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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-116244

CVE-2026-116244

Containerized lab and stdlib-only PoC for CVE-2026-116244: pgAdmin 4 server mode leaks its service account's Kerberos credentials to GSSAPI PostgreSQL, enabling passwordless privilege escalation.

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CVE-2026-116244 — pgAdmin 4 service-account Kerberos credential leak

CVECVE-2026-116244
ProductpgAdmin 4 (server mode)
Affected≤ v9.18
Fixedv9.19 (2026-10-29), issue #10655
ClassAmbient credential confusion / authentication bypass (CWE-668-ish)
PreconditionspgAdmin runs in server mode; the OS account running pgAdmin has Kerberos credentials reachable through the default credential cache (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>) or the default/client keytab — exactly what happens when pgAdmin's host has been kinit-ed for the service account or uses a client keytab; attacker needs any pgAdmin web account (internal auth, no Kerberos); a PostgreSQL server reachable from the pgAdmin host that authenticates with GSSAPI (and maps the service principal to a privileged role — e.g. the pgAdmin service principal is also a DB superuser/owner).
ImpactA low-privilege web user makes pgAdmin's libpq answer the database's GSSAPI challenge as the pgAdmin service account's principal, inheriting every privilege that principal has on that server. No password, no Kerberos login, one unauthenticated-to-DB click path.

Root cause

For every server connection made on behalf of a web user, pgAdmin (≤ 9.18) temporarily "isolates" Kerberos state in web/pgadmin/utils/locker.py:

if source == KERBEROS and 'KRB5CCNAME' in session and self.is_kerberos_conn:
    environ['KRB5CCNAME'] = session['KRB5CCNAME']   # user's delegated ticket
else:
    environ.pop('KRB5CCNAME', None)                 # <-- the bug

Removing KRB5CCNAME does not remove Kerberos: libpq still answers a server's AuthenticationGSS request, and the Kerberos library then falls back to the default credential cache of the OS account running pgAdmin (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>) — or acquires one from the account's default client keytab (~/client.keytab, KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME). Whatever TGT the service account holds is used for the GSS exchange, so the web user authenticates as the service principal (e.g. pgadminsvc@REALM), and PostgreSQL's pg_ident mapping then logs them into the privileged role that principal maps to.

The connect itself is psycopg.Connection.connect(...) inside the locker (web/pgadmin/utils/driver/psycopg3/connection.py), so the credentials leak through pgAdmin's own driver path — and equally through psql/pg_dump, which inherit the same environment.

Fix (v9.19)

locker.py now points the environment at a cache/keytab that can never exist and additionally hard-stops the GSS negotiation at the libpq level:

NO_KERBEROS_CREDENTIALS = {
    'KRB5CCNAME': 'FILE:' + NO_CLIENT_FILE,        # inside the app dir, never creatable
    'KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME': 'FILE:' + NO_CLIENT_FILE,
}
# plus, for every connection that may not use Kerberos:
#   gssencmode=disable
#   require_auth=!gss,!sspi     (libpq >= 16; blocks SSPI on Windows and gssproxy)
# a server whose require_auth allows only gss/sspi is refused outright.

A user who actually logged in to pgAdmin with Kerberos still gets their own delegated KRB5CCNAME, but only for servers with Kerberos authentication enabled.

The lab (fully containerized)

┌────────────┐   UDP/TCP 88    ┌───────────────────┐
│    kdc     │◄───────────────►│  db (postgres:17) │  pg_hba: host gss only
│ MIT realm  │                 │  alias db.lab.test│  map: pgadminsvc→pgadminsvc
│ LAB.TEST   │                 │  secrets.payroll  │  (privileged role owns it)
└─────┬──────┘                 └─────────▲─────────┘
      │ ktadd/ccache export (bind mount)│ GSSAPI 5432
      │                                 │
┌─────▼──────────────────┐   ┌──────────┴──────────┐
│ pgadmin-vuln  :9.18    │   │ pgadmin-fixed :9.19 │
│ dpage/pgadmin4:9.18    │   │ dpage/pgadmin4:9.19 │
│ uid 5050 +             │   │ same service-       │
│ /tmp/krb5cc_5050       │   │ account ccache …    │
└────────────────────────┘   └─────────────────────┘
        ▲ HTTP 50918 / 50919                HTTP 50919
        └─────────────── poc.py (attacker = ordinary web user)
  • kdc — MIT Kerberos realm LAB.TEST; exports the PG service keytab and a TGT ccache for [email protected] which lands exactly at the default ccache path (/tmp/krb5cc_5050) of pgAdmin's service account (uid 5050) in both pgAdmin containers. No KRB5CCNAME is exported to the pgAdmin process — that ambient default cache is precisely the credential the CVE leaks.
  • db — PostgreSQL 17 where GSSAPI is the only remote auth method (host all all 0.0.0.0/0 gss include_realm=0 map=gssmap), with pgadminsvc owning a secrets.payroll table and alice a harmless role. The attacker's web login maps to no PostgreSQL role at all.
  • pgadmin-vuln / pgadmin-fixed — official dpage/pgadmin4 images 9.18 and 9.19 in server mode; a non-administrator [email protected] is created on both.

Everything runs with CPU/memory caps (--cpus 2 --memory 4g, verified via NanoCpus after create) on a single docker network.

Exploit chain (what poc.py does)

  1. POST /authenticate/login as the ordinary internal user (CSRF dance via /login page props + /browser/js/utils.js token).
  2. POST /browser/server/obj/1/ — register server db.lab.test:5432 with username=pgadminsvc, no password, kerberos_conn=true (this flag also skips the "password required" prompt — the GSS path is taken either way).
  3. POST /browser/server/connect/1/<sid> — pgAdmin 9.18 answers the GSS challenge with the service account's default ccache: connection authorized: user=pgadminsvc … [email protected].
  4. Query Tool API (/sqleditor/initialize/… + /query_tool/start + /poll): SELECT current_user → pgadminsvc, then SELECT * FROM secrets.payroll → the privileged data.

On 9.19 the same chain dies at step 3 with authentication method requirement "!gss,!sspi" failed: server requested GSSAPI authentication even though the ambient ccache is still mounted — proving the fix is what blocks it.

Usage

./lab.sh up                       # build + start kdc, db, pgadmin 9.18 & 9.19
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:50918   # → VULNERABLE, exit 0
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:50919   # → NOT VULNERABLE, exit 1
./lab.sh teardown

poc.py is stdlib-only. Against a real deployment, point --url at pgAdmin and --target-* at any GSSAPI-authenticating PostgreSQL server it can reach. The PoC also runs fully containerized: docker run --rm --network cve116244net -v "$PWD/poc.py":/poc.py:ro python:3.13-slim python3 /poc.py --url http://cve116244-pgadmin-vuln.

Variant notes: the trigger exercised here is the default FILE ccache holding the service account's TGT — the reliable Linux reproducer. The advisory's client-keytab fallback does not fire in libpq's gss_init_sec_context path on stock MIT krb5 (tested with ~/client.keytab, KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME, and a DIR: collection ccache); that variant, like SSPI on Windows and gssproxy, depends on the platform credential machinery — all covered by the same 9.19 fix. Setting kerberos_conn=false and sending a dummy password reaches the same vulnerable path (the locker pops KRB5CCNAME regardless of the flag).

Sample output (vulnerable instance)

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