
Practical defense guidelines against Evil Twin attacks in public Wi-Fi — full research cycle: threat analysis, isolated lab simulation (Kali Linux / airgeddon), and 6-rule protection framework
Individual research project. MAOU Gymnasium №16, Tyumen, Russia (2026)
Author: Saveliy Golubev | Supervisor: Yulia Myshko, Informatics Teacher
Awarded 3rd Place at the Lomonosov Readings Research Conference (МАОУ Гимназия №16, Тюмень, 2026)
This project presents a full research cycle on the Evil Twin attack, one of the most prevalent and underestimated threats in public Wi-Fi environments. The work combines rigorous theoretical analysis with hands-on simulation in an isolated laboratory, culminating in a practical set of defensive guidelines for everyday users.
Core hypothesis: A live, controlled demonstration of an Evil Twin attack produces more effective and internalized security guidelines than purely theoretical analysis.
| Award | 3rd Place, Individual Research Project |
| Event | Lomonosov Readings (Ломоносовские чтения), School Research Conference |
| Institution | MAOU Gymnasium №16, Tyumen, Russia |
| Year | 2026 |
| Category | Informatics |
The project was recognized by the conference jury for combining a rigorous theoretical analysis of 802.11 vulnerabilities with a fully reproducible lab simulation and a practical, user-oriented defense framework, bridging academic research and applied digital safety education.
Public Wi-Fi networks (cafes, airports, universities) have become standard infrastructure. Their primary advantage, open accessibility, is also their greatest security liability. Evil Twin attacks exploit this by:
The attack requires no advanced skills. Off-the-shelf tools automate every stage within minutes. This accessibility is precisely what makes it dangerous and worthy of public education.
| Chapter | Focus |
|---|---|
| 1. Theoretical Analysis | 802.11 architecture vulnerabilities, attack mechanics (5-stage model), comparison with other Wi-Fi attacks, legal and ethical framework |
| 2. Lab Simulation | Isolated VirtualBox environment, airgeddon v11.22 framework, captive portal mechanics, WPA2 shared-key attack variant |
| 3. Defense Guidelines | 6-rule protection framework, technical detection methods, VPN vs Tor vs hotspot comparison, vendor/ISP responsibilities |
[Physical Host: Windows]
│
└─ [VirtualBox Internal Network] ──► NO external connectivity
│
├─ Kali Linux VM (attacker)
└─ Android Device (victim, manual connection)
flowchart LR
A["1. Reconnaissance\nairodump-ng\nmonitor mode"]
B["2. Evil Twin\nhostapd\ncloned SSID"]
C["3. Deauth\naireplay-ng\nforced disconnect"]
D["4. Interception\ndnsmasq + iptables\nall traffic routed"]
E["5. Phishing Portal\nlighttpd\ncredentials captured"]
A --> B --> C --> D --> E
style C fill:#c0392b,color:#fff
style E fill:#c0392b,color:#fff
The full attack chain was reproduced in ~15 minutes from VM launch to credential capture:
Free_Public_Lab, encryption disabledaireplay-ng deauth packets forced the victim device to disconnect from the legitimate APtest_user / Sup3rSecret!) entered by the victim, immediately displayed in the attacker terminalExtended scenario: Attack was also validated against a WPA2 network with a shared password (PublicPassword123), confirming that knowing the network password offers no protection against Evil Twin.
All experiments were conducted exclusively on researcher-owned equipment in a physically and logically isolated environment, using test credentials only. No real user data was intercepted at any point.

A trusted VPN encrypts all traffic before it leaves the device. Even on a compromised Evil Twin network, the attacker sees only an encrypted stream between the device and the VPN server.
Starbucks_Free vs Google Starbucks)