
Turkish advisory for CVE-2026-86595: authenticated blind SQL injection via the grdMainSORT_ID ORDER BY parameter in Iron Mountain enVision EBYS, with impact analysis and mitigations.
enVision EBYS is an ASP.NET WebForms-based Electronic Document Management System (EBYS) product used by public institutions, universities, and the private sector in Turkey to carry out official correspondence, document management, workflow, and electronic signature processes. The product is developed and distributed by IRON MOUNTAIN ARŞİVLEME HİZMETLERİ A.Ş. (the product codebase uses the CBK.enVision namespace).
In the product's document listing/detailed search screen, the sort column parameter received from the client is concatenated directly into the ORDER BY clause of the SQL query without passing through any whitelist validation and without using a parameterized query.
This allows the lowest-privileged user with any valid account in the system — without any administrative privileges — to alter the database query and read the entire database through blind boolean-based inference. Because the account the application uses to connect to the database has the db_owner role on the database, the impact is not limited to reading; writing and deleting also become possible.
The vulnerability was independently verified three times across three separate sessions in an institutional installation during an authorized penetration test conducted between 31.08.2026 – 04.09.2026. During this period, although the installation's application components were updated (the embedded Telerik UI component version changed from 2023.3.1010.45 → 2025.2.609.462), the vulnerability remained open; this shows that the issue is not a component/dependency vulnerability but a vendor-level vulnerability originating from the product's own application code.
Any user who can log in to the system (civil servant, academic, intern, contracted personnel — regardless of role distinction) can alter the query logic with a single HTTP request and, through a verified inference oracle, perform the following:
db_owner role and holds all of the CONTROL, SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE permissions on the database. Accordingly, an attacker can modify official document records, insert forged documents, or delete records. In an EBYS product, this means the falsification of records that are legally evidentiary in nature.LOG/AUDIT in the schema was verified. Since these tables are also writable with db_owner privileges, an attacker can erase their own traces; the reliability of incident response and forensic investigation is eliminated.Limiting factor (honesty note): The database account is not sysadmin and does not have permission to execute on xp_cmdshell; no linked server is defined. Therefore, escalation from this vulnerability to operating-system-level code execution in a single step could not be demonstrated. The impact is full confidentiality and full integrity loss within the database boundary.
Exploiting the vulnerability does not require a special tool, a privileged account, or user interaction.
The vulnerable endpoint is the search submission of the document listing and detailed search screen:
POST /enVision/DocumentModule/DOC_Documents.aspx?value=<kodlanmış sayfa parametreleri> HTTP/1.1
Host: <kurum-ebys-adresi>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=<oturum>; envision.AUTH=<oturum>
__EVENTTARGET=<arama düğmesi>&...&grdMainSORT_ID=<SIRALAMA SÜTUNU>&...
The grdMainSORT_ID field in the request body specifies which column the result grid is sorted by, and it is added to the ORDER BY clause of the server-side generated query via direct string concatenation. Since the ORDER BY context is a context that cannot be bound with a parameterized query, this field should have been subject to a whitelist against only known column names/indices; the product does not do this.
The presence of the injection has been proven at the fingerprint level through the field's behavioral differences:
| Submitted value | Server behavior | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Valid column index | Search works, result grid is returned | Baseline behavior |
| Subquery returning a value | Search works, result grid is returned | The field is interpreted as SQL |
| Invalid/string value | Generic error message | Query does not compile |
| Value containing a sort direction suffix | Generic error message | Indicates the code also appends a direction to the end of the expression |
When an expression that produces a runtime error depending on a condition is used, the server produces two stable and clearly distinguishable responses:
Since the difference between these two states is stable, a reliable oracle is formed for blind boolean-based inference. (Note: since the response size changes during the session, the classification must be made based on the presence of the error message block, not on a fixed byte threshold; this is a methodology note for the tester.)
Using this oracle, the following information has been verified through true/false matching of known values (without character-by-character inference):
| Verified information | Value |
|---|---|
| Database management system | Microsoft SQL Server 2017 (14.0.1000.169) |
| Patch level | RTM — no CU/GDR applied |
| Edition | Standard Edition (64-bit) |
| Database name | The application's product database |
| Connecting account | Application-specific account (not sa) |
| Database role | db_owner (member) |
| Server roles | sysadmin, dbcreator, securityadmin — not a member |
| Number of user tables | Over 100 |
For each verification, both positive and negative controls were queried separately, and expressions returning NULL were eliminated to prevent false positives. In addition, queries for a wrong server name, wrong database name, and wrong role membership produced the expected "false" response, confirming the validity of the oracle through negative controls.
The vulnerability can be triggered in the same way in both the synchronous postback and asynchronous (AJAX/delta) postback flows; that is, it is not possible to close the issue by blocking a single client-side flow.
The vulnerability is exclusively in the sort column parameter. However, since it is highly likely that the list/grid screens in the product's other modules use the same shared sorting code path, the fix should not be limited to a single page.