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cve-2026-114630-poc

CVE-2026-114630 - ELEX HelpDesk <= 3.3.8 unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion (PoC + exploit by thiscitze)

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15 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-114630 — ELEX HelpDesk unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion

by thiscitze

ProductELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System (elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system)
Affected<= 3.3.8
TypePath traversal / arbitrary unlink() (CWE-22)
ImpactUnauthenticated file deletion; RCE depends on the deleted file
CVSS9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H)
NVDhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114630

Summary

Two bugs combine into an unauthenticated unlink() primitive:

  1. Arbitrary ticket meta. eh_crm_new_ticket_post is registered with wp_ajax_nopriv_ and, after verifying the wsdesk_nonce, copies every field of the form POST parameter into ticket meta:

    foreach ( $post_values as $key => $value ) {
        $meta[ $key ] = $value;
    }
    

    Arrays are serialized by eh_crm_insert_ticketmeta(). Supplying ticket_attachment_path[]=/path/to/file therefore stores an attacker chosen path in the ticket meta.

  2. Unguarded factory reset. The plugin runs the reset handler at load time, before auth_redirect() on wp-admin/admin.php:

    if ( isset( $_GET['page'] ) ) {
        if ( is_admin() ) {
            if ( 'wsdesk_factory_reset' === $_GET['page'] ) {
                EH_CRM_Init_Handler::factory_reset();
            }
        }
    }
    

    is_admin() is a request-type check, not a capability check. factory_reset() walks every ticket and calls unlink() on every ticket_attachment_path.

The nonce (wsdesk_nonce) is printed on any page that renders the [wsdesk_support] shortcode, so an anonymous visitor can obtain it.

This is destructive. Besides the unlink() calls, the reset routine deactivates the plugin, drops the wsdesk_* tables and deletes the support page. Use it only on a disposable lab instance.

Requirements

  • A page rendering [wsdesk_support] (the PoC discovers it automatically)
  • The plugin active and reachable
  • Python 3.6+, no third-party packages

Usage

# default target: the plugin's readme.txt (safe verification)
python3 poc.py --url https://target.example --yes

# delete a specific file (absolute path on the server)
python3 poc.py --url https://target.example --yes \
    --target /var/www/html/wp-config.php \
    --check /wp-config.php

# support page not discoverable
python3 poc.py --url https://target.example --support-url https://target.example/support/ --yes

Options:

FlagMeaning
--target PATHabsolute path passed to unlink()
--check URLURL used to verify deletion (default: plugin readme.txt)
--no-verifyskip the 404 verification
--yesrequired for the destructive reset when stdin is not a TTY
--support-urlpage with the support shortcode
--proxyHTTP proxy

Exit codes: 0 deletion verified, 2 aborted/unverified, 1 failure.

How the PoC works

  1. Finds the support page (REST API, homepage, common paths) and extracts the support_object JSON (ajax_url, nonce).
  2. Posts a ticket whose form payload includes ticket_attachment_path[]=<target>; the array is stored serialized in the ticket meta.
  3. Requests wp-admin/admin.php?page=wsdesk_factory_reset, which reaches the handler before auth_redirect() and unlinks the path.
  4. Verifies the deletion with a 404 on --check.

Impact notes

Deleting wp-config.php drops the site into the installer; depending on the environment this can lead to a full takeover. Deleting security plugin files, .htaccess or a must-use plugin can expose other attack surface. The primitive is simple: any file writable by the web user can be removed.

Detection

  • POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=eh_crm_new_ticket_post and a form field containing ticket_attachment_path
  • GET /wp-admin/admin.php?page=wsdesk_factory_reset from an unauthenticated client
  • Plugin deactivation followed by DROP TABLE wp_wsdesk_* and a burst of unlink() calls in the audit log

Mitigation

  • Update past 3.3.8 (the vendor change set is referenced in the NVD entry)
  • Add a real capability check (current_user_can('manage_options')) and a nonce to the reset handler
  • Never copy arbitrary request keys into ticket meta
  • WAF rule: block page=wsdesk_factory_reset for unauthenticated users

References

  • NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114630
  • Wordfence: https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2151249a-8e7a-4c7b-89ff-5058942368fb
  • Plugin source (3.3.8): https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system/tags/3.3.8

Disclaimer

For authorized testing and lab use only. The reset step destroys data by design; do not point this at a production site.


written by thiscitze · github.com/thiscitze

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