CVE-2026-43664
"The magic of NSUserDefaults…"
Any app can silently read the user's AirPods Bluetooth MAC address and 150+ system preference keys via NSUserDefaults persistentDomainForName: without any permission or entitlement.
The preference subsystem does not enforce per-domain access control for these system daemon preference files when queried by sandboxed apps.
In addition to the Bluetooth MAC, the same API call provides unauthorized access to 8 system preference domains totaling 150+ keys, including:
- com.apple.Accessibility (60 keys): AirPods Bluetooth MAC address, hearing aid pairing status, GuestPass device UUID, VoiceOver/AssistiveTouch configuration
- com.apple.camera (70 keys): Full camera usage profile - capture mode, portrait aperture, smudge detection analytics, last settings date — without Camera permission
- com.apple.locationd (12 keys): Location Services enabled status, step counting enabled, VO2Max CloudKit timing, AirTag metrics — without Location permission
- com.apple.assistant.support (8 keys): Siri enabled/disabled, Dictation enabled/disabled, Siri Data Sharing Opt-In Status
- com.apple.GEO (6 keys): Maps route cache tile hash, navigation voice guidance levels
- com.apple.UIKit (6 keys): Preferred text size, dictation status
- com.apple.keyboard (3 keys): Keyboard setup state
- com.apple.preferences.sounds (1 key): Haptic feedback setting
Patched in iOS 27 and iPadOS 27 & macOS Golden Gate 27 public beta & tvOS 27 public beta & watchOS 27 as CVE-2026-43664
I wonder how other 9 people found out about this one