Independent discovery & coordinated disclosure: CoreMedia bytestream XPC (mediaplaybackd) vended live file descriptors for protected paths to any sandboxed app on iOS 26.5–27.0.1. Fixed in iOS 27.2 as CVE-2026-112706. PoC + evidence.
Status: FIXED in iOS 27.2 / iPadOS 27.2 (and tvOS/visionOS/watchOS 27.2), released 2026-10-27. Affected (verified): iOS 26.5 (23F77), iOS 27.0 (24A437), iOS 27.0.1 (24A446).
This repository documents an independent discovery and coordinated disclosure of this issue.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-15 | Issue independently discovered and reported to Apple Product Security (report OE11044060567043). |
| 2026-10-27 | Apple ships the fix in iOS/iPadOS/tvOS/visionOS/watchOS 27.2 as CVE-2026-112706 ("An app may be able to access sensitive user data" — CoreMedia, "a permissions issue was addressed with additional restrictions"). |
| 2026-10-27 | Advisory credits the earlier report: Adriatik Raci, Rodolphe BRUNETTI (@eisw0lf) of Lupus Nova, Chris Bailey – Short Circuit. My report was confirmed as a duplicate of a previously known issue; per Apple policy the duplicate received no bounty and no advisory credit. |
| 2026-10-28 | Post-fix publication of this writeup and PoC for the record. |
I am publishing this because the advisory does not reflect my independent report, and the material here may be useful to researchers studying XPC/sandbox design flaws on Apple platforms. Nothing in this repository is zero-day: the issue is patched on all current releases. Do not test the PoC against devices you do not own.
Every iOS device exposes the launchd Mach service
com.apple.coremedia.mediaplaybackd.bytestream.xpc. A sandboxed third-party app —
no entitlements, no permission prompts, no usage-description keys — can connect to it
directly and obtain live file descriptors for files outside its sandbox, opened by
the mediaplaybackd daemon with its own credentials.
The chain:
.rp1 → .rp2 → .org) completes with status 0 for an unprivileged client.Curl create with a client-controlled path. The create message carries a
"CreationURL" dictionary with an absolute file:// path chosen by the client.
The daemon opens that path itself, never validating it against the requesting
client's sandbox container.ByteStreamDetails dictionary contains a
live FileDescriptor for the opened file. The app dups it and pread()s it —
descriptor-based I/O bypasses the client sandbox's path checks, so the full
content of the protected file lands in the app container.fdopendir/readdir enumeration of protected directories) and a file-existence
oracle (a real-but-forbidden path returns -12203, a nonexistent path -17913).Control evidence: in the same run, the app's own open() of the identical path
fails with errno 1 (EPERM). The daemon-vended fd returns every byte.
Incomplete mitigation in iOS 27.0: on iOS 26.5 the auxiliary opcodes read / fdsc
/ getL were also open; iOS 27.0 sealed those (-16158) but left the primary
fd-vending path inside the Curl create reply fully functional — verified end-to-end
on 27.0 and 27.0.1.
Readable domain (mapped on both versions, 27 targets probed): exactly the
media-library directory /private/var/mobile/Media/iTunes_Control/iTunes/
(database trio, PlayCounts.plist, VoiceMemos.plist, per-user ContentTaste plists,
IC-Info device files). User photos, messages, contacts, the TCC permission database,
keychain, Safari data, Health, Wallet passes and other apps' containers were all
refused with -12203. The write path was denied on both versions (-12878), so the
primitive is read/enumerate/oracle, not write.
All logs are from clean, stock (non-jailbroken) test devices. Unrelated third-party
tool residue in directory listings is replaced with [redacted].
| File | Device / OS | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
evidence/wave4_clean_16pro_result.txt | iOS 26.5 (23F77) | EPERM control, fd steal 749,568 + 2,175,392 B, read data channel, dir list (18), oracle |
evidence/wave4_ios270_result.txt | iOS 27.0 (24A437) | Curl OK, fd in ByteStreamDetails, steals 835,584 + 1,730,432 + 32,768 B, aux opcodes sealed -16158, dir list (13), oracle |
evidence/wave4_ios2701_result.txt | iOS 27.0.1 (24A446) | Re-run after update: Curl/fd path still live (835,584 + 1,862,272 B) — not fixed in 27.0.1 |
evidence/wave5_domain_map.txt | both | 27-target readable-domain map; only iTunes_Control/iTunes/ opens |
evidence/wave4_ab_matrix.md | both | One-page 26.5 vs 27.0 channel matrix |
The stolen database copies themselves are not published (test-device data); the PoC regenerates them on any affected device.
poc/ contains a minimal Xcode project (MConfPoC). To run:
YOUR_TEAM_ID placeholders).Documents/wave4_clean_result.txt plus the stolen .bin copies.xcrun devicectl device copy from --device <UDID> \
--source Documents/wave4_clean_result.txt --destination . \
--domain-type appDataContainer --domain-identifier <bundle-id>
Core chain (~390 lines of Swift): dlopen CoreMedia + dlsym the FigXPC helpers →
xpc_connection_create_mach_service → .rp1/.rp2/.org handshake →
FigXPCCreateBasicMessage('Curl') + FigXPCMessageSetCFURL("CreationURL") → reply
ByteStreamDetails.FileDescriptor → dup/fstat/pread.
Curl create, verify the requesting process (audit token / sandbox
ownership) and reject paths the client itself cannot open; never open
client-supplied absolute paths with daemon credentials.FileDescriptor embedded in the create reply as was
applied to the read/fdsc opcodes in iOS 27.0.Provided for educational and defensive research purposes only. The vulnerability is patched; running the PoC on current iOS will simply fail. The author is not responsible for misuse.