Find CA bundles in venvs, node_modules, wheels, jars, container images and binaries that still trust a revoked CA (eMudhra 2026, CVE-2026-111943) and the package to upgrade. Offline Rust CLI, SARIF output.
trustsweep scans venvs, node_modules, wheels, jars, container images and single-file binaries for bundled CA certificate stores (certifi, pip, Node, Bun, Deno, uv, Java cacerts, Alpine/Debian ca-certificates) that still trust a revoked CA, such as the October 2026 eMudhra intermediate CA compromise (CVE-2026-111943), and tells you which package to upgrade.
Patching the OS trust store does not reach the copies of the CA bundle that pip, Node, Bun, Deno, uv, Java and many SDKs ship themselves. Vulnerability scanners that work from an SBOM or lockfile only catch packages that have an advisory, such as certifi or webpki-roots. trustsweep reads the bytes instead. It finds PEM, DER, JKS, PKCS#12, escaped source literals and the bare root keys that webpki-roots compiles into Rust binaries, and matches them against Mozilla OneCRL, the CCADB list of roots Mozilla removed, and incident data. It runs offline as a single binary; container images can be pulled straight from a registry.
If grype, trivy or osv-scanner reported GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (PYSEC-2026-4320) for certifi, or RUSTSEC-2026-0381/0383 for webpki-roots, those cover the package itself. The copies vendored inside pip, grpcio and other wheels have no advisory, and that is what trustsweep adds. Note that the advisory lists certifi 2026.10.18 as fixed, but 2026.10.19 put emSign Root CA - C1, ECC Root CA - C3 and G1 back; upgrade to 2026.10.23 or later. Likewise webpki-roots 1.0.10 fixes the advisory but still has C1 and C3, which Mozilla removed; 1.0.11 has neither (how each fixed version was checked).
brew install majiayu000/tap/trustsweep # or: cargo install trustsweep
Or download a prebuilt binary (macOS arm64, macOS x86_64 or Linux x86_64) from Releases.
trustsweep image <ref> pulls directly from registries (Docker Hub, ghcr.io, gcr.io and other OCI Distribution registries) without a local docker. It picks the platform from multi-arch images (--platform), checks every manifest and layer against its sha256, and reads gzip and zstd layers. OCI layout directories and docker save tarballs still work, and --docker keeps the old route.trustsweep feed update rebuilds the whole revoked-CA feed from Mozilla OneCRL (1262 revoked intermediates), the CCADB report of roots Mozilla removed (106 unexpired roots) and incident data (eMudhra). This makes trustsweep useful beyond one incident.trustsweep brotlisweep checks embedded Brotli decoders for the CVE-2026-111497 fix in Mach-O (per universal slice), PE and ELF binaries, Electron, Bun, Node and Deno programs, and Python Brotli wheels (see below).xxd -i arrays), distroless status.d and RPM-distro bundle attribution./etc/ssl/cert.pem and can still accept these certificates until a later software update (Apple Support 149555).quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.7.3 still trusts all 7 chains through emSign ECC Root CA - G3 (keycloak/keycloak#54197).These are exactly the copies that an OS update does not reach and that trustsweep finds by content.
trustsweep scan .venv node_modules ~/.local/bin app.jar # files, directories, archives
trustsweep image python:3.12-alpine # pulled straight from the registry, no docker needed
trustsweep image ghcr.io/org/app:tag --platform linux/amd64
trustsweep image ./oci-layout-dir # or an OCI layout directory / `docker save` tarball
trustsweep scan . --format sarif -o trustsweep.sarif # GitHub Code Scanning
trustsweep feed update # rebuild the feed from Mozilla OneCRL, CCADB and incident data
Exit code 1 means a live CA bundle still trusts a revoked CA. Exit code 2 means the scan was incomplete or failed. Exit code 0 means neither.
trustsweep brotlisweep looks for copies of the Brotli decoder affected by CVE-2026-111497 ("Node2Shell" / "HTTP2Shell") that are bundled inside Mach-O (including each slice of a universal binary), PE and ELF files, Electron frameworks, Bun/Node/Deno single-file programs, and Python Brotli/brotlicffi wheels.
trustsweep brotlisweep /Applications ~/.bun/bin ~/.local/bin .venv
trustsweep brotlisweep --image node:22 --format sarif -o brotli.sarif
Each decoder copy gets one of three results:
ERROR_FORMAT_BLOCK_SWITCH, the error code added by the fix google/brotli@0ed4268a, is compiled in. This is string evidence, not a code-level proof.For a Python Brotli package, it also lists any urllib3, requests, httpx or aiohttp installed next to it. These clients send Accept-Encoding: br whenever brotli or brotlicffi can be imported, which makes the decoder reachable from ordinary HTTP requests.
On Linux and in containers, also run trailofbits/brotli-checker. It matches the decoder's compiled code in ELF binaries across 12 architecture targets (x86-64, AArch64, RISC-V64, MIPS and more) and checks source fingerprints, which is much stronger evidence than a string. Its documentation says PE and Mach-O are not classified, and that is the gap brotlisweep covers.
Real run on a Mac (examples/brotlisweep-macos.txt): 25 decoders. 7 were UNFIXED (bun 1.3.14, node 22.15.0, a single-file CLI with embedded Bun 1.4.3, a Node 22.14.0 helper inside a Chromium-based browser, three cached Brotli 1.1.0/1.2.0 wheels), 12 UNKNOWN (five Electron 33–39 apps, Deno 2.9.7, the browser's own framework) and 6 FIXED (five Electron 42+ apps and one Chromium-based framework). App names in the example are replaced with ExampleApp01–14.
trustsweep image python:3.12-alpine (sha256:4c47124a8391…, 2026-10-22):