
CVE-2026-118378: SQL injection in Tabularis SQLite driver via MCP describe_table (fixed in 0.28.0)
describe_table| Product | Tabularis, desktop SQL workspace with a built-in MCP server |
| Affected | < 0.28.0 (tested at 54d9eae2) |
| Fixed | 0.28.0 |
| CVE | CVE-2026-118378 (VulnCheck) |
| Advisory | GHSA-xrx3-j98v-67x9 |
| CWE | CWE-89, CWE-863 |
| CVSS 3.1 | 7.8 AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Found by | Dostxodjayev Abdullox (@squeeze440) |
The SQLite driver built its schema introspection queries by pasting the table name into a string literal:
// src-tauri/src/drivers/sqlite/mod.rs (get_columns, also get_foreign_keys, get_indexes and the batch variants)
let query = format!("PRAGMA table_info('{}')", table_name);
sqlx::query(&query).fetch_all(&pool).await
sqlx-sqlite 0.8.6 prepares and steps every statement in that string, not just the first, so a table name that closes the quote and adds ; runs a second statement. The MySQL and Postgres drivers bind the same lookup as a parameter. SQLite was the odd one out.
The MCP server's describe_table tool passes table_name straight from the tool call to the driver. Tabularis's read-only mode and write-approval gate only run inside run_query, so describe_table skips them. An agent steered by prompt injection could drop or change data on a connection the user had marked read-only.
{"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"describe_table",
"arguments":{"connection_id":"<sqlite-conn>","table_name":"x'); DROP TABLE customers;--"}}}
poc.py drives libsqlite3 with the same prepare-and-step loop that sqlx uses, on the exact string the driver builds:
$ python3 poc.py
tables before: ['customers']
query: PRAGMA table_info('x'); DROP TABLE customers;--')
statements executed: 2
tables after: []
I couldn't build the Tauri binary in my environment, so this reproduces the mechanism (driver string plus sqlx's statement loop) rather than running the app end to end.