(url) helper and make it the only way any part of the codebase reaches a URL chosen by a user or by document content.

Authorized security testing and research only. Verified against repository source and pipeshubai/pipeshub-ai:slim (image built 2026-09-17, which contains 23f85354d). Reported to the maintainers per SECURITY.md.


CVE-2026-119710 — Unauthorized connector deletion via the schedule route

POST /api/v1/crawlingManager/:connector/:connectorId/schedule validates the connectorId but takes :connector as an arbitrary string and requires only the crawl:write scope. That path parameter becomes the message-broker event type, and the connector service re-parses it and dispatches on its second dotted segment as the action — so :connector = "web.delete" runs the DELETE handler, destroying a connector and its indexed records, bypassing the CONNECTOR_DELETE scope and the require_connector_not_locked guard.

Descargar herramienta